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Abstract
This study examined the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to 
academic culture. Defined here as presidents who come from non-academic 
backgrounds, such as government, business, or the military, this paper used a case study 
design and pragmatist approach to analyze the experiences of three such individuals, Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia University (1948-1953), former North Carolina Gov. 
Terry Sanford at Duke University (1969-1985), and former U.S. Sen. Paul S. Trible at 
Christopher Newport University (1996-present). A combination of historical research 
and interview formats were utilized to learn about the experiences that Eisenhower, 
Sanford, and Trible had in adjusting to academic culture at their respective universities. 
This study found that Eisenhower had a very difficult adjustment experience while 
Sanford and Trible were more successful in adapting to academic culture. This study 
concluded that for non-traditional presidents, vision, adaptability, commitment to 
institution, and prior academic exposure were key issues in facilitating a successful 
adjustment experience to academic culture.
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction
As American higher education advances into the 21st century, the college 
presidency is undergoing a rapid and significant evolution. Once the reserve of career 
academics, dwindling government funding and increased competition for private support 
are prompting hiring boards at college and universities to seek out individuals who are 
adept at fundraising as well as friend-raising (Howard, 2007; Tromble, 1998). To find 
such leaders, higher education institutions are appointing their presidents increasingly 
from professional sectors outside of the academy, including the business, military, and 
government realms (The American College President, 2012; Basinger, 2002; Fischer, 
2005, Greenberg, 1998; Trachtenberg, Kauvar, & Bogue, 2013; Will, 2003).
Often referred to as non-traditional presidents, these new types of leaders were 
defined for the purposes of this study as college presidents with little to no prior 
professional experience in higher education. Over the past 28 years, these non-traditional 
college presidents have become more common across all institutions, increasing in 
representation in higher education from 10.1% in 1986 to 20.3% in 2011 (The American 
College President, 2012). The number of presidents with experience outside of academe 
across various four-year institutions, which are the focus o f this study, is also compelling. 
For instance, in 2011 non-traditional presidents comprised 15% of all doctorate-granting 
institution presidents, 15.5% of master’s institution presidents, as well as 25.7% of 
baccalaureate institution presidents (The American College President, 2012). However, 
despite their growing presence, little scholarly research has been done to analyze their 
efficacy as educational leaders. To date, the majority o f writing on non-traditional 
presidents has been solely in the form of editorial commentary (Cotnam, 2006). Further,
1
little is known about how these non-traditional presidents perceive, respond to, and adapt 
to academic culture.
Statement of the Problem
Based on existing scholarly literature, there are distinct differences between 
academic and non-academic cultures. Scholars portray non-academic cultures 
(particularly business culture) as profit driven and being focused on the bottom line 
(Hofstede, Van Deusen, Mueller, & Charles, 2002). Conversely, academic culture 
prioritizes notions of academic freedom, collegiality, and collective decision-making 
(Rosovsky, 1990). Further, while scholars have generally portrayed non-academic 
cultures as highly organized and goal-oriented, others have described academic culture as 
an organized anarchy with highly ambiguous goals (Cohen & March, 1974; Lane, 1985; 
Pfeffer, 1997). While there has been a recent neo-liberal push for higher education to 
adopt more business-like practices, the traditional foundations of academic culture have 
remained sound (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
These differences in cultures are significant and carry important implications for 
non-traditional college presidents, since most will be unfamiliar with academic culture 
upon assuming their posts. Recent higher education history is full o f highly publicized 
examples o f non-traditional college presidents (Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia 
University, former U.S. Sen. Robert “Bob” Kerrey at New York’s New School, etc.) who 
had serious difficulties making the adjustment to academic life. Their problems ranged 
from disputes with faculty leaders to trouble adjusting to the collective decision-making 
process found in many areas o f higher education. However, there are other examples of 
non-traditional presidents who made the cultural transition with little or no trouble.
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Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the potential for this clash of cultures is increasing 
as the number of non-traditional presidents in American higher education is rising 
gradually. For instance, the September 2014 appointment of veteran Florida state 
legislator John E. Thrasher as president of Florida State University was met with 
considerable protest from students and faculty, who had favored more traditional 
academic candidates (Schmidt, 2014). Dismissing the selection process as being tainted 
with political favoritism, the faculty senate had even passed a resolution for Thrasher not 
to be appointed, claiming that “he lacked the stated qualifications required for the 
position” (Schmidt, 2014, p. 2). However, several board of trustee members countered 
that with Thrasher’s immense political network, he was uniquely positioned to raise 
funds for the university and increase its national reputation (Schmidt, 2014). Ultimately, 
this episode at Florida State University may foreshadow a clash between academic and 
non-academic cultures that could become even more acute in the future.
According to the American Council on Education’s (ACE) 1986 Report on the 
College Presidency, about 10.1% of all (four-year and two-year) college presidents came 
from outside o f higher education. Redden (2008) noted that after reaching 14.7% in 
2001, the numbers slipped back to 13.1 % by 2006. However, by 2011 the number had 
grown significantly to over 20% of the overall presidential population for four-year 
college presidents -  the object of this study -  and roughly 17% for two-year college 
presidents (The American College President, 2012). More specifically, private colleges 
have traditionally hired a larger number of their presidents from outside academe (Song 
& Hartley, 2012; The American College President, 2012). According to ACE’s The 
American College President (2007), the percentage of non-traditional presidents serving
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at private institutions (18.9%) in 2006 was over double the number of non-traditional 
presidents serving at public institutions (7.3%). By 2011, the percentage of non- 
traditional presidents serving at private institutions had grown to 27.6%, while the 
percentage of non-traditional presidents at public institutions was 13.9% {The American 
College President, 2012). Interestingly, the hiring gap between private and public 
institutions increased incrementally between 2006 (11.6%) and 2011 (13.7%).
Purpose of Study
As the ranks of non-traditional presidents are growing steadily in American 
higher education, it is imperative that greater scholarly attention is placed upon them. 
More specifically, focused research is needed to determine what issues they face in 
adjusting to academic life. As the rising number of non-traditional presidents is 
beginning to generate significant potential for a culture clash between the worlds of 
academic and non-academic culture, this issue needs to be studied in order to provide 
current and future non-traditional presidents the information they need to succeed in 
office. The alternative would be to just stand by and watch several of these presidents 
possibly fail, such as when former U.S. Sen. Robert “Bob” Kerrey and former U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers suffered faculty no-confidence votes during their 
presidential tenures at the New School and at Harvard, respectively (Santora & Foderaro, 
2008). However, such a strategy would be counterproductive to the nation’s educational 
interests. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the issues that non- 
traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what 
lessons could be learned to inform future practice.
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Methods Summary
Employing a qualitative research methodology and case study format, data were 
obtained by studying three non-traditional presidents and the experiences they had in 
adjusting to academic culture. These presidents included Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
who served as president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953, former North 
Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, who served as president of Duke University from 1969 
to 1985, and former U.S. Sen. Paul S. Trible, who has served as president o f Christopher 
Newport University (CNU) since 1996. Collectively, these individuals are among the 
highest profile non-traditional academic leaders who have served as college presidents in 
the United States. Moreover, they each experienced unique adjustment processes to 
academic life in different historical, cultural, and organizational contexts that merit closer 
study. Data were collected by a combination of qualitative approaches, including 
archival research, content analysis, and interviews.
Research Paradigm
The research paradigm that served as a foundation for this research was 
pragmatism (Biesta & Burbules, 2004; Creswell, 2012). Individuals holding this 
worldview “focus on the outcomes of the research -  the actions, situations, and 
consequences o f inquiry -  rather than antecedent conditions” (Creswell, 2012, p. 22). 
Further, there is a focus on the practical implications of research as well as a concern for 
applications and solutions to problems (Creswell, 2012). Thus, instead o f focusing on 
methods, pragmatists examine the problem being studied as well as the questions asked 
about the problem (Creswell, 2012). Considered by many to be the only uniquely 
American philosophy, pragmatism, according to Schwandt (2001), had its roots in the
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work ofWilliam James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839-1914).
Though there are many versions of pragmatism, the philosophy generally “views 
knowledge as an instrument or tool for organizing experience, and it is deeply concerned 
with the union of theory and practice” (Schwandt, 2001, p. 204). This study fit within the 
realm of pragmatism because it endeavored to draw practical lessons about the issues that 
non-traditional presidents face in adjusting to academic culture from the experiences of 
three modem non-traditional presidents. Ultimately, this research is intended for use as a 
resource for new non-traditional presidents as they begin the process o f learning about 
and/or adapting to academic culture. It would also be a vital resource for those involved 
in the selection of non-traditional presidents, including board of trustee members and 
other academic leaders. By examining this study, they would have a more complete 
understanding of the academic culture as well as the possible issues (both positive and 
negative) that non-traditional presidents face in acclimating to it. In following the 
pragmatist philosophical tradition, this study focused primarily on outcomes -  namely 
how it could help new non-traditional presidents adapt to academic culture.
Research Questions Investigated
The research questions that were addressed in this study included:
1. What perceptions do non-traditional presidents have of academic culture?
A) How do those perceptions help them in adjusting to academic culture?
B) How do those perceptions hinder them in adjusting to academic culture?
2. How do non-traditional presidents adjust to academic culture?
A) What are (if any) the key issues that non-traditional presidents face in
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adjusting to academic culture?
B) How have some non-traditional presidents been able to adjust to 
academic culture successfully while others could not?
Significance of the Study
Understanding more about the issues that non-traditional college presidents face 
in adjusting to academic life is significant for several reasons. On a personal level, this 
study serves as important exploratory research to provide a strong foundation for my 
future research in this area. On a broader level, this study is also significant because it 
addresses a key leadership challenge that many new non-traditional college presidents 
face -  what are the issues involved in adjusting to academic culture and how can that 
adjustment best be achieved? Further, to what extent are these adjustment experiences 
influenced by institutional type? As rising numbers of leaders with non-academic 
backgrounds are appointed to college presidencies, research in these areas will be an 
important resource for those who need to make that transition successfully.
Moreover, whatever academics think of these non-traditional college leaders, they 
are becoming a more common presence at higher education institutions across the United 
States. As the higher education community looks increasingly to this type of leader for 
leadership, it is imperative that non-traditional presidents are studied more closely in 
order to help prevent possible adjustment problems and to help facilitate success. Thus, 
the findings from this study could help inform practice for new non-traditional presidents 
in the future. For instance, exposing such presidents to this information in leadership 
development programs could possibly enable them to avoid some of the mistakes made 
by their predecessors. These findings would also be useful for hiring boards, giving them
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a more sophisticated understanding about non-traditional presidents and the adjustment 
issues that they face upon entering office.
Theoretical Perspective
The theoretical perspective for this study was rooted in two distinct strains of 
leadership theory. In recent years, several scholars have studied the leadership process 
within academic settings (Boyett, 1996; Gregory, 1996; Neumann & Neumann, 1999; 
Pounder, 2001; Ramsden, 1998; Randall & Coakley, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2003). 
Within the broad realm of leadership theories, two specific theoretical approaches -  
adaptive leadership and change leadership -  are most applicable to how non-traditional 
presidents may lead while adjusting to academic culture. Heifetz (1994) pioneered the 
research on adaptive leadership, basing it on the premise that leadership is more of a 
process rather than individual personal capabilities (Heifetz, Kama, & Kramer, 2004; 
Randall & Coakley, 2007). According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “this process 
requires people to focus on the specific problems at hand and to modify the way they 
have worked in the past” (p. 327). In his model of adaptive leadership, Heifetz (1994) 
focused it on the process and not the person, and the model employed the knowledge of 
all who have a vested interest in moving the organization to the next level (Randall & 
Coakley, 2007).
Along with Ronald Heifetz, other scholars have studied how leaders lead most 
effectively in a culture o f change, often referring to the concept as change leadership 
(Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Fullan, 2001; Goleman, 2000; Hamel, 2000; Koteen, 1991; Kotter, 1996). Heifetz (1994) 
argued that people must re-conceptualize their philosophy of leadership, framing it as the
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mobilization of people to solve tough problems instead of merely looking for a heroic 
figure to save them. Thus, this study utilized both adaptive leadership and change 
leadership as a theoretical lens to explore the extent to which Presidents Eisenhower, 
Sanford, and Trible were able to adjust to academic culture.
Definition of Key Terms
The following key terms were used in this study:
- Academic Culture: an institution in which values such as objectivity, academic 
freedom, and respect for students and human subjects guide academic behavior, 
and are therefore reflected in the language, symbols, and ceremonies of academic 
life (Clark, 1983; Dill, 2012).
College President: a generic term for the chief executive officer o f a college or 
university. Other titles may include university president or chancellor (Cotnam, 
2006).
- Non-Traditional College President: A college or university president who meets 
one or more o f the following conditions (Cotnam, 2006):
1) Lacking an academic doctoral degree (Ph.D. or Ed.D)
2) Holding an immediate prior position outside of higher education
3) Having no faculty experience (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001)
Summary
Due to the increasing demands and complexities inherent in the modem college 
presidency, more and more hiring boards are looking to executives from outside the 
realm of higher education to provide leadership. This has been driven in part by the rise 
of neoliberalism in higher education since the mid-twentieth century (Slaughter &
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Rhoades, 2004). Based on a philosophy of generating wealth and building a free market, 
neoliberalism within the higher education context involves transitioning colleges and 
universities toward privatization and commercialization (Brentnall, 2013). This vision 
has also been used as a rationale for the withdrawal o f state funding from public 
universities, prompting them to adopt neoliberal practices only used previously by their 
private institutional peers (Fish, 2009). However, critics o f neoliberalism contend that 
such short-term, profit-driven approaches rob the academy of its fundamental mission 
and consequently short-change its students (Giroux, 2014).
Within this neoliberal paradigm, recent history has shown that non-traditional 
college presidents can often provide the fundraising and friend-raising prowess that many 
revenue-starved institutions are currently seeking (Bomstein, 2011). However, little 
empirical research has been done to analyze this new type of president to which colleges 
and universities are looking increasingly for leadership. Chapter 1 outlined the statement 
of the problem and the means by which this study will explore the issues that non- 
traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture. To provide the 
necessary context for this study, the next chapter will provide a thorough literature review 
that explores the applicable scholarship in the evolution of the college presidency, the 
demands on modem presidents, the dynamics of academic culture, as well as the 
processes of adaptive and change leadership. This section will provide the appropriate 
contextual background to examine the methodology for this study, which will be outlined 
in Chapter 3. Each presidency will then be reviewed in individual chapters, followed by 
a findings chapter that also examines implications for future research.
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Chapter 2 -  Literature Review
As discussed in Chapter 1, the college presidency is undergoing a significant 
change in response to increased organizational complexity and increased demands for 
fundraising as well as friend-raising prowess (Howard, 2007; Tromble, 1998). Thus, 
higher education institutions are appointing more regularly their presidents from 
professional sectors outside of the academy, including the business, military, and 
government realms (Basinger, 2002; Fischer, 2005, Greenberg, 1998; Will, 2003). Often 
referred to as non-traditional presidents, they were defined for the purposes o f this study 
as college presidents with little to no prior professional experience in higher education.
While these non-traditional college presidents are becoming more common across 
the higher education landscape, little scholarly research has been done on them to analyze 
their impact on higher education. To date, the majority of writing on non-traditional 
presidents has been solely in the form of editorial commentary (Applebome, 1995; 
Basinger, 2002; Cotnam, 2006; Fischer, 2005; Greenberg, 1998; Mead-Fox, 2009; 
Redden, 2008). Further, little is known about how these non-traditional presidents 
perceive, respond to, and adapt to academic culture. Therefore, the purpose of this study 
was to explore the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to 
academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned to inform future practice.
This literature review explores existing scholarly and anecdotal literature on non- 
traditional presidents and the issues they face in adjusting to academic culture. Further, it 
examines existing research attempting to define academic culture and how it compares 
and contrasts with other forms of organizational culture. Further, this literature review
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explores research on the leadership approaches that presidents often use to engage with 
their academic community - namely adaptive and change leadership.
Overview of Literature Review
The following literature review examines the existing scholarship that pertains to 
non-traditional presidents. It includes some of the aforementioned media coverage and 
statistical reports, along with scholarly research on the college presidency that focus at 
least in part on non-traditional presidents. There is also a section on academic culture, 
which has received far more attention in the scholarly literature than non-traditional 
presidents. This literature review includes references to research that attempt to define 
academic culture as well as studies on how it compares and contrasts with other types of 
organizational culture. Further, there is a section on adaptive and change leadership, 
which provides a framework for what approaches non-traditional presidents may use in 
adjusting to academic life. However, it is useful to begin this study with applicable 
research on the evolution of the college presidency and how non-traditional presidents 
have figured into that process, specifically in modem times.
The Evolution of the College Presidency
Several scholars have explored the evolution of the college presidency over the 
last two to three centuries (Bomstein, 2003; Kauffman, 1980; Nelson, 2009; Rudolph, 
1990). From the colonial era through the mid-20th century, the college presidency was 
largely the reserve of academics (Kauffman, 1980). In the 18th and 19th centuries, 
presidents would often serve as professors and continue teaching while performing their 
administrative duties (Bomstein, 2003; Rudolph, 1990). As higher education evolved in 
the 20th century, a career track began to take a more focused shape. According to Cohen
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and March (1974), those aspiring to the presidency would begin their careers as faculty 
members, and earn successive promotions to department chair, dean, and finally provost 
or academic vice president. However, further research suggested that this career ladder 
was a bit too simplistic; arguing that most presidents did not advance through the ranks in 
that particular order, and had even skipped certain steps on occasion (Moore, Salimbene, 
Marlier, & Bragg, 1983). Nevertheless, the predominant path to the presidency during 
this period remained an academic one -  requiring aspirants to hold a series of faculty and 
or administrative positions before making the jump to a presidency (Bimbaum & 
Umbach, 2001; Wessel & Keim, 1994). This pattern has continued to the present day, 
with roughly 80% of all college presidents coming from traditional academic 
backgrounds {The American College President, 2012).
Consequently, college presidents with academic backgrounds remained the norm 
throughout the so-called “Golden Age” of higher education (spanning from roughly 1945 
to 1970). However, as the twentieth century progressed the recruiting and hiring pattern 
began to gradually shift, as the demands on the college president began to change (Cook, 
1997). As Whetten and Cameron (1985) argued:
For at least two decades after World War II, higher education 
administrators had a relatively easy job. By traditional standards, 
administrative effectiveness was almost universal. Enrollments were 
increasing, revenues were growing... and almost unprecedented prestige 
was associated with college professors and administrators in the eyes of 
the public... All o f that changed in the 1970s and was magnified in the 
1980s: the availability of funds was severely curtailed; the legitimacy and
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usefulness of college degrees called into question... the public prestige 
associated with faculty and administrator status plummeted along with 
their relative earnings, (p. 35)
According to Keller (1983), for these and other reasons, the postwar higher 
education boom had begun to fizzle by the mid-1970s. Further, beginning in the mid- 
1960s' larger numbers of students, driven by population growth and a growing middle 
class, began attending college (Bomstein, 2003). This growth prompted an expansion in 
educational infrastructure as well as in the numbers of faculty, but also in the 
administrative staff necessary to manage the more complex organization. Thus, 
institutional administrative structures gradually became more elaborate, and the 
presidency became more bureaucratic and managerial in nature. All of this was also 
happening in a time when financial resources were increasingly scarce. A 1996 
commission established by the Association of Governing Boards described the modem 
academic president as “juggler-in-chief, expected to meet an endless stream of individual 
needs and special demands within and outside the institution” (Renewing the Academic 
Presidency, 1996, pp. 9-10). Along the same lines, Asghar (2013) argued that the 
modem college presidency is probably the most demanding leadership job possible.
Along with growing institutional complexity, the job requirements for academic 
presidents began to change in the 1970s. Gone were the days when a broad array of 
academics could assume college presidencies. Instead, the job was beginning to require 
individuals with specialized skills. For example, state funding for many public 
institutions began to decline in the 1990s, prompting these colleges to look toward private 
sources for financial support (Bomstein, 2003; St. John & Parsons, 2005). This
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development caused many governing boards to look favorably upon presidential 
candidates with experience in fundraising and networking, skills that many career 
academicians do not possess. As Bomstein (2003) noted, the Council for the 
Advancement and Support Education (CASE) documented an increase in the number of 
college presidents with backgrounds in advancement from 25 to 167 between their 1982 
and 1997 surveys. As Applebome (1995) explained:
It’s not that corporate tycoons and professional managers are displacing 
classicists and zoologists en masse as university presidents. But 
increasingly, as the demands on university presidents center on raising 
money, restructuring and political savvy rather than traditional academic 
pursuits, universities are considering less traditional candidates for the 
pressure cooker job of university president, (p. 1)
Consequently, the college presidency is no longer exclusively the reserve of career 
academics, and non-traditional presidents are slowly but surely becoming more common. 
As Nelson (2009) noted, “of course, college presidents are educators. But the reality is 
that presidents do not as actively play and are not as forced by nature of their office to 
serve the role of educator as was once the case” (p. 70). This trend can also be explained 
by examining the evolving responsibilities of modem college presidents, which are 
increasingly calling for skills in fundraising and friend-raising that career academics do 
not always possess.
Evolving responsibilities of the college president. In addition to researching the 
evolution of the college presidency in general, higher education scholars have begun 
studying the evolution of responsibilities for presidents. This area of research is
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important as it shapes what qualities hiring boards will look for in presidential applicants. 
For instance, hiring boards have a modem tendency to hire people who are like them, 
typically possessing non-academic professional backgrounds such as business and 
government (Glazer-Raymo, 2001). Thus, with the increasing complexities of the 
modem college presidency, it only reinforces the notion among hiring boards to hire 
people who have the necessary and expanded skill set to handle the job. Increasingly, job 
requirements tap skills in fund development, entrepreneurial development, and 
partnership creation.
As Bimbaum (1988) wrote, “the days of amateur administration when faculty 
temporarily assumed administrative positions and then returned to the classrooms are 
long since over at most institutions” (pp. 6-7). Based on this assumption that business- 
oriented hiring boards want leaders who can focus on the bottom line, Bimbaum (1988) 
further noted that as colleges and universities become more complex, specialized 
knowledge in such areas as federal regulations, higher education law, organizational 
management, and student development theory are required of administrators to pursue 
their work effectively. In a similar vein, Esterberg and Wooding (2012) noted that 
modem presidents have the “fundamental responsibility o f setting the direction for the 
campus, seeking sources o f funds, and making the budget work” (p. 27). Consequently, 
presidents across all four-year institutional types reported in 2011 that fundraising and 
budgetary/financial management, and not academics, consumed most of their time (The 
American College President, 2012).
Several scholars have supported this view, stressing that the academic presidency 
has become more complex than ever before (Bomstein, 2003; Kerr, 1991; Neumann,
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1989; Silber, 1989). Neumann (1989) found that presidential strategy has become more 
complex over the years and that it now focuses more on shaping organizational members’ 
perceptions and attitudes. Further, she concluded that changes in presidential strategy 
may result from changes in the environment or in the presidents themselves as they learn 
the job (Neumann, 1989). However, the study was limited by a small sample size and did 
not highlight non-traditional college presidents.
Bomstein (2003) argued that the presidency is made more difficult because of 
increasing public and media scrutiny. In a similar vein, Kovala (2014) asserted that 
college presidents must now engage in the “everlasting interview” (p. 1), where they are 
constantly held accountable to their institutions’ students, faculty members, 
administration, and community. Kerr (1991) concluded that modem college presidents 
are more like political leaders, “depending on persuasion and coalition building rather 
than the authority o f office to get things done” (pp. 218-220). This point was echoed by 
Asghar (2013), who argued that since college presidents work closely with tenured 
faculty who cannot be easily fired, they must lead through collaboration and cajoling, not 
control. However, what remains unknown is how non-traditional presidents approach 
faculty interaction.
Pusser (2000) stated that many observers now believe the academic presidency is 
“an untenable position... mutating beyond the ability of anyone to do the job” (p. 3).
This long list o f challenges is leaving a noticeable impact on the cadre of professionals 
who are qualified enough and willing to take on a college presidency. Higher education 
observers are now noticing a “shrinking pool” of qualified candidates for presidential 
positions (Mead-Fox, 2009, p. 1). As Mead-Fox (2009) argued, the changing nature of
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the college presidency along with shifting cultural norms regarding family obligations are 
now causing many aspiring academic leaders to rethink their presidential aspirations. 
Consequently, it is increasingly difficult for hiring committees to find superior candidates 
(Mead-Fox, 2009). With a multitude of on-the-job challenges, it is clear that the role of 
college president is in the midst of a dynamic paradigm shift.
Career paths leading to the college presidency. Even though research on non- 
traditional presidents is sparse, scholars have completed valuable work in related areas 
that can provide useful insights. Moore and associates (1983) conducted pioneering 
research concerning variations in career paths among presidents of four-year institutions, 
but the study was limited by a small sample size of 156 presidents. However, the study 
found that a single hierarchical trajectory does not reflect accurately the career experience 
of the majority o f deans or presidents (Moore, et al., 1983). Almost two decades later, 
Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) conducted a more thorough study that addressed such 
issues as gender, age, and highest degree earned. They concluded that although extensive 
research has developed demographic profiles of four-year college presidents, relatively 
little is known about the career paths that lead to the presidency (Bimbaum & Umbach, 
2001). In their own research, they posited four career paths among college presidents -  
the “scholar,” “steward,” “spanner,” and “stranger” (p. 206). “Scholars” represented the 
traditional faculty path to the presidency, while “stewards” were career higher education 
administrators. The non-traditional paths are represented in the “spanner,” who spends a 
career rotating in and out of higher education, and the “stranger,” who has never held a 
position in the academy (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206).
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Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) concluded that the traditional scholar path remains 
the “royal road” to the presidency and is followed by the “steward” path (p. 210). They 
further stated, “for ‘strangers,’ the presidency may be less likely to represent a 
commitment to education than a target of opportunity created by some unusual 
confluence of events” (pp. 204-205). They also indicate that the numbers of non- 
traditional presidents varied depending upon institutional type. Cotnam (2006) compared 
the “activities, concerns, and goals” of non-traditional versus traditional presidents and 
concluded that traditional presidents showed more interest in “academic matters, faculty 
related activities, and governmental support and regulation” (p. 1). In noting the 
advantages that non-traditional presidents bring to academe, McCulloch-Lovell (2012) 
argued that they were likely to have previous experience with budgeting, fundraising, and 
adapting to a wide variety of workplaces. Further, McCulloch-Lovell (2012) noted that 
non-traditional presidents bring with them a healthy impatience to the academy, asserting 
that their usual reply to “we don’t do it this way” is “why not?” (p. 2). However, what 
remains unknown is how non-traditional presidents actually engage with academic 
culture, and whether exposure to academic culture influences their priorities in office.
Bomstein (2003) in her research on the academic presidency defined one o f the 
key factors for efficacy, individual legitimacy, as the “president’s background, career, 
and identity characteristics, and how they mesh with the institution’s needs” (p. 25). 
Further, Bomstein (2003) noted that the key threats to achieving legitimacy were lack of 
cultural fit, management incompetence, misconduct, erosion of social capital, 
inattentiveness, and grandiosity. Moreover, Bomstein (2003) asserted that the lack of 
cultural fit was the most dire legitimacy threat for non-traditional presidents. Conversely,
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Bomstein (2003) noted that those coming to the presidency from the traditional “royal 
road” (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 210) with service at prestigious institutions 
enjoyed the highest degrees of individual legitimacy. However, Bomstein (2003) also 
noted that such individuals usually had little experience in areas within external relations, 
such as fundraising, politicking, and networking. Perhaps in response to this reality, 
Basinger (2003) and Redden (2008) noted an increased interest among hiring committees 
in so-called “hybrid models” (pp. 2-3), that is, aspiring college presidents with academic 
credentials as well as experience outside the academy. In many ways, they are similar to 
the “spanners” listed in the Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) model (p. 206). Such 
individuals normally served as faculty members before entering non-academic arenas, 
and could effectively bridge the gap between aspiring traditional-track and non- 
traditional presidents in the future. Given the spanning of college and business careers, 
more research is required to understand better their efficacy as college presidents.
While existing scholarly research on non-traditional presidents is sparse, more 
work has been done in the area of studying academic culture. A question that has 
interested scholars in recent years is how academic culture compares with the cultures 
found in other organizations, such as those found in the business and government sectors. 
However, making such comparisons has proven challenging at times since scholars have 
not yet reached a consensus as to what academic culture really entails.
Defining Academic Culture
For several decades, higher education scholars have also endeavored to define 
academic culture and explore what distinguishes it from other types o f organizational 
culture. According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), the research in this area has progressed
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through three distinct phases. First, researchers in the 1960s (Clark, 1970; Lunsford, 
1963; Riesman, Gusfield, & Gamson, 1970) used culture to illustrate how academic 
culture was unique compared with other institutions (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Later higher 
education studies in the 1980s (Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Peterson, Cameron, Jones, 
Mets, & Ettington, 1986) linked institutional culture with organizational success (Kezar 
& Eckel, 2002). To explore this connection with institutional culture and organizational 
success more deeply, several studies have also demonstrated the way that different 
cultures shaped various institutional functions, including governance (Chaffee & Tierney, 
1988), leadership (Bimbaum, 1988), and planning (Hearn, Clugston, & Heydinger, 1993; 
Leslie & Fretwell, 1996).
According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), two links between culture and change have 
been made in higher education literature as a result of previous research. The first link 
suggests that institutions need to have a culture that encourages change (Curry, 1992; 
Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Thus, the goal of this line of research has been to determine the 
aspects of culture that need to be fostered to promote institutional change (Schein, 1985: 
Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Meanwhile, the second link suggests that culture or key 
institutional elements that shape culture, such as a vision or mission, are modified as a 
result of the change process (Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Eckel, Hill, & Green, 1998; 
Guskin, 1996). In their line of research, Kezar and Eckel (2002) presented a proposed 
third link, in addition to the first two, “investigating the ways in which culture shapes an 
institution’s change processes and strategies” (p. 438). They characterize culture as the 
modifying element rather than the subject of modification (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). Thus, 
there are a variety of opinions among scholars about the role that culture plays in an
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organizational setting -  with some believing that culture shapes the organization, and 
others believing that the organization shapes the culture.
Schein (1992) proposed a model of culture that contains three elements; artifacts, 
espoused values, and assumptions. Artifacts represent the visible elements in a culture, 
including such things as dress codes, furniture, art, work climate, organizational 
structures, etc. (Schein, 1992). Espoused values are the values normally espoused by 
leading figures of a culture, which should in turn be in line with the general assumptions 
o f the culture (Schein, 1992). Assumptions reflect the shared values within the specific 
culture and are typically not visible to its members (Schein, 1992).
Along with presenting this cultural model, Schein (2010) also noted that 
subcultures may exist within organizations. Specifically, Schein (2010) identified three 
distinct groups that constitute subcultures within organizations; operators, engineers, and 
executives. Operators are characterized by a high level o f human interaction, strong 
communication, trust, and teamwork (Schein, 2010). Conversely, engineers are focused 
on pursuing abstract solutions to problems and developing functional systems (Schein, 
2010). Finally, executives are described as lone heroes who maintain a sense of rightness 
and omniscience (Schein, 2010). For organizations to function correctly, Schein (2010) 
noted that proper alignment o f these subcultural groups was critical. Schein (2010) 
argued that many problems typically attributed to bureaucracy, environmental factors, or 
personality conflicts among managers are in fact the result o f a lack o f alignment between 
these subcultures. However, what remains unknown is how non-traditional college 
presidents engage with the subcultures found within the academy, and how these 
subcultures influence their adjustment process to academic culture. What also remains
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unknown is the extent to which these subcultures align with the organizational cultures 
with which non-traditional presidents are most familiar.
Despite these research advances in recent years, the process of actually defining 
academic culture has been challenging. According to Tierney (1988), “a usable 
definition of organizational culture appropriate to higher education has remained elusive” 
(p. 6). To further complicate matters, scholars have had difficulty determining whether 
the academy even constitutes a profession (Williams, 2008). For instance, as Piper 
(1994) and Taylor (1999) asked, are academics professional as discipline experts or as 
educators? As Taylor (1999) further noted, “traditional.. .understandings of academics’ 
sense of professionalism are neither fixed, nor closed... [but are]... social constructions -  
partial, patchy, and incomplete” (p. 116). Thus, it is clear that the academy as both a 
profession and as a distinct culture invites a large number o f definitions and 
interpretations. To that end, increased scholarly interest in organizational culture has 
generated increasingly broad and divergent concepts of culture (Tierney, 1988). Defining 
academic culture is further complicated by the popular image of the Ivory Tower, where 
professors can engage carelessly in enlightened discourse without having to worry about 
the challenges of the outside world (Aguirre, 2000).
Nevertheless, some scholars have been able to produce a general definition of 
academic culture that is useful when considering how non-traditional presidents may 
perceive this unique environment. Supporting the research of Schein (2010) on 
subcultures, Adams (1988) and Becher (1989) wrote that academic communities are 
notably fractured places with distinct tribes and territories. Further, if colleges and 
universities “are like a conglomeration of tribal communities organized into villages and
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hamlets, then the disciplines serve as the tribes into which individual scholars are 
organized” (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012, p. 81). According to Esterberg and Wooding 
(2012), it is this tribe -  the discipline -  with which most faculty members are identified. 
Fundamentally, the discipline represents the faculty members’ overarching professional 
identity (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012). Therefore, campuses contain competing and 
contradictory loyalties, as faculty members are often split between commitments to their 
institution versus commitments to their discipline (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012). 
Consequently, this dynamic makes it difficult for presidents who seek transforming 
institutional change, as they must struggle to get faculty members to look beyond their 
own departments and disciplines and appreciate the needs of the larger campus 
community (Esterberg & Wooding, 2012).
Aguirre (2000) and Stewart (1995) defined academic culture as a lifestyle that 
socializes faculty to perform and value activities that are vital to membership in the 
academic community, such as attending conferences, presenting papers, and conducting 
research. Clark (1983) and Dill (2012) argued that universities are “culturally loaded” 
institutions, in which values such as objectivity, academic freedom, and respect for 
students and human subjects guide academic behavior, and are therefore reflected in the 
language, symbols, and ceremonies of academic life (Dill, 2012, p. 11). Further, another 
key characteristic of academic culture is its resistance to rapid change. Traditionally, 
academic culture has been fairly static and conservative, changing only minimally in 
response to external pressures (Crawford & Crawford, 1997; Hesketh et al., 1996). This 
resistance to change is interesting considering that higher education has undergone major 
periods of transformation over the past century.
24
In Clark’s (1981) study, he concluded that academic culture was also highly 
complex, with systems of belief permeating academic institutions on at least three levels: 
the culture of the entaprise, the culture of the academic profession at large, and the 
culture of the academic discipline (as cited in Dill, 1982). The culture o f the enterprise 
refers to the traditions and symbols o f academic life, such as titles, degrees, a specified 
curriculum, and examinations (Dill, 1982). The culture of the academic profession at 
large refers to the established tradition of scholars organizing themselves into guilds or 
other professional organizations, such as the American Association of University 
Professors (Dill, 1982). Lastly, the culture of the academic discipline refers to the 
distinct ideologies found within the academy’s various disciplines (Dill, 1982). These 
levels help to produce an academic culture that is multi-faceted and complex when 
compared with many other organizational cultures. Despite this complexity, higher 
education as an organizational form has never been more powerful than it is today, as 
universities through their research, academic programs, and disciplines increasingly 
define the legitimacy of knowledge in modem society (Bastedo, 2012; Clark, 1983; Frank 
& Meyer, 2007).
Along with attempting to produce a usable definition of academic culture, 
scholars have also endeavored to define what specific cultural components comprise 
academic life. Some of this work has evolved from Bolman and Deal’s (1984) Four 
Frames Model, which views organizations as a mental model operationalized in four 
frames; the structural frame, the human resource frame, the political frame, and the 
symbolic frame. While the structural frame focuses on the architecture of the 
organization, such as goals and role coordination, the human resource frame emphasizes
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understanding people and their relationships (Bolman & Deal, 2013). Conversely, the 
political frame emphasizes power, competition, and winning scarce resources, while the 
symbolic frame captures organizational life as drama and focuses on ceremony and ritual 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013). Using the Four Frames Model, a study by Bensimon (1989) 
concluded that most college presidents view their institutions through multiple frames. 
Out of 32 presidents interviewed, 13 espoused a single frame, 11 espoused two frames, 
seven espoused three frames, and one espoused four frames (Bensimon, 1989). However, 
the study’s sample size was small and it did address non-traditional college presidents 
specifically. Further, the non-traditional presidents who possessed more of a multi-frame 
perspective were located at community colleges instead of four-year institutions. Thus, 
what remains unknown is whether all non-traditional college presidents view the 
academy through a particular frame, or whether it varies by each individual.
Tierney (1991) developed a model of unique university culture, proposing that 
academic culture consisted of six categories: environment, mission, socialization, 
information, strategy, and leadership. By examining each of these six categories, Tierney 
(1991) argued that researchers could obtain a clearer picture of a university’s culture. 
Meanwhile, Bergquist (1992) established that the academy is made up of four distinct 
cultures. First, the collegial culture finds meaning primarily in the disciplines represented 
by faculty at the institution (Bergquist, 1992). Those aligned with this culture value 
faculty research and scholarship and consider their institution’s primary enterprise as the 
generation, interpretation, and dissemination of knowledge (Bergquist, 1992). Second, 
the managerial culture is comprised by those who find meaning in the organization, 
implementation, and evaluation of work that is directed toward specified goals and
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purposes (Bergquist, 1992). Further, they hold assumptions about the capacity of the 
institution to define and measure its goals and objectives clearly (Bergquist, 1992).
Third, the developmental culture is comprised by those in the academy who find 
meaning in the creation of programs and activities that promote the personal and 
professional growth of all members of the academic community (Bergquist, 1992).
Those aligned with this culture value openness and service to others and encourage the 
potential for cognitive, affective, and behavioral growth among students, faculty, 
administrators, and staff (Bergquist, 1992). Fourth, the culture of advocacy centers on 
the establishment of equitable and egalitarian policies and procedures for the distribution 
of resources and benefits at the institution (Bergquist, 1992). Those who find meaning in 
this culture value confrontation and fair bargaining among constituency groups and 
conceive o f the institution’s enterprise as either the undesirable promulgation of existing 
and repressive social attitudes or the establishment of new and more liberating ones 
(Bergquist, 1992). Because of its focus on confrontation and bargaining, the culture of 
advocacy is somewhat similar to Bolman and Deal’s (1984) political frame.
In later research, Bergquist and Pawlak (2008) identified two additional cultures 
found in the academy. The virtual culture centers on finding meaning by responding to 
the knowledge generation and dissemination capacity of the postmodern world and 
promoting an open and global perspective (Bergquist & Pawlak, 2008). Those aligned 
with this culture believe the purpose of their institution is to link its educational resources 
to global and technological resources, thus broadening the global learning network 
(Bergquist & Pawlak, 2008). Meanwhile, the sixth category, the tangible culture, finds 
meaning in its roots, the community, and its spiritual grounding (Bergquist & Pawlak,
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2008). Those aligned with this culture value the predictability of a value-based, face-to- 
face education in a stable physical location and conceive of the institution’s enterprise as 
the honoring and reintegration of learning from a local perspective (Bergquist & Pawlak, 
2008).
Despite the advances in research concerning the components of academic culture, 
scholars argue that more focused study is urgently needed (Kezar & Eckel, 2002;
Tierney, 1988). According to Tierney (1988), “our lack of understanding about the role 
of organizational culture in improving management and institutional performance inhibits 
our ability to address the challenges that face higher education” (p. 4). To that end, a key 
challenge in the exploration of academic culture has been the lack of research on sub­
cultures found in the academy (Kezar & Eckel, 2002). While most scholars have studied 
academic culture as a broad, all-encompassing concept, some scholars have argued that it 
also consists o f multiple levels, including the enterprise, the institution, the subgroup (i.e. 
faculty, administrators), and the individual level (Martin, 1992). Moreover, diversity 
scholars could also argue that academic culture may differ based on race, class, and 
gender (Bastedo, 2012; Bensimon & Neumann, 1994). Thus, more research is needed to 
determine how these different levels and subgroups compare and differ within the 
academy.
Further, much of the research on academic culture has dealt with how educational 
leaders must operate within its framework. According to Kezar and Eckel (2002), more 
research is needed to determine when it is best for leaders to operate within an existing 
cultural framework or to challenge it. That also raises the question as to whether 
academic culture is universal or whether it varies to some degree by institution (Kezar &
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Eckel, 2002). Thus, more research on how much context impacts academic culture is 
also needed. Moreover, no known studies have attempted to explore the adjustment 
process of non-traditional presidents to academic culture using the aforementioned 
definitions, models and approaches.
Academic culture under threat. To best understand how non-traditional 
presidents engage with academic culture, it is useful to explore this culture’s role and 
level o f vitality in modem society. Along with attempting to define academic culture, 
scholars have studied the challenges it faces along with its prospects for future survival in 
a society that wants to increasingly see tangible, measurable results. While academic 
culture has a long and distinguished tradition in Western civilization, many scholars have 
argued that its long-term survival is under threat (Beck & Young, 2005; Dill, 1982; Rice, 
1999; Rowland, 2002; Williams, 2008). Beck and Young (2005) identified the modem 
primary threats as the increased calls for greater professionalism, productivity, and 
managerial oversight coming from non-academic authorities. Williams (2008) attributed 
academic culture’s vulnerability to the challenges created by evolving socio-economic 
conditions. Such an argument sounds plausible in an era of ever-growing virtual 
universities and on-line degree programs. In a similar vein, Rice (1999) attributed the 
plight of faculty and academic culture to a decline of extrinsic rewards, such as salaries 
and professional opportunities. Dill (1982) maintained that academic culture was in 
decline because of the steady erosion of an enterprise culture originally based on 
sectarian religious beliefs. Specifically:
In the United States the loss o f meaning of enterprise culture has been 
relatively rapid. In only a hundred years we have moved from colleges
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and universities with the symbols and traditions of required chapel, a 
liberal education heavily based upon religious and moral precepts, and 
baccalaureate services at graduation, to secular institutions which retain 
many of these symbols and rituals but have discarded the underlying 
religious faith which gave these symbols meaning. In its place, we have 
adopted a faith in disciplinary ideology. But at the enterprise level we 
have failed to develop a corresponding culture rich enough in symbol and 
ritual to provide a unifying sense o f belief. (Dill, 1982, p. 311)
Further, Dill (1982) argued that the rapid growth of systems of higher education, 
along with a growing orientation toward the individual, discipline-based career was 
eroding traditional academic culture significantly. A primary cause o f these phenomena 
was the rapid proliferation of fields, disciplines, and PhD recipients in the years 
following World War II, resulting in an elimination of shared traditions, identification 
with a common calling, and the sense of a single academic profession (Dill, 1982). 
Further, instead of identifying with academic culture in general, faculty have come to 
identify with the culture of their discipline (Nisbet, 1971), or even more specifically, with 
just their own professional careers (Blankenship, 1977; Dill, 1982; Rice, 1999). 
Consequently, “faculty members who a generation ago would define themselves in terms 
of their institution -  ‘I am a member of the Harvard faculty’ -  now identify themselves in 
terms of their field -  ‘I am a sociologist, currently at Harvard’” (Dill, 1982, p. 311). 
However, what remains unknown is how these faculty attitudes influence the adjustment 
processes of non-traditional college presidents to academic culture.
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Comparing academic culture with other cultures. Along with attempting to 
define academic culture and its prospects for long-term viability, scholars have explored 
how it compares and contrasts with other types of organizational culture. This research is 
significant when studying how non-traditional presidents engage with academic culture. 
Coming from the worlds of the military, government, business, etc., non-traditional 
presidents are likely much more familiar with other forms of organizational culture upon 
assuming their posts. Thus, understanding how academic culture compares and contrasts 
with other forms of organizational culture provides a framework for the possible issues 
that a new non-traditional president may face in adjusting to academic life.
According to Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker, and Riley (1999), a major difference 
between academic and non-academic organizational cultures has to do with goal 
ambiguity. In general, most organizations are goal-oriented, such as businesses trying to 
make profit or hospitals trying to help sick people. However, colleges and universities 
have vague, ambiguous goals that force them to have to make decisions with a high 
degree o f uncertainty. Thus, goal ambiguity is one of the chief characteristics of 
academic organizations (Baldridge et al., 1999). This could present a key challenge for 
new non-traditional college presidents who are used to leading goal-oriented institutions.
Along with goal ambiguity, scholars have determined that other distinct 
differences exist between academic and non-academic cultures. For instance, some 
scholars have done extensive research on the specific intricacies o f academic culture, 
explaining how it is a unique entity when compared to other organizational cultures (Dill, 
2012; Lane, 1985; Williams, 2008). Lane (1985) found that while differentiation (i.e. 
division of the organizational culture into smaller sub-units) exists in every organization,
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higher education is characterized by extreme differentiation. Specifically, academic work 
is first divided according to subject matter or academic department and then in relation to 
the orientation of each scholar (Lane, 1985; Smith, 1990). Thus, each academic 
department is typically a world unto itself. Lane (1985) also concluded that academia is 
often characterized by an interplay between the academic organization and the academic 
man/woman. Whereas an academic organization is typically passive, with slow and 
collective decision-making, the academic man/woman is active, busily pursuing their 
individual research agendas (Lane, 1985).
Bimbaum (1988) also studied this phenomenon of parallel organizational 
structures in higher education, referring to it as a “dualism of controls” (p. 9). However, 
instead of focusing specifically on the interplay between academic organization and 
scholar, he examined this interplay on a variety of fronts, including faculty vs. board 
interaction and faculty vs. administrator interaction. Bimbaum (1988) characterized 
these interactions as a problem of governance, as this organizational structure is often 
difficult to lead and perceived as disorganized by outside cultures. Moreover, he 
concluded that there is a clear problem in higher education organization that has an 
impact on its culture. In organizations, “administrative authority is predicated on the 
control and coordination of activities by superiors; professional authority is predicated on 
autonomy and individual knowledge” (Bimbaum, 1988, p. 10).
Noting that these types o f authority are in fundamental disagreement, Bimbaum 
(1988) found that such an arrangement can make it quite difficult to lead an academic 
organization because both types o f authority are equally present within that culture.
Thus, this arrangement o f competing orientations will increase the need for collegiality
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and collective decision-making in order to satisfy all of the stakeholders involved (i.e. 
faculty, administrators, board members). This approach to authority is quite different 
than business, military, or government organizations, in which only administrative 
authority is typically present and singular decision-making is more common. This 
background of reasoning is quite helpful in understanding why it can be difficult for non- 
traditional presidents to adjust to academic culture. They come from organizational 
cultures where only administrative authority is present, and are typically not used to the 
professional authority possessed by faculty members as well as some administrators.
In his typology of organizational cultures, Mintzberg (1980) labeled the one best 
suited for academic organizations as “professional bureaucracy” (p. 333). In this 
decentralized culture, organizations hire highly trained specialists, known as 
professionals, in its hiring core (Mintzberg, 1980). Given considerable autonomy, these 
professionals work freely not only of the administrative hierarchy but also o f their own 
colleagues (Mintzberg, 1980). Moreover, managers in this culture must have the support 
o f professional operators and be professionals themselves in order to maintain credibility 
and power (Mintzberg, 1980). Mintzberg’s (1980) model for professional bureaucracy 
may help to explain why non-traditional college presidents may have difficulty in 
adjusting to academic culture. If they are not considered to be professional by their 
faculty peers, it may lead to legitimacy problems.
Further, non-traditional presidents may be more accustomed to Mintzberg’s 
(1980) model for “machine bureaucracy” (p. 332), particularly if they come from 
business, government, or military backgrounds. In this more centralized culture, there are 
formalized procedures in the operating core, as well as centralized power for decision­
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making (Mintzberg, 1980). Moreover, there is an elaborate administrative structure along 
with a clear distinction between staff and managers (Mintzberg, 1980). Overall, this 
culture stands in marked contrast to the professional bureaucracy model (Mintzberg, 
1980). Thus, additional research is needed to explore the extent to which the differences 
between Mintzberg’s (1980) models for professional and machine bureaucracy impact 
non-traditional college presidents.
Rosovsky (1990) also wrote extensively about academic culture, noting that 
academics are typically happier and more satisfied professionally than their peers in 
business, government, or the military because they have more freedom of movement, 
minimal direct supervision, and they have the opportunity to work in the pleasant, 
attractive, and tranquil surroundings found on most college campuses. To support his 
claim, he referenced a study (Ladd & Lipset, 1976) that surveyed faculty job satisfaction 
for American academics. It found that 88% of the sample maintained that if  they were to 
begin their careers anew, they would still want to be college professors (Ladd & Lipset,
1976). However, such arguments raise a possible limitation of research on academic 
culture by such scholars as Rosovsky (1990), Bimbaum (1988), and Lane (1985). When 
they described and analyzed academic culture, they only referred to faculty members, and 
not to other key constituency groups within an academic setting. Further, according to 
Gappa, Austin, and Trice (2007), modem professionals, including academics, are not as 
tied to their employers and careers as they were in previous decades. According to 
Berrett (2012), faculty members are also more stressed and strapped for teaching time, 
suggesting that the faculty sentiments expressed in Ladd and Lipset (1976) may be 
different today among modem academics. Overall, it would be useful to examine more
34
research on how academic administrators perceive and engage with academic culture, and 
determine if there are any differences with the perceptions held by faculty members.
As with academic culture, there has also been extensive research on non-academic 
culture, particularly within the realm of business. While non-academic culture is 
portrayed as having distinct differences from its academic counterpart, there also appear 
to be some areas of similarity. For instance, Gordon (1991) argued that corporate culture 
is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the industry in which the company 
operates. Thus, the organizational culture of a local insurance agent’s office would be 
influenced by the corporate culture of the larger company of which it is a part (Gordon, 
1991). This line of reasoning could also fit within academic culture, as overarching 
cultural themes such as academic freedom, intellectual growth, and advancement of 
knowledge would be present within the culture on many college campuses.
In recent years, scholars have also pointed to other areas o f similarity between 
academic and corporate culture, asserting that they are slowly becoming more alike. For 
instance, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) studied the rise of what they called academic 
capitalism, or the tendency o f colleges and universities to engage in market-like 
behaviors. Prompted by a sluggish economy and declining state support for public 
institutions, colleges and universities have increasingly sought to generate revenue from 
their core educational, research, and service functions (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
Recent examples of this strategy have included encouraging faculty to pursue research 
that leads to patents and to develop curricular materials that can be copyrighted and 
marketed (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
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While Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argued that academic culture is becoming 
more like corporate culture, Bastedo (2012) argued the opposite, maintaining that many 
corporations are beginning to take on aspects of academic culture. For instance, Bastedo
(2012) pointed out that several corporations are giving employees greater autonomy, 
implanting sabbaticals in certain cases, and encouraging greater research and 
development. Overall, due to economic realities and shifting societal norms, it appears 
that the lines between academic and corporate culture are blurring to a certain extent. 
Further research would be useful in determining if a similar pattern is taking place 
between academic culture and other forms of non-academic culture, such as those found 
in the military and the government.
However, while there are possible similarities between academic and non- 
academic cultures, the research indicates that there are also key differences. Gordon 
(1991) asserted that corporate culture would likely possess a greater sense of shared 
assumptions and values than its academic counterpart, which is often influenced by its 
extreme differentiation. Further, Rotemberg (1993) argued that autocratic leadership and 
management styles are more likely to be found in non-academic organizational cultures, 
where administrative authority is more prevalent. As mentioned in Bimbaum (1988), an 
autocratic governance style would not likely last long within academic culture because of 
the strong presence of professional authority held by faculty members in particular. 
Hofstede et al. (2002) came upon another possible difference when they concluded that 
profit and growth of the organization were the top priorities of executives in non- 
academic cultures. Within academic culture the importance of those profit-oriented goals 
would depend upon the constituency group in question. While presidents, boards of
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trustees, and financial administrators would be interested in profit and growth, those 
goals may not be of as much importance to faculty members, who may be more interested 
in academic freedom, student success, and intellectual growth.
Overall, based on existing research, academic culture appears to be a unique 
enterprise immersed in special traditions, symbols, and ceremonies, which also values 
objectivity and academic freedom (Clark, 1983; Dill, 2012). Moreover, modem research 
makes a compelling argument that academic culture is quite different than other types of 
organizational culture. As opposed to other organizational cultures, academic culture is 
characterized by extreme differentiation and is highly decentralized, especially within the 
faculty ranks (Lane, 1985). Further, the advanced education and expertise of faculty 
members and many administrators often necessitates a collective decision-making 
approach not often found in other organizational cultures (Bimbaum, 1988). Specifically, 
the belief is promoted among faculty that they are a community o f scholars who 
collectively governs academia (Aguirre, 2000; Chaffee & Tierney, 1988; Clark, 1970; 
Mortimer & McConnell, 1978). To that end, autocratic leadership is not an approach that 
works well within academic settings (Bimbaum, 1988). This reality about autocratic 
leadership is a compelling and sobering point, considering that many non-traditional 
presidents come from organizational cultures (such as business, the government, or the 
military) where that form of leadership is more common (Rotemberg, 1993).
Adaptive and Change Leadership
Considering that there are key similarities and differences between academic 
culture and other forms of organizational culture, it raises the question as to what are the 
best leadership strategies for presidents to employ within a higher education setting,
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particularly if  they are unfamiliar with academic culture. Moreover, what resources can 
presidents utilize in order to lead colleges and universities effectively? Along with 
literature on organizational culture, research on leadership theory comprises another 
important dimension in exploring how non-traditional college presidents can adjust to 
academic culture and lead within it effectively.
Scholars have conducted extensive research on the types of personal influence 
that leaders possess. Within a higher education setting, this research would inform how 
college presidents establish and maintain the credibility to lead their institutions, as well 
as to advance their formal agendas. Some of the seminal work in this area was conducted 
by Bourdieu (1985) through his model for four forms of capital - economic, social, 
cultural, and symbolic. Bourdieu (1985) developed these terms in the early 1970s as a 
means for revealing the dynamics o f power relations in social life and for studying the 
role that these forms of capital play in the leadership process. According to Bourdieu 
(1985), economic capital refers to command over economic resources; social capital 
refers to resources based on group membership, relationships, and networks o f influence; 
and cultural capital refers to forms of knowledge, skills, education, and advantages a 
person has, which gives them a higher status in society. Cultural capital is further 
comprised of three subtypes. The embodied state refers to the inherited (non-genetic) and 
acquired traits and skills embedded in the individual (Bourdieu, 1985). The objectified 
state refers to things that are owned (such as artwork), while the institutionalized state 
refers to institutional recognition of one’s cultural capital, normally understood as 
academic credentials (Bourdieu, 1985). Bourdieu (1985) also developed the concept of
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symbolic capital, which refers to the resources available to an individual on the basis of 
honor, prestige, or recognition.
In recent decades, scholars have also researched the types of power that 
organizational leaders possess. Power sources can be classified in two general forms -  
position power and personal power (Bass, 1960; Etzioni, 1961; Rahim, 1988; Yukl & 
Falbe, 1991). According to Yukl (2006), types of position power, based upon 
opportunities inherent in a person’s position, include legitimate power (power stemming 
from formal authority over work activities), reward power (the power to distribute gifts 
or incentives), and coercive power (the power to distribute punishment). Information 
power (control over the flow of information) and ecological power (control over the 
physical environment, technology, and organization of the work) are also categorized 
under position power (Cartwright, 1965; Raven, 1965; Yukl, 2006).
Conversely, personal power stems from the attributes of the leader himself or 
herself (Yukl, 2006). According to Yukl (2006), it includes referent power (power based 
on affection, admiration, and loyalty), and expert power (task-relevant knowledge and 
skill). While the research on power and capital is abundant, what remains unknown is 
how it applies to non-traditional college presidents. Do non-traditional presidents all 
possess the same types of power and capital, or does it depend upon the person and 
situation? Moreover, would any expert power possessed by non-traditional presidents be 
diminished in an academic setting, where they are surrounded by highly-educated 
scholars? More research is needed to address these questions.
Several scholars have also studied the leadership process within academic settings 
(Boyett, 1996; Gregory, 1996; Neumann & Neumann, 1999; Pounder, 2001; Ramsden,
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1998; Randall & Coakley, 2007; Rowley & Sherman, 2003). Within the broad realm of 
leadership theories, two specific theoretical approaches -  adaptive leadership and change 
leadership -  are most applicable to how non-traditional presidents, as well as traditional 
presidents, may lead while adjusting to academic culture. Heifetz (1994) pioneered the 
research on adaptive leadership, basing it on the premise that leadership is more of a 
process rather than individual personal capabilities (Heifetz, Kania, & Kramer, 2004; 
Randall & Coakley, 2007). According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “this process 
requires people to focus on the specific problems at hand and to modify the way they 
have worked in the past” (p. 327). In his model of adaptive leadership, Heifetz (1994) 
focused it on the process and not the person, and the model employed the knowledge of 
all who have a vested interest in moving the organization to the next level (Randall & 
Coakley, 2007). However, it is important to note that most of the examples that Heifetz 
(1994) used in his research are non-academic, prompting the question of how his adaptive 
leadership model would work in an academic cultural setting. Nevertheless, the Heifetz 
(1994) model still provides a useful framework to examine how adaptive leadership could 
possibly work in such a setting.
As part of his model, Heifetz proposed that leaders are confronted by two types of 
problems -  technical and adaptive (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002). Technical problems are 
well defined with known solutions, and anyone with the right expertise and resources can 
solve them (Heifetz, 1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Conversely, adaptive problems 
are not well defined and consequently present no known solutions in advance (Heifetz, 
1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Instead, it requires learning to formulate workable
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solutions (Heifetz, 1994). Senge (1997) supported this rationale, asserting that learning is 
the “currency of survival” in an era of constant change (p. 46).
Recognizing the important role that learning plays in the modem world, several 
scholars have studied the dynamics o f adult learning. For instance, Knowles (1980) 
introduced the European concept o f andragogy to American scholarly audiences, defining 
it as “the art and science of helping adults learn” (p. 43). Centered on the concepts of 
independence and self-directed learning, Knowles (1980) maintained that there were five 
assumptions underlying andragogy. They describe the adult learner as someone who (1) 
has an independent self-concept and who can direct his or her own learning, (2) has 
accumulated a reservoir of life experiences that is a rich resource for learning, (3) has 
learning needs closely related to changing social roles, (4) is problem-centered and 
interested in immediate application of knowledge, and (5) is motivated to learn by 
internal rather than external factors (Knowles, 1980; Merriam, 2001). Based on these 
assumptions, Knowles (1980) developed a program-planning model for designing, 
implementing, and evaluating educational experiences for adults (Merriam, 2001).
In a similar vein, Mezirow (1996) developed a transformational learning model 
that helped explain how adults changed the way that they interpreted their world (Taylor, 
2008). This model is based on the premise that “learning is understood as the process of 
using a prior interpretation to construe a new or revised interpretation o f the meaning of 
one’s experience in order to guide future action (Mezirow, 1996, p. 162). This 
transformative process is formed and circumscribed by frames of reference, defined as 
“structures of assumptions and expectations that frame an individual’s tacit points of 
view and influence their thinking, beliefs, and actions” (Taylor, 2008, p. 5). According to
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Taylor (2008), it is the revision of a frame of reference in concert with reflection on 
experience that culminates in a paradigmatic shift. This dynamic is specifically what is 
addressed by the theory of perspective transformation (Taylor, 2008).
Applying many of these concepts about learning to leadership, Amey (2005) 
concluded that instead of viewing leadership as a series of career stages through which 
particular skills are learned, it is more effective to conceptualize leadership as a broader, 
ongoing process of learning. Beckhard and Pritchard (1992) echoed this point about 
learning, finding that leading any successful change or adaptation requires a conscious 
decision to move to a learning mode, where learning and doing are both valued. Further, 
when adaptive problems exist, there are generally many different stakeholders involved 
with their own interpretations of the issues at hand (Randall & Coakley, 2007). 
Consequently, solutions stem from the stakeholders themselves, and not from one single 
entity, because the problem is based in their own attitudes, priorities, and behavior 
(Heifetz et al., 2004; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Thus, if  a leader does not recognize that 
their organization is confronted with adaptive problems and employs a more technical 
approach; successful change will fail to occur (Randall & Coakley, 2007). However, 
what remains unknown is how these principles apply to non-traditional presidents. For 
instance, will they be more inclined to follow one approach or another given their 
leadership in other contexts? Moreover, would non-traditional presidents be more likely 
to see the adaptive changes needed considering their ability to cross over and adapt to a 
new organizational culture and profession? More research is needed to answer these 
questions.
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According to Randall and Coakley (2007), “the adaptive leadership model 
includes six stages when executing change in a complex, organizational setting where 
non-routine decisions are required” (p. 328). These include identifying the type of 
problem, focusing attention, framing the issues, securing ownership, managing 
stakeholder conflict and stress, and creating a safe haven (Heifetz & Laurie, 1997). Yukl 
(2006) maintained that this approach to leadership is “consistent with the idea that 
flexible, adaptive leadership is essential to deal successfully with the difficult challenges 
posed by trade-offs, competing objectives, and changing situations” (p. 373).
Along with Ronald Heifetz, other scholars have studied how leaders lead most 
effectively in a culture o f change, often referring to the concept as change leadership 
(Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Fullan, 2001; Goleman, 2000; Hamel, 2000; Koteen, 1991; Kotter, 1996). Heifetz (1994) 
argued that people must re-conceptualize their philosophy of leadership, framing it as the 
mobilization of people to solve tough problems instead of merely looking for a heroic 
figure to save them. Fullan (2001) followed this view in his framework for change 
leadership. He believed that five components of leadership “represent independent but 
mutual reinforcing forces for positive change” (Fullan, 2001, p. 3). They include moral 
purpose, or the intention of making a positive difference in the lives of others, as well as 
understanding the change process. The components also include relationship building 
along with knowledge creation and sharing. Finally, one of the most crucial components 
is coherence making (or sense making), since effective change leaders must help 
followers make sense of chaotic conditions and help them see the larger picture (Fullan, 
2001; Weick, 1995). Along with those components, Fullan (2001) believed that effective
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change leaders possess certain personal characteristics that help them engage with 
followers. They include energy, enthusiasm, and hopefulness, and Fullan (2001) argued 
that all effective change leaders possess them.
In a similar vein, Kotter (1996) proposed an eight-step process for initiating 
transformation in organizations. The steps were to establish a grand strategy, create a 
guiding coalition, develop a vision and strategy, communicate the change vision, 
empower broad-based action, generate short-term wins, consolidate gains and produce 
more change, and anchor new approaches in the culture (Kotter, 1996). Kotter and 
Cohen (2002) revised these steps, listing them as follows: increase urgency, build the 
guiding team, get the vision right, communicate for buy-in, empower action, create short­
term wins, do not let up, and make the changes stick. Hamel (2000) presented a similar 
eight-step process for leading change. His steps included building a point o f view, 
writing a manifesto, creating a coalition, picking your targets and your moments, co­
opting and neutralizing, finding a translator, pursuing small victories, and finally 
integrating the new approach (Hamel, 2000). Further, Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector 
(1990) created a model for drawing out bottom-up ideas and energies from within the 
organization. The model called for mobilizing joint commitment to change and 
developing a shared vision for how to best move forward (Beer, et al., 1990).
In order to understand leading in times of change, it is important to have a better 
framework in place regarding the change process. Kezar (2014) asserted that there are 
six fundamental theories of change, upon which many change implementation models are 
built. The theories are also instrumental for leaders in understanding how change works, 
and include scientific management, evolutionary, social cognition, cultural, political, and
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institutional (Kezar, 2014). The scientific management approach assumes that 
organizations are purposeful and adaptive, while evolutionary theories maintain that 
change is the result of, and dependent on, circumstances, situational variables, and the 
environment faced by each organization (Cameron & Smart, 1998; Camall, 1995; 
Morgan, 1986; Peterson, 1995; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Social cognition theory 
maintains that change can be best understood and enacted through individuals and their 
thought processes, while cultural theory is based on the premise that change occurs 
naturally as a response to constant alterations in the human environment (Morgan, 1986; 
Peterson, 1997; Scott, 1995; Weick, 1995).
Lastly, political theories identify change as being a natural part of human 
interaction, occurring as different agendas and interests are negotiated, while institutional 
theory examines how higher education as a social institution might change in different 
ways from other types of organizations (Kezar, 2014). Although these theories provide a 
useful framework for understanding change, what remains unknown is how non- 
traditional presidents interact with them and how the theories may be employed 
differently depending upon context. Moreover, do non-traditional presidents tend to 
favor some of these theoretical perspectives over others, or does it depend upon the 
individual thoughts and interests? More research is needed to shed light on these 
questions.
While many change leadership models have been developed, some scholars have 
questioned their usefulness and efficacy. Fullan (2001) considered many of these models 
to be contradictory and difficult to follow. He also argued that the change models were 
often much too general and unclear as to how to best proceed (Fullan, 2001). Along
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those lines, Argyris (2000) considered many of these change leadership models to be 
“non-actionable advice” (p. 3). Fullan (2001) argued that there is no single, universal 
strategy to lead change effectively in all situations. Further, he proposed that “change 
can be understood and perhaps led, but it cannot be controlled” (Fullan, 2001, p. 33). 
However, despite the preponderance of research on change leadership, few studies have 
connected it specifically to non-traditional college presidents and their process of 
engaging with and adjusting to academic culture. More research in that area is urgently 
needed, as non-traditional presidents are typically appointed to oversee periods of 
significant change at their institutions. According to Trachtenberg, Kauvar, and Bogue
(2013), difficulty adapting to change is among the major reasons why some college 
presidents fail, so it is imperative that we achieve a better understanding of how non- 
traditional as well as traditional college presidents cope with change. Research is also 
needed to determine if adaptive or change leadership strategies can be used equally well 
in academic versus non-academic organizational cultures.
Conceptual Model
After examining the relevant literature pertaining to the college presidency, 
academic culture, and leadership, a conceptual model emerged (See Figure 1) in my mind 
that links these three areas together. In this model, seven factors contribute in 
approximately equal degrees to the non-traditional president’s adaptive experience to 
academic culture. The factors are split into three main categories -  institution-driven 
factors, leadership-oriented factors, and external factors. In this model, the green circles 
represent institution-driven factors, including the institution’s culture and subcultures, 
duties and responsibilities of the presidency at that institution, and how the non-
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traditional president’s professional background intersects with the institutional culture. 
Meanwhile, the teal circles represent leadership-oriented factors specific to the non- 
traditional president, including adaptive leadership ability and responsiveness to change. 
Finally, the purple circles represent external factors, including the evolution of the 
college presidency and the broader societal context. Collectively, these factors provide a 
framework for understanding the various issues that non-traditional college presidents 
face in adjusting to academic culture.
Figure 1 - Conceptual Model
Summary
Extensive research has been undertaken to explore the unique dynamics of 
academic culture and how it compares with other organizational cultures. Further,
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additional research has focused on how academic leaders most effectively lead in a 
higher education environment. However, there have been no scholarly studies that 
explore how non-traditional college presidents specifically engage with, adapt to, and 
lead within academic culture. While scholars have studied the evolution of the college 
presidency as well as the skills needed for the office, there has been little research on the 
unique dynamics o f non-traditional presidents. One study (Cotnam, 2006) analyzed the 
leadership style of traditional versus non-traditional presidents, and found that traditional 
presidents showed more interest in academic activities while non-traditional presidents 
showed more interest in financial and management-related activities. However, beyond 
that singular study there has been little to no scholarly research on the issues non- 
traditional presidents face adjusting to academic culture. The studies that are available on 
non-traditional presidents are typically limited in their generalizability by small sample 
sizes. Scholars have mentioned the issue of small sample size frequently as a 
fundamental challenge in this area of research because the ranks of non-traditional 
presidents are still fairly small (Cotnam, 2006). Thus, this limitation makes it a 
challenging group to study.
There are other little-researched areas that would merit more investigation to 
better inform our understanding of non-traditional presidents. For one, more scholarly 
research within the context o f non-traditional presidents is needed in the realm of 
institutional fit, or how new presidents acclimate to their college or university’s 
community. According to Will (2010), once a candidate meets all the objective criteria 
(earned terminal degree, appropriate experience, etc.) for appointment, the final selection 
of a new president will depend almost entirely on an assessment -  by the candidate and
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by the institution’s constituents -  o f the level of cultural comfort they have with one 
another. An interesting question for future study is whether non-traditional presidents 
have a more challenging time achieving institutional fit because o f their lack of exposure 
to academic culture?
Moreover, more research is needed concerning the priorities that boards of 
trustees possess in selecting new presidents. Supporting the notion of institutional fit, 
Johnston and Ferrare (2013) argued that boards must define their institution’s leadership 
needs in order to find a president who can meet those requirements. However, according 
to the Association of Governing Board’s (AGB) 2010 Statement on Board Responsibility 
for Institutional Governance, current social, political, economic, and technological issues 
present multiple challenges for governing boards. Such issues can in turn make 
determining the necessary qualifications for a new president difficult. For instance, 
modem colleges and universities are increasingly limited by insufficient resources, 
greater calls for scrutiny and accountability, and a highly competitive marketplace 
(Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional Governance, 2010). Thus, such 
limitations can influence the qualifications that boards want in a new president. What 
can be most challenging in this context is the rapid pace of change, driven by things like 
technology and increased competition (Statement on Board Responsibility for 
Institutional Governance, 2010). Such rapid change can make determining institutional 
needs difficult, which can in turn complicate the search process for a new president.
At present, literature that informs our understanding of how governing boards 
respond to these challenges while conducting presidential searches is limited. More 
research in this area could help explain why the numbers of non-traditional presidents are
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steadily rising in American colleges and universities. Are non-traditional presidents seen 
as a possible answer to these growing institutional challenges? Governing boards may 
assume that prospective presidents from non-academic backgrounds may be uniquely 
equipped to handle the complex issues inherent in modem college and universities. 
Conversely, some scholars argue that mixing non-traditional presidents with governing 
boards can sometimes result in contentious relations (Trachtenberg, Kauvar, & Bogue, 
2013). However, there is still a considerable gap in the literature when it comes to 
understanding how governing boards engage with non-traditional presidents. While 
scholars have studied academic culture extensively along with adaptive and change 
leadership, and to a lesser extent institutional fit for presidents and priorities for boards, 
no study thus far has combined all o f these research strands to better inform our 
understanding of non-traditional presidents.
This presents a key problem since the higher education community knows 
relatively little about a group to whom they are looking increasingly for leadership. 
Although the ranks of non-traditional presidents are still small when compared with 
presidents from traditional academic backgrounds, their numbers are growing (The 
American College President, 2012). Further, if  the current rates of growth continue, non- 
traditional presidents could constitute a significant proportion of all college presidents in 
the not too distant future. Thus, research in this area would help fill a critical gap in the 
literature and would be of great use to hiring boards and other higher education scholars 
eager to learn more about this new breed of college president. In addition, research on 
how non-traditional presidents adapt to and even influence academic culture would be of 
use to potential non-traditional presidents themselves, providing them with a useful
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resource to pursue a job successfully that is becoming increasingly complex. In the end, 
all constituencies within the higher education community would benefit immensely by 
gaining a better understanding of this phenomenon.
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Chapter 3 -  Methodology
As noted in previous chapters, the purpose o f this study was to explore the issues 
that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive 
what lessons could be learned to inform future practice. To obtain the necessary data, 
this project entailed a combination of qualitative methodological approaches to explore 
the issues that three non-traditional college presidents -  Dwight D. Eisenhower at 
Columbia University (1948 to 1953), Terry Sanford at Duke University (1969 to 1985), 
and Paul Trible at Christopher Newport University (1996 to present) -  faced as higher 
education leaders needing to adapt to academic culture. Using a case study format, I 
combined historical research and content analysis techniques with interviews to study 
these three non-traditional presidents from three distinct time periods. By studying past 
non-traditional presidents as well as a long-serving current one, I anticipated achieving a 
better understanding of their institutional impacts than if  I were studying only current 
non-traditional presidents exclusively. Studying past non-traditional presidents allowed 
me to obtain a better sense of their institutional impact and legacy. Further, I anticipated 
having access to a wider cross-section of data sources than with newer non-traditional 
presidents, who likely have not been in office long enough to generate the necessary 
sources for data collection needed in this study.
An emergent research design was utilized in order to adjust the inquiry plans and 
strategies in response to what was learned as the study unfolded (Schwandt, 2001). At 
the outset of this study, I had no formal hypothesis concerning the issues that non- 
traditional presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and planned to follow the data 
where it took me. Therefore, inferences were made from drawing conclusions from
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particular premises (Schwandt, 2001). In qualitative research, three kinds of procedures 
for making inferences are deductive, inductive, and abductive (Schwandt, 2001). For this 
study, inductive analysis was utilized to reached a general set of conclusions about the 
participants following my analysis o f their experiences adjusting to academic culture 
(Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2008; Schwandt, 2001). This approach was effective for 
this study as I needed to collect data, in the forms of content analysis, historical research, 
and (in President Trible’s case) interviews, on each non-traditional president before 
reaching any general conclusions.
To examine Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, a combination of historical 
research and content analysis techniques were utilized. Along with those two 
approaches, an interview protocol was conducted with President Trible, as well as with 
other senior CNU faculty and administrative leaders who were present when he first 
came to the University. By using this multi-faceted approach, I anticipated discovering 
the primary issues that Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible faced in adjusting to 
academic culture. Moreover, I anticipated learning what strategies they utilized to make 
this adjustment during the early stages of their presidencies.
Research Questions Investigated
The research questions that were addressed in this study included:
1. What perceptions do non-traditional presidents have of academic culture?
A) How do those perceptions help them in adjusting to academic culture?
B) How do those perceptions hinder them in adjusting to academic culture?
2. How do non-traditional presidents adjust to academic culture?
A) What are (if any) the key issues that non-traditional presidents face in
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adjusting to academic culture?
B) How have some non-traditional presidents been able to adjust to 
academic culture successfully while others could not?
Participants
This study centered on the examination of three non-traditional college presidents 
from distinct historical eras -  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible. 
Eisenhower was a career U.S. Army officer who achieved legendary status as Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe during World War II (Smith, 2012). He later served as 
chief o f staff of the U.S. Army before his 1948 appointment as president of Columbia 
University (Smith, 2012). Following his service there, Eisenhower served as president of 
the United States from 1953 to 1961. Terry Sanford was a World War II veteran and 
prominent attorney who served as governor o f North Carolina from 1961 to 1965. He 
was also a close political ally of John F. Kennedy and was rumored to have been 
Kennedy’s choice as a running mate in the 1964 presidential election had Kennedy lived 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Following his tenure as Duke University’s president, he later 
represented North Carolina in the U.S. Senate from 1986 to 1993 (Covington & Ellis,
1999). In a similar vein, Paul Trible began his career as a noted Tidewater Virginia 
attorney and prosecutor before serving in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1977 to 
1983 and the U.S. Senate from 1983 to 1989 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). Following his 
service in Congress, he served as part of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations and 
taught briefly at Harvard before assuming the presidency of Christopher Newport 
University in 1996 (Hamilton, 2011).
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A combination of convenience and purposeful sampling was used to identify the 
participants for this study -  Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. In convenience 
sampling, the researcher selects participants because they are willing to be studied, while 
in purposeful sampling, researchers intentionally select individuals to learn or understand 
the central phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). Within the realm of convenience sampling, I 
chose to study Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford because their papers were either 
readily accessible in nearby archives or have already been published. This high level of 
access provided for an efficient and logistically feasible data collection process.
President Trible also fit the criteria for convenience sampling because he was accessible 
for research purposes by virtue of my long association with him, he was relatively close 
in geographic proximity, and an interview with him could easily be scheduled and 
completed within the time frame required for this study. Because of this close 
association with Trible, I took steps to bracket my bias and assumptions and maintained a 
research reflexivity log during the study.
However, aspects of purposeful sampling also applied to all three participants.
For this study, I utilized three guidelines in selecting the participants after surveying 
historical and current college presidents who possessed exclusively non-academic 
backgrounds. First, I wanted to study some of the most high-profile examples of non­
academics who became college presidents. By examining their adjustment processes to 
academic culture, I believed that these pioneering leaders could provide useful lessons for 
aspiring non-traditional presidents and other key stakeholders. By serving during World 
War II as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe prior to serving as president of 
Columbia, I believed that President Eisenhower met this guideline quite well. Similarly,
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as a former North Carolina governor and national Democratic Party leader, President 
Sanford also fit the criteria. Lastly, President Trible served as an example of a high- 
profile, non-traditional president in the modem era, owing to his service as both a U.S. 
congressman and U.S. senator.
Second, I wanted to study non-traditional presidents who had a range of 
experiences in adjusting to academic culture -  specifically one highly negative 
(Eisenhower), one highly positive (Sanford), and one somewhere in-between (Trible). 
While history serves as a judge of the success of Eisenhower and Sanford, the modem 
day presidency of Trible is still occurring. Even though the final assessment of Trible’s 
leadership remains unknown, however, his having served 18 years as president of CNU 
affords a preliminary judgment of his success. Using this “pendulum” approach, 
President Eisenhower fit the bill as a non-traditional president who arguably failed to 
adjust to academic culture, while President Sanford fit as someone who enjoyed a much 
more positive experience. Lastly, President Trible fit the criteria for a non-traditional 
president who, to date, has landed somewhere in the middle as he has experienced both 
successes and challenges in this area during his presidency. Further, President Trible was 
a useful participant for this study since he is currently one of the longest-serving non- 
traditional college presidents in the nation. Over the course o f his tenure, he has also 
worked closely with faculty to spearhead major curricular changes and building 
construction campaigns at CNU. Thus, the data derived from an examination of 
President Trible’s experiences was useful for the purposes of this study.
My third criteria for selecting participants centered on their placement in a larger, 
chronological framework. By choosing non-traditional presidents from three distinct
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historical periods, this study could investigate how the contextual variables in each time 
frame influenced the perception that academic stakeholders had concerning non- 
traditional presidents. Thus, by selecting Presidents Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible, 
they each fit well into a broader chronological spectrum -  with Eisenhower covering the 
late 1940s/early 1950s, Sanford covering the 1970s/early 1980s, and Trible covering the 
late 1990s/2000s.
Since President Trible is a currently serving non-traditional president, I was also 
able to draw on additional members of the CNU community to serve as participants in 
this study. Specifically, I utilized the same combination of purposeful and convenience 
sampling to identify five senior academic and faculty leaders who could speak to the 
issues that President Trible faced in adjusting to academic culture. These were all 
individuals who had been at CNU for either all or the vast majority of the Trible era. 
Since there were not that many individuals left at CNU who fit those criteria, I believed 
that interviewing five participants was sufficient. This total emerged because I wanted 
individuals who could reflect on the long trajectory and evolution o f Trible’s leadership 
over time, instead of those who did not have as much exposure and were therefore not in 
a position to comment on the evolution.
Data Sources
The data for this study came from a variety of sources. In examining Presidents 
Eisenhower and Sanford, most of my data came from primary sources such as journals, 
letters, speeches, period newspaper articles, and memoirs. In historical research, a 
primary source is “a record that was generated by people who personally witnessed or 
participated in the historical events o f interest” (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007, p. 537). Thus,
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diary entries, memoirs, speeches, and letters written by Presidents Eisenhower and 
Sanford were of paramount importance for this study. Specifically, personal documents 
were critical sources of data for this study. Personal documents generally refer to any 
first-person narrative that describes an individual’s actions, experiences, and beliefs 
(Plummer, 1983; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). They typically consist of such writings as 
intimate diaries, personal letters, and autobiographies (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992). Many of 
these sources were contained in archives such as those at the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Library, Columbia University, and Duke University. However, others were 
published, particularly the papers o f President Eisenhower, and were readily accessible 
through books and online databases.
Secondary sources, such as biographies and media coverage, were also useful as 
supplementary sources for the purposes of data triangulation. According to Gall and 
associates (2007), secondary sources are “documents in which individuals give an 
account of an event at which they were not present” (p. 537). Over the past few decades, 
there have been several major biographies of President Eisenhower written. Further, 
there has been at least one major biography of Terry Sanford as well as two books about 
CNU’s institutional history. These secondary sources provided useful data in the form of 
scholarly insight and interpretation on each of the three presidents. Such data were useful 
for data triangulation purposes in this study.
For President Trible, some of my data also came from a combination of primary 
and secondary sources, including university documents, newspaper articles, and 
published books pertaining to CNU’s history. However, as President Trible was the only 
living figure among the individuals profiled in the three case studies, the bulk of the data
58
came from an interview with him. Further, six additional interviews were conducted with 
five senior CNU faculty members and administrators (See Appendix A) who have served 
throughout the Trible presidency - or for the vast majority of it - and could speak to the 
issues he faced in adjusting to academic culture. One participant was interviewed twice -  
once for the original pilot study and a second time for this study. Three of the interviews 
were done for an earlier pilot study on this topic that was approved by The College of 
William and Mary’s institutional review board (IRB). The other three interviews were 
done for the purposes of this study. For both sets of interviews, the interview protocol 
was nearly identical (See Appendix C). Since these individuals have known President 
Trible for a number of years, their reflections on this topic also served as a valuable 
source for data triangulation in this study.
Procedures for Data Collection
The data collection process began with preparing and filing the necessary 
paperwork to The College of William and Mary’s IRB. This paperwork was then 
reviewed and ultimately approved. For all three presidents, data were then collected 
through the framework of a case study format. According to Gall and associates (2007), 
a case study is “the in-depth study of one or more instances o f a phenomenon in its real- 
life context that reflects the perspective of the participants involved in the phenomenon” 
(p. 447). In a case study, a substantial amount of data are collected about the specific 
case selected to represent the phenomenon (Gall et al., 2007; Merriam, 1998; Stake,
1995; Yin, 1989). Moreover, a case study design typically involves the study of a 
phenomenon in its real-life context (Gall et al., 2007; Kirk & Miller, 1986). Since three 
non-traditional presidents were examined for this study, a cross-case comparison, also
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known as a cross-case analysis, was employed in order to compare and contrast each 
president (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Schwandt, 2001; Yin, 1989). According to Yin 
(1989), the choice of multiple case designs follows a replication rather than a sampling 
logic. Specifically, additional cases are chosen for study because they are expected to 
yield “similar information or findings or contrary but predictable findings” (Schwandt, 
2001, p. 47).
According to Yin (1989), a case study strategy is preferred when the inquirer 
seeks answers to how or why questions, when the inquirer has little control over the 
events being studied, when the object of the study is a contemporary phenomenon in a 
real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not too 
clear, and when it is desirable to utilize multiple sources of evidence. This study 
followed all of the guidelines mentioned above as I carefully examined primary and 
secondary source documents pertaining to each presidency. It also followed a case study 
design by incorporating semi-structured interviews in certain cases with President Trible 
and other senior faculty and administrative leaders on the CNU campus. Because o f its 
focus on the study of a phenomenon in its real-life context, I believed that a case study 
format was the best method to capture the unique experiences that Presidents 
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible each faced in adjusting to academic culture.
Within this case study framework, a combination of approaches was utilized to 
collect data for all three presidents. First, a historical research technique was utilized to 
study Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford. Historical research entails the “process of 
systematically searching for data to answer questions about a phenomenon from the past 
to gain a better understanding of the foundation of present institutions, practices, trends,
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beliefs, and issues in education” (Gall et al., p. 529). According to Edson (1986), 
historical investigation is similar to other qualitative research methodologies in four 
distinct ways: 1) the emphasis on the study of the context, 2) the study of behavior in 
natural rather than in contrived or hypothetical settings, 3) the appreciation of the 
wholeness of experiences, and 4) the centrality of interpretation in the research process. 
Along these lines, data for Eisenhower and Sanford were collected through reviewing 
primary source documents in archival settings as well as in published books.
To obtain these data, I designed and implemented a search plan (See Appendix B) 
before conducting thorough archival research. According to Gall and associates (2007), 
historians need to have some idea of what they are looking for before beginning a search 
for data. Thus, the first step in my search plan involved studying preliminary sources for 
Eisenhower and Sanford. Preliminary sources are indexes to primary and secondary 
sources, and may include bibliographies as well as indexes to archival holdings at 
libraries (Gall et al., 2007). For the purposes of this study, lists of archival holdings were 
useful as a means of identifying materials that shed light on the issues that Eisenhower 
and Sanford faced in adjusting to academic culture. Therefore, I reviewed the indexes to 
the Dwight D. Eisenhower papers at Columbia University and at his presidential library 
as well as the indexes for Terry Sanford’s papers at Duke University to identify key 
documents before proceeding with further historical research. This approach allowed me 
to save time and devote the bulk o f my attention to documents that would provide useful 
data for this study.
To coincide with this historical research approach, content analysis was also 
utilized to obtain data for coding and the generation of key themes. According to
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Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), content analysis is “a technique that enables researchers to 
study human behavior in an indirect way, through an analysis o f their communications” 
(p. 483). For Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, their writings were analyzed to look 
for key words and phrases that pertained to the issues they faced in adjusting to academic 
culture. These key words and phrases were then coded for further analysis (See 
Appendix E). According to Schwandt (2001), coding “is a procedure that disaggregates 
the data, breaks it down into manageable segments, and identifies or names those 
segments” (p. 26).
For this study, I believed that this combination of historical research and content 
analysis was the best approach to analyzing the issues that Eisenhower and Sanford faced 
in adjusting to academic culture. As noted by Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), a principal 
advantage of historical research is that it permits the investigation of topics and questions 
that cannot be studied any other way, such as things pertaining to the past. Since both 
presidents are now deceased, it was no longer possible to collect data from them 
personally through interviews. Moreover, the vast majority o f faculty and administrative 
leaders from Columbia University and Duke University who would have been familiar 
with their adjustment processes were also likely deceased. Thus, by permitting the study 
of evidence from the past, historical research and content analysis provided the most 
effective methods to collect data for this study (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006).
To a certain extent, historical research and content analysis approaches were also 
utilized to study President Trible. As with Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, I studied 
primary and secondary source documents that provided insights to the issues he faced in 
adjusting to academic culture. However, since Trible was a living, currently serving
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higher education executive, most data for his case study were collected through semi­
structured interviews. According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), semi-structured 
interviews are fairly formal and consist of a series of questions designed to elicit specific 
answers from respondents. They are most useful when time with the respondent is 
limited and it is desirable to obtain specific or focused information (Schwandt, 2001).
For the purposes of this study, semi-structured interviews were most effective since they 
provided a framework for the discussion and allowed for targeted answers to specific 
questions in a short period of time.
One hour-long interview with President Trible was held in the conference room 
attached to his office suite on the CNU campus. An interview protocol (See Appendix C) 
with nine questions was utilized to explore aspects of Trible’s experiences as a non- 
traditional president, his experiences interacting with academic culture, and the strategies 
he utilized to adapt to it. A modified version of the same protocol (See Appendix C) was 
used to interview five senior faculty and administrative leaders (See Appendix A) -  with 
one participant being interviewed twice -  and each interview was held in their respective 
offices. Further, a consent form (See Appendix D) was provided to each of the 
participants for their signature. They kept one signed copy while I kept the other. As 
outlined in the consent form (See Appendix D), their real names were not included (See 
Appendix A) in this study in order to protect their privacy and permit a full range of 
discussion. Instead, they were listed simply as “Participant 1,” “Participant 2,” etc. 
Following the in-person meetings with President Trible and the five administrative and 
faculty leaders, the interviews were transcribed and coded. The transcripts were then sent
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to the participants for member checking and I made modifications and corrections based 
on their feedback.
Procedures for Data Analysis
For all three case studies (Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible), a thematic analysis 
was conducted following data collection to develop categories that summarized the data 
(Gall et al., 2007). This analysis also incorporated the time and contextual variables 
present during each presidency. For this study, a grounded, a posteriori, inductive, 
context-specific scheme was developed and utilized. According to Schwandt (2001), this 
schematic approach allows analysts to a) work with the actual language of respondents to 
generate the codes or categories, and b) work back and forth between the data segments 
and the codes or categories to refine the meaning of categories as they proceed through 
the data. For the purposes of this study, this approach was most effective since it offered 
a high degree of flexibility for developing codes and categories from raw data. Since the 
data largely came from studying historical documents that do not pertain to the specific 
focus of this study, that flexibility was crucial for effective data analysis. After this 
coding process, themes were then derived from these categories, followed by the 
determination of aggregate and then final themes for use in this study.
While analyzing the data for this study to determine findings and conclusions, 
following the accepted standards for trustworthiness criteria was critical. According to 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness consists of a set of criteria that are used to 
judge the quality or goodness of qualitative inquiry. These criteria essentially mirror the 
criteria set forth for effective quantitative research. Further, trustworthiness is considered 
the quality o f an investigation and its findings that make it noteworthy to audiences
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(Schwandt, 2001). Lincoln and Guba (1985) determined that trustworthiness is 
comprised of four criteria -  credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
Credibility runs parallel with internal validity as used in quantitative research and 
addresses the level of fit between respondents’ views of their life ways and the inquirers’ 
reconstruction and representation of the same (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). 
Transferability runs parallel with external validity as used in quantitative research and 
deals with the issue of generalizability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). 
Meanwhile, dependability is closely associated with reliability as used in quantitative 
research and focuses on the process o f the inquiry, helping to ensure that the process is 
logical, traceable, and documented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). Finally, 
confirmability runs parallel with objectivity as used in quantitative research and helps 
ensure that the data and interpretations of an inquiry are not just merely the figments of 
the inquirer’s imagination (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Schwandt, 2001). It calls for linking 
assertions, findings, and interpretations to the data in clearly discemable ways (Schwandt, 
2001).
To provide dependability for this study, I included detailed instructions outlining 
the specific research process in a manner allowing future researchers to replicate it if 
needed. Meanwhile, to provide credibility, confirmability, and to a certain extent 
transferability for this study, the procedure of triangulation was utilized to check the 
integrity of the inferences drawn from the study (Lincoln & Denzin, 2011; Schwandt, 
2001). According to Creswell (2012), triangulation is the process of corroborating 
evidence from different individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection. This 
helps ensure accuracy since the information draws on multiple sources of information,
65
individuals, or processes (Creswell, 2012). For this study, the primary data were derived 
from the writings o f Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford, as well as from interview 
responses from President Trible. These data were triangulated by comparing them to two 
other types o f data. First, they were compared with the writings or interview responses of 
senior faculty and administrative leaders at their respective universities. Second, they 
were compared with secondary sources such as newspaper articles, biographies, and other 
scholarly publications analyzing each president. The objective o f utilizing triangulation 
was to ensure that these distinct forms of data corroborated with one another, thus 
helping to also provide confirmability. Since I was only studying three non-traditional 
presidents, the prospects for transferability were limited. However, the data triangulation 
in this study provided a good foundation of findings that would at least have bearing on 
the study of other non-traditional presidents.
To provide further confirmability and validity for the study, I utilized peer review, 
which is considered an integral verification procedure in qualitative research (Creswell, 
1998; Glesne, 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). According to Glesne (2006), peer review 
and debriefing allow for external reflection and input on your work. For this study, a 
member o f my dissertation committee (Dr. Eddie Cole) served as a peer reviewer. Dr. 
Cole has expertise in conducting historical research. Specifically, I shared with him 
samples o f my data in the form of correspondence, interview transcripts, etc. along with 
the codes and themes I generated from those data. Ultimately, this provided me the 
opportunity to have an additional scholar concur with my findings and support my data 
triangulation.
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Along with meeting the accepted criteria for trustworthiness, it was also crucial 
that this study met the standards set forth for analyzing historical documents. Thus, it 
was important to ensure the genuineness o f the historical sources used for this study. 
According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), “perhaps more so than in any other form of 
research, the historical researcher must adopt a critical attitude toward any and all sources 
he or she reviews” (p. 549). Along those lines, two key objectives for historical 
researchers are to determine whether the document under analysis was really written by 
the supposed author and to determine whether the information contained in the document 
is true (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006).
The first objective requires external criticism, which refers to the process of 
determining genuineness of any and all documents the researcher uses (Fraenkel & 
Wallen, 2006; Gall et al., 2007). Since documents can sometimes be forged, falsified, or 
ghostwritten it is important that I took care to be diligent in this area. Meanwhile, the 
second objective refers to internal criticism, which “involves evaluating the accuracy and 
worth of the statements contained in a historical document” (Gall et al., 2007, p. 542). 
According to Gall and associates (2007), internal criticism is more complicated than 
external criticism because it includes the historian’s judgment about the truth of the 
statements in a historical source as well as an evaluation of the person who wrote them.
In addition, there is the added challenge for historians of trying to glean perception and 
intention from the historical data (Gall et al., 2007). For the purposes of this study, 
internal criticism and the interpretation of intention and perception were important factors 
for consideration, and I was careful to ensure that the contents of each document I
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examined were accurate and appropriately interpreted by comparing them with other 
historical sources.
Researcher Positionality
I was originally drawn to this study because of my experience working with 
President Trible at CNU. I have been employed by the university since 2003, serving 
first as an administrator before becoming a full-time faculty member. With strong 
personal interests in American history and politics, I have also long been intrigued by the 
idea of a former elected official with little prior higher education experience presiding 
over a university. Thus, I was interested in how such an individual with a non-academic 
professional background engaged successfully with academic culture. While conducting 
background research for a pilot study leading up to this project, I was further interested in 
how historically, some non-traditional presidents adjusted quite successfully to academic 
culture while others did not. It led to me to wonder if the success or failure could be 
attributed to each individual non-traditional president, or to situational factors beyond 
their control.
In pursuing this study, I enjoyed certain benefits while having to overcome a few 
challenges. I anticipated few challenges studying Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford 
beyond the logistics of coordinating archival research and traveling to the necessary 
venues for data collection, which included the libraries at Columbia University and Duke 
University. However, one key challenge I faced involved the rigors of conducting 
historical research and content analysis. My study involved reviewing hundreds of pages 
of documents. Thus, I needed to ensure that I allowed enough time to do the thorough 
data collection and analysis that were required for this study.
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As a longtime CNU employee with longstanding professional relationships with 
President Trible’s staff, scheduling and conducting an interview with him was not 
difficult. Several officials in his office, including Trible himself, were aware of my 
interest in this general topic and were more than happy to help in this endeavor. 
However, one challenge I experienced could be attributed to my long association with 
President Trible. I have enjoyed a long and productive friendship with him for 15 years 
now and view him as a mentor. This relationship, coupled with my observation of his 
achievements in office during my tenure at CNU, has prompted me to develop a largely 
positive view concerning the efficacy and value of non-traditional presidents.
Therefore, I took care throughout this study to bracket my own sentiments as 
much as possible and endeavored to maintain a strict objectivity when interviewing 
President Trible and analyzing data. Further, I was careful to listen in the interview not 
just for complimentary language about Trible’s presidency, but also for constructive 
criticism given to him by others concerning his leadership style and possible challenges 
he faced in adjusting to academic culture. Overall, the need for reflexivity was very 
important over the course of this study. It allowed for critical self-reflection and 
provided an important means of inspecting the entire research process (Denzin, 1997; 
Schwandt, 2001). In order to facilitate this process of reflexivity, I maintained a field 
journal throughout this study where I could maintain a log of my personal notes as well 
as reflections (Schwandt, 2001). This journal played a valuable role in helping to 
produce a thoughtful and well-designed study.
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Limitations and Delimitations
This study was delimited in the fact that it only examined three non-traditional 
college presidents at three distinct higher education institutions. Thus, it has little 
generalizability beyond that narrow area. This study also had several limitations. For 
one, while the intention for this study was to examine non-traditional presidents with no 
prior academic experience, the participants actually represented only one particular type -  
those who come from a public sector background, which includes such areas as 
government and military service. Non-traditional presidents from exclusively private 
sector backgrounds were not examined. Thus, the results from this study may not be 
applicable to other types of non-traditional presidents, including those from private sector 
backgrounds. Further research is needed to determine whether there are differences in 
the adjustment process to academic culture for different types of non-traditional 
presidents -  namely between those from public sector backgrounds versus those from 
private sector backgrounds.
Another limitation was that the study focused on only three higher education 
institutions in distinct periods of time -  Columbia University in the late 1940s/early 
1950s, Duke University in the 1970s/early 1980s, and Christopher Newport University in 
the late 1990s and 2000s. While some of the findings in this study may be applicable to 
non-traditional presidents at other types of institutions, they will not apply in all cases 
due to differences in time, culture, and institutional contexts. Again, further research is 
needed to explore if  there are differences in how non-traditional presidents adapt to 
academic culture depending upon institutional type and time context.
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A further limitation of the study involved the challenges inherent in conducting 
historical research. According to Fraenkel and Wallen (2006), historical research is 
among the most difficult types o f research to conduct. This challenge is because of the 
severe limitations imposed by the nature of the sample o f documents and the 
instrumentation process, which is typically content analysis (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006). 
For instance, in historical research, researchers cannot ensure representatives o f a sample 
or check the reliability and validity of the inferences made from the available data 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 2006). Further, for the purposes of this study, there was the threat 
of taking statements made by Eisenhower and Sanford about academic culture out of 
context since they are now deceased and can no longer speak for themselves to provide 
elaboration or clarification.
Ethical Considerations
Since two of the cases in this study (Eisenhower and Sanford) are historical while 
the other one (Trible) is modem, I encountered different ethical considerations within 
each realm. For the historical case studies, following the accepted guidelines of proper 
archival research was an important consideration. Further, abiding by the usage and 
permissions guidelines of certain archival documents I examined was also an issue. 
However, since Presidents Eisenhower and Sanford are both deceased, this provided 
greater flexibility in areas such as IRB approval than if they were both still living.
For the modem case study, ensuring the confidentiality o f informants beyond 
President Trible was important since I was using an interview protocol. This 
confidentiality was especially critical since the study required the informants to speak 
candidly about Trible, who is either their direct or indirect superior. Thus, data collected
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from these interviews were kept in a secure location and I was the only researcher with 
direct access to these data. Further, in order to ensure confidentiality, I was the only 
researcher who knew the true identities o f the informants in this study. I did not 
encounter the same situation with the historical case studies since all parties involved in 
those cases were likely deceased.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to explore the issues that non-traditional college 
presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned 
to inform future practice. Using a qualitative, case study approach, this study examined 
the experiences of three non-traditional presidents from distinct historical periods in 
American higher education. Included were Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at Columbia 
University (1948-1953), former North Carolina Gov. Terry Sanford at Duke University 
(1969-1985), and former U.S. Sen. Paul Trible at Christopher Newport University (1996- 
present). This chapter has outlined the methodological approaches that were utilized in 
order to gather and interpret the necessary data. The next chapters will provide a 
contextual overview of the experiences o f each president at their respective universities 
and explore the findings from the study’s data collection and analysis process.
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Chapter 4 -  Dwight D. Eisenhower and Columbia University
As noted in previous chapters, non-traditional college presidents are gradually 
becoming a more common fixture across all levels of American higher education. 
However, despite their growing numbers, little is known about the issues that they face in 
adjusting to academic culture. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that the adjustment 
experiences o f non-traditional college presidents may vary depending upon such factors 
as the president’s leadership approach, historical context, institutional context, and even 
unforeseen events (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001; Bomstein, 2003; Cotnam, 2006). This 
chapter explores the experiences of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as president of 
Columbia University from 1948 to 1953. The findings from this study indicated that 
Eisenhower personified a non-traditional college president who did not adjust well to 
academic culture. Instead, his tenure as president was a rocky one, leaving behind a 
legacy of bitterness within Columbia’s campus community that remained years after his 
tenure (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985).
Noted historian Stephen Ambrose (1990) once described Eisenhower as one of 
the greatest leaders from the Western world in the 20th century. This was a man who led 
armies of millions during World War II and helped to mastermind the greatest 
amphibious invasion ever attempted in world history (Smith, 2012). Moreover, 
Eisenhower managed to hold together against incredible odds the largest multinational 
alliance ever assembled, forging a path to victory over Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). However, when it came to 
leading a complex, urban university like Columbia, Eisenhower was unable to make it 
work (Clark, 2013; Smith, 2012). To make matters worse, he never adapted well to
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academic culture and had an uncomfortable relationship at best with Columbia’s faculty 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Using data derived from 
Eisenhower’s personal and official correspondence, along with selected secondary 
sources, this study found that his failure to adjust to academic culture stemmed from a 
combination of factors. These included intense frustration over mounting political, 
military, and academic obligations; being overextended professionally; lacking the 
necessary academic experience for the position; and advocating a presidential vision that 
did not coincide with Columbia’s institutional needs. To put these factors into 
perspective, this study situated Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia within a broader 
framework that included his personal history, a historical context o f the post-World War 
II higher education landscape, and Columbia’s institutional context during that period. 
Those sections follow below.
Personal History
Dwight D. Eisenhower was bom on October 14,1890 in Denison, Texas. 
Following a childhood spent in Kansas, a strong interest in military history as well as 
financial necessity prompted him to attend West Point, from which he graduated in 1915. 
Coming from a large family with limited financial means, West Point proved to be the 
only viable option for Eisenhower to obtain a college education. Following graduation, 
he married Mamie Doud Eisenhower, with whom he eventually had two children. 
Eisenhower spent World War I serving stateside in various staff officer positions. His 
lack of combat experience on the warfront was a source of embarrassment for 
Eisenhower, and was used by rivals to denigrate him in later years. Nevertheless, his 
stellar reputation as a staff officer brought him into close contact with several prominent
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military leaders, including Generals John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, and George C. 
Marshall. Such influential connections combined with his natural talent for military 
administration allowed Eisenhower to rise steadily through the ranks, and he was 
promoted to brigadier general in October 1941 (Ambrose, 1990). During the World War 
II era, the promotion progression for U.S. Army officers would have been as follows: 
second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier 
general (one-star), major general (two-star), lieutenant general (three-star), general (four- 
star), and General of the Army (five-star).
Advancement for Eisenhower continued as the United States entered World War 
II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Following rapid promotions to major 
general and then lieutenant general, Eisenhower led the Allied invasion of North Africa 
in November 1942 -  code-named “Operation Torch.” After overseeing the invasion of 
Sicily and earning promotion to general in 1943, Eisenhower was appointed Supreme 
Allied Commander of Allied forces, charged with planning the proposed Operation 
Overlord. In that capacity, he worked closely with some of the top Allied leadership, 
including Winston Churchill, British Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, and 
French Gen. Charles de Gaulle. In recognition of his success in the D-Day campaign, 
Eisenhower was promoted to General o f the Army in December 1944 (Ambrose, 1990).
Following the German surrender, he served as military governor of the U.S. 
occupation zone in Germany and then replaced Gen. George C. Marshall as U.S. Army 
chief o f staff in November 1945 (Ambrose, 1990). Not one to give compliments lightly, 
Marshall praised Eisenhower’s wartime leadership, telling him, “you have completed 
your mission with the greatest victory in the history of warfare... you have been selfless
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in your actions, always sound and tolerant in your judgments and altogether admirable in 
the courage and wisdom of your military decisions” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 4). 
However, by early 1947, Eisenhower was pondering his next career move, as his term as 
Army chief of staff was coming to an end. While at age 57 he was too young and vibrant 
to retire, the immensely popular Eisenhower was also ready for a bit of a rest. Despite 
lucrative financial offers from the corporate world, he wanted to remain in some form of 
public service. A military historian at heart, Eisenhower had often dreamt of leading a 
small liberal arts college in a sort o f semi-retirement with his wife, Mamie (Ambrose, 
1990; Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978). Thus, while uncertain of what the future would hold 
Eisenhower was open to the prospect of a career in higher education (Jacobs, 2001). 
Historical Context
By the late 1940s, the higher education landscape that Eisenhower contemplated 
entering was full of challenges as well as opportunities. Following World War II, 
American colleges and universities entered a “Golden Age” that was marked by 
prosperity, prestige, and popularity (Clark, 2013, p. 16; Thelin, 2011, p. 260). Much of 
this success was fueled by a strong federal government commitment to enhance college 
access, along with the availability o f millions of returning World War II veterans who 
were eager to obtain college educations (Rudolph 1990; Thelin, 2011). In order to adjust 
adequately to a peacetime economy and to avert civil strife among disgruntled veterans 
who arrived home without jobs or prospects, the U.S. Congress passed the G.I. Bill in 
1944 to provide educational support for college-bound veterans (Clark, 2013; Thelin,
2011). The bill guaranteed one year o f education for 90 days of military service, plus one 
month for each additional month of active duty up to 48 months (Thelin, 2011). Along
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with paying tuition, it also provided funds for fees, books, and other supplies (Thelin, 
2011).
Despite initial projections that the section of the G.I. Bill regarding educational 
benefits would not attract much interest, it was wildly popular, with college enrollments 
passing one million in 1946 (Thelin, 2011). Eventually, of the 11 million veterans who 
returned home following World War II, roughly one third utilized G.I. Bill benefits to 
attend colleges and universities (Rudolph, 1990). Aware of this financial boon, many 
higher education institutions put into place marketing initiatives to attract veterans to 
their campuses (Thelin, 2011). The net result of such efforts was a doubling in 
enrollments at American colleges and universities between 1943 and 1946 (Thelin,
2011).
Along with the G.I. Bill, other federal government initiatives during this period 
benefitted higher education institutions immensely. One such example was the Truman 
Commission, a 28-member body appointed by President Harry S. Truman in 1946. The 
commission’s task was to explore the functions of higher education in supporting 
democracy and to identify the means by which the subsequent plans could best be 
performed (Thelin, 2011). The resulting 1947 Truman Commission Report, entitled 
Higher Education for American Democracy, concluded that the United States devoted far 
too little of its gross national product to investment in postsecondary education (Thelin,
2011). Another report, developed in 1945 by the preeminent scientist Vannevar Bush 
and entitled Science, the Endless Frontier, argued for the utilization of American higher 
education institutions in federal government research (Clark, 2013; Thelin, 2011). The 
impact of this document for colleges and universities was monumental, as it positioned
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the federal government as a research patron and contractor, working with scores of higher 
education institutions to advance scientific research (Clark, 2013; Thelin, 2011). Thus, 
the late 1940s was an exciting and lucrative period for American higher education, as it 
enjoyed spectacular success between unprecedented student enrollments and strong 
financial support from government and corporate sources (Clark, 2013).
However, this era was not without its challenges for colleges and universities 
across the nation. For one, higher education leaders debated the role that their institutions 
should play in the rapidly evolving societal landscape (Rudolph, 1990). Some questioned 
the long-range impact on American higher education of pursuing the enlargement of 
educational opportunity through the G.I. Bill (Rudolph, 1990). Further, they speculated 
openly whether it was in the best interest of colleges and universities, traditionally the 
domain o f the elite, to open their gates to the masses (Rudolph, 1990). Thus, this 
question of whether American higher education was sacrificing quality for quantity 
concerned many educators throughout the nation (Rudolph, 1990).
Higher education leaders also came to realize that the rapid increase in student 
enrollment on their campuses, driven by the G.I. Bill, came at a steep price. First, most 
colleges and universities had not prepared to handle such a high volume of students. 
According to Thelin (2011), “the swelling of postwar enrollments signaled the need for 
massive construction of laboratories, classroom buildings, and dormitories” (p. 265). 
Consequently, institutions scrambled to keep up with the extraordinary demand for new 
facilities. Also, higher education leaders found it difficult to accommodate the needs of 
G.I. Bill students (Thelin, 2011). These veterans were older than the traditional college 
student, were in some cases disabled, and were usually married with children (Thelin,
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2011). This group of adult learners required college faculty and administrators to 
reassess everything from how they designed curricular offerings to what campus 
activities they should offer. The G.I. Bill students also prompted traditional-aged college 
students to rethink their activities (Thelin, 2011). According to Thelin (2011), “how, for 
example could the hazing of a fraternity initiation intimidate a twenty-six-year-old army 
veteran who had been in mortal combat” (p. 266)? Consequently, the presence of 
millions of veterans on college campuses presented something of a double-edged sword 
for American higher education during this time. On the one hand, these veterans 
provided a large amount of revenue and prosperity for higher education institutions. On 
the other hand, they also created a number of logistical, infrastructural, and curricular 
problems.
Another major challenge stemmed from the growing threat o f communism across 
the globe. Known as either the “Red Scare” or the “McCarthy” era, the period from 1947 
to 1954 was characterized by intense ideological conflict and driven by the fear that a 
serious communist-based threat existed within the United States (Clark, 2013, p. 17; 
Foster, 1997, p. 1). Consequently, American society was propelled into “a period of 
fervent anti-communism, which produced one of the most severe episodes o f political 
repercussion the United States has ever experienced” (Foster, 1997, p. 1). This 
repercussion was best characterized by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Un-American 
Activities Committee, a congressional task force that endeavored to seek out suspected 
communists from all walks of American society (Thelin, 2011).
This Red Scare era proved to be highly problematic for American higher 
education. During World War II, the nation’s colleges and universities were seen as
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centers of democracy, teaching citizens about civic engagement and providing research 
expertise that contributed to national defense (Thelin, 2011). However, after the war, 
concerns began to rise that these same institutions were havens for dissidence and 
disloyalty (Thelin, 2011). Such thinking was driven largely by vague accusations that 
leading scholars nationwide had ties to the Communist Party (Thelin, 2011). 
Consequently, faculty members at many institutions were subjected to political 
compliance tests in order to be considered for federal research funding or to even keep 
their jobs (Thelin, 2011). This demand for loyalty oaths prompted intense debate about 
the importance of academic freedom, and even prompted some faculty members at 
schools such as Berkeley to resign their positions in protest (Thelin, 2011). Hundreds of 
others with suspected communist ties were quietly dismissed by presidents and boards of 
trustees without due process (Thelin, 2011). It was a very troubling period in American 
higher education that tested the leadership prowess of many college presidents. 
Unfortunately, many campus presidents proved to be “more interested in defusing 
external scrutiny than in defending their professors’ traditional rights o f academic 
freedom” (Thelin, 2011, p. 275). Therefore, despite the significant benefits for higher 
education brought about by the increased federal government support, they came at a 
steep price for many faculty members and administrators.
Institutional Context
The situation at Momingside Heights, the epicenter of the Columbia University 
campus, closely paralleled what was happening at colleges and universities elsewhere in 
the country. Following World War II, Columbia was inundated with military veterans, 
who comprised nearly 80% of the institution’s new students (Jacobs, 1985). By fall
80
1946, there were nearly 14,000 veterans enrolled on campus; a number that nearly 
matched Columbia’s entire 16,161 member student body in late 1941 (Jacobs, 2001; 
Kahn, 1941). By 1947, roughly half o f Columbia’s students were enrolled under the G.I. 
Bill (McCaughey, 2003). Further, possessing a world-class faculty, Columbia was 
uniquely positioned to take advantage of the federal government’s emerging research 
partnerships with higher education institutions. However, several years of weak 
presidential leadership, along with an outdated administrative structure and mounting 
financial problems left the university woefully unprepared to meet the demands of this 
emerging era. By the late 1940s, Columbia was in dire straits and in search of a bold and 
compelling leader who could advance the university back to prosperity (Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001).
Interestingly, the decades prior to World War II were highly productive for 
Columbia. For many years, the institution was ably led by Nicholas Murray Butler, who 
had served as president since 1902 (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985). A respected educator 
and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Butler had overseen a massive building program during 
his tenure, adding over a dozen buildings and several academic programs to the campus 
by the early 1940s (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). His success prompted many observers to 
refer to Columbia as the “Acropolis of America” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 14). Moreover, 
historian Allan Nevins considered Columbia during this period to be “the largest and 
richest seat of learning in the largest and richest city in the globe” (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). 
Butler himself also helped give the institution an international reputation (Jacobs, 2001). 
As president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he was highly respected 
in the diplomatic community and visits to his home by foreign government officials and
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other dignitaries were common (Jacobs, 2001). While Butler did have some detractors, 
who referred to him as “Czar Nicholas” for his autocratic nature, his supporters were far 
more numerous (Jacobs, 2001, p. 15). According to scholar Lindsay Rogers, Butler was 
“a great university president -  the greatest o f the twentieth century” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 15).
However, as the 20th century progressed the acropolis that Butler had labored so 
hard to build began to crumble. First, the Great Depression depleted the fortunes of 
Columbia’s largest donors and left a noticeable impact on the institution’s fundraising 
(Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, as Butler’s tenure lingered on, many of his closest friends 
passed away, which drastically shrank the university’s donor pool (Jacobs, 2001). The 
largest problem, however, was Butler himself. Believing that only he could lead 
Columbia effectively, he remained at the helm well past the customary retirement age 
(Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, Butler’s final years at the University were 
described as “tragic,” with increasing blindness and deafness impacting even his ability 
to give speeches (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). By 1945, this decaying leadership left Columbia 
years behind in construction projects, building maintenance, fundraising, and 
administrative reorganization (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, there was an 
increasing realization that Columbia was nowhere near prepared to respond to the 
educational needs o f post-World War II America. Ultimately, Butler had nearly 
destroyed the great university he himself had created (Jacobs, 2001). Later in 1945, the 
board of trustees finally asked the 83-year-old Butler to step down as president (Jacobs, 
2001).
Unfortunately, getting Butler to retire did little to alleviate Columbia’s pressing 
problems. By 1945, “the lack of strong leadership and fundraising for over a decade
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meant that Butler’s successor would face a challenge far greater than Butler’s formidable 
shadow” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 17). Specifically, Columbia faced the postwar era with an 
acting president, an administration in dire need of reorganization, a new presidential 
search, and pressing financial problems (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Further, even in 
retirement Butler continued to lurk in the shadows, attending board meetings and 
endeavoring to exert his influence (Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, many prominent 
educators refused to accept the Columbia presidency, prolonging the search and fueling 
faculty discontent on the Momingside Heights campus (Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001). 
Even after a two-year presidential search, there was still no clear successor to Butler. 
Thus, by 1947 Columbia University was in deep trouble on a variety o f fronts. What 
follows (See Table 1) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Eisenhower’s 
experience at Columbia. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context, 
Columbia’s institutional context, and by Eisenhower’s personal history. These three 
categories are placed side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual 
overview of the key events and issues that occurred during the Eisenhower era at 
Columbia.
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Table 1 -  Eisenhower/Columbia Timeline
Historical Context Institutional Context Personal History
1917-1918: U.S. 
involvement in WWI.
1929: Great Depression 
Begins.
1940-1945: WWII.
1944: G.I. Bill passed.
Late 1940s: Higher 
Education Golden Age 
begins.
1946: Veteran college 
enrollment tops one million.
1947: Truman Commission 
Report Published. Cold War 
begins.
1947-1954: Red 
Scare/McCarthy Era.
1754: Columbia founded 
(as King’s College).
1784: Institution renamed 
Columbia College.
1896: Institution renamed 
Columbia University.
1902: Nicholas Murray 
Butler named president.
1930s: Massive campus 
construction program.
Mid 1940s: Financial 
problems arise. Results in 
backlogged maintenance 
and construction.
1945: Nicholas Murray 
Butler steps down as 
Columbia’s president.
1946:14,000 veterans 
enrolled on campus.
1947: Almost half of 
student body enrolled under 
G.I. Bill.
1954: 200th anniversary of 
Columbia.
1890: Eisenhower bom.
1915: Graduated from West 
Point.
1917-1918: Served in WWI 
(no combat service).
1942-1945: Served in 
WWII (no combat service).
1946-1948: Served as U.S. 
Army chief o f staff.
1948: Appointed president 
of Columbia.
1951-1952: NATO 
commander in Europe.
1953: Elected U.S. 
president. Resigns from 
Columbia presidency.
1956: Re-elected U.S. 
president.
1961: Leaves office.
1969: Eisenhower dies.
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Selecting a New President
It was against this contextual backdrop that Dwight D. Eisenhower was first 
considered for Columbia’s presidency. The Eisenhower name had popped up regularly in 
board deliberations concerning a possible successor for Butler. A popular Columbia 
myth is that at one presidential search meeting, a trustee asked, “what about 
Eisenhower?” as a possible option, allegedly referring to General Eisenhower’s brother, 
Milton, who was an experienced university president (Jacobs, 2001, p. 33; Neal, 1978, 
pp. 237-238). However, as the legend goes, the other trustees assumed he meant General 
Eisenhower and subsequently initiated contact with the World War II hero (Jacobs, 2001; 
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). In reality, many of the trustees were legitimately 
interested in General Eisenhower, even though he possessed minimal qualifications at 
best for the position (Childs, 1958; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). Thirty years later, a 
veteran Columbia faculty member observed that the university would have been better off 
with Milton (Neal, 1978). However, he pointed out that ultimately, “the trustees wanted 
General Eisenhower” (Neal, 1978, p. 238).
Despite some initial reservations, the trustees wanted the general to be 
Columbia’s president for a variety o f reasons. For one, Eisenhower was widely 
considered to be a future U.S. president, and many trustees yearned for Columbia to have 
a close association with such an important historical figure (Childs, 1958; McCaughey, 
2003). Moreover, the university desperately needed money, and a celebrity president 
looked like a viable option to help alleviate the pressing financial problems (Clark, 2013; 
Parmet, 1972). Eisenhower’s close friendship with a wide array of wealthy businessmen 
and financiers proved very attractive to the board, and they believed that Eisenhower
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could encourage many of those executives to support Columbia (Parmet, 1972). Lastly, 
in the midst of the Red Scare and the challenges it created for American higher education, 
Columbia needed the international stature and prestige that Eisenhower would bring to 
help protect it in that challenging political environment (Clark, 2013; Galambos, 1984a; 
Smith, 2012). Overall, it was “as a massive public figure that Eisenhower attracted the 
Columbia Trustees.... the Columbia tradition demanded such a public figure” (Neal,
1978, p. 239).
However, while Columbia was very interested in Dwight D. Eisenhower, he was 
not nearly as interested in Columbia (McCaughey, 2003). As early as spring 1946, 
Eisenhower had politely declined offers to assume the office of president (Ambrose,
1990; McCaughey, 2003). While the general was certainly interested in a college 
presidency, he had dreamt instead of presiding over a much smaller school in a country 
setting (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Galambos, 1984a; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978; 
Smith, 2012). Conversely, the thought o f leading a complex, urban university like 
Columbia intimidated him (Neal, 1978; Parmet, 1972). While military leaders had 
certainly served as college presents in the past, none had ever led an institution as 
prestigious as Columbia (Neal, 1978). Nevertheless, certain Columbia trustees were so 
eager to recruit Eisenhower that they persisted in their lobbying efforts despite his initial 
reservations (McCaughey, 2003).
Further, the trustees made unrealistic promises to the general about the nature of 
his potential duties at Momingside Heights (McCaughey, 2003). In attempting to fit 
Columbia into Eisenhower’s vision for a desired semi-retirement, they insisted that his 
responsibilities would include no involvement in purely academic affairs and no
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responsibility for fundraising (Ambrose, 1990; McCaughey, 2003). Instead, those 
functions were to be handled by the provost and various deans (Jacobs, 2001). The 
trustees also insisted that Eisenhower would not have to engage in excessive entertaining 
nor involve himself with burdensome administrative details (Ambrose, 1990;
McCaughey, 2003). Alternately, Eisenhower could be the master of his own time and 
use Columbia as a national platform to advance his interests in civic engagement and 
democratic citizenship (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985).
Knowing the full extent of Columbia’s financial and administrative problems, it is 
striking that these trustees made such absurd promises to Eisenhower. However, they 
were desperate to recruit him and were prepared to say nearly anything to help seal the 
deal (McCaughey, 2003). Eisenhower eventually gave in and accepted the offer 
reluctantly in June 1947 (Ambrose, 1990; McCaughey, 2003). In assuming this new role, 
he believed that it would possibly afford him certain advantages and opportunities. For 
one, he could focus on his efforts to promote “basic concepts of education in a democracy 
with particular emphasis upon the American system of democracy” (Jacobs, 1985, p.
556). Columbia’s presidency also provided him a national platform to speak on 
significant issues, while avoiding either business ties or major political controversy 
(Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). Further, the position potentially provided Eisenhower a 
respite from mounting public pressure to run for president o f the United States (Clark, 
2013; Parmet, 1972). At the time, Eisenhower and the trustees came to believe that it 
would be a mutually beneficial arrangement (McCaughey, 2003; Smith, 2012).
However, in a troubling sign of things to come, then-West Point superintendent 
and Eisenhower confidante, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, felt that the general was perplexingly
87
nai ve about the demands on the president o f a large university (Jacobs, 1985). Believing 
that Eisenhower had allowed himself to be persuaded by false promises, Taylor remarked 
that his friend was “largely unaware of the nature of the primary duties o f a university 
president with the emphasis on money raising and administration” (Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). 
As subsequent events proved, this observation was quite accurate and illustrated some of 
the key challenges that Eisenhower would face during his presidential tenure at 
Columbia. Moreover, Taylor’s sentiments foreshadowed Eisenhower’s difficult 
adjustment process to academic culture; one that he never really mastered.
Summary of Emerging Themes
As Taylor’s observations forewarned, Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia was a 
troubled one. Although Eisenhower was well-intentioned, he did relatively little to 
alleviate the institution’s pressing problems, was frequently away from campus, and 
stirred up considerable resentment within the university community as a result (Clark, 
2013; Jacobs, 2001; Parmet, 1972). Eisenhower also represents a clear example of a non- 
traditional college president who did not adjust well to academic culture (Ambrose, 1990; 
Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). While he certainly held no ill will 
toward Columbia’s faculty, Eisenhower simply did not have the time, interest, or patience 
to learn the ways of the academy. And, indeed, he was told this area of oversight would 
not be included in his job.
Thus, this inability to adapt to academic culture, coupled with a lack of progress 
in addressing Columbia’s institutional needs, has prompted some modem historians to 
consider Eisenhower’s tenure at Momingside Heights a failed one (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 
2001; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972). Conversely, other historians argue that
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Eisenhower did achieve some degree of success. He gave Columbia enhanced 
international prestige, carefully defended the academic freedom of its faculty, and at least 
attempted to fix the institution’s broken finances (Galambos, 1984a; Smith, 2012). 
However, regardless of his level of success as an educational leader, the purpose of this 
study was to determine the reasons why he failed -  as concluded in this study - to adjust 
to academic culture.
To investigate this question, over 2,200 pieces of Eisenhower’s personal 
correspondence spanning his years as Columbia’s president (1948-1953) were examined. 
Interestingly, only about 220 of these documents were found to be relevant to 
Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia, and therefore only those were coded (See Appendix 
E). The rest pertained to military, political, and international diplomacy issues that were 
not germane to this study and therefore not coded. For the purposes of data triangulation, 
the coded data were then compared to analysis by historians as well as the relevant 
reflections of Eisenhower’s Columbia colleagues to ensure that the findings were 
consistent.
The objective behind this research was to identify Eisenhower’s perceptions about 
academic culture as reflected in his personal and official correspondence with others as 
well as in his diary entries. Another key objective was to identify the issues behind 
Eisenhower’s failure to adjust to academic life. Open coding identified 12 applicable 
codes that showed up multiple times in his writings. Axial coding later narrowed these 
codes down into four central themes that helped explain his inability to adapt to academic 
culture. These themes included Eisenhower’s frustration over the intricacies o f academic 
culture as well as the demands o f mounting political and military obligations. They also
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included the challenges that Eisenhower faced by being too overextended professionally. 
While he was president o f Columbia, he also had other important military and political 
commitments, which limited the time he could devote to Momingside Heights. The other 
two central themes were his lack of academic experience and the disconnect that existed 
between Eisenhower’s presidential vision and Columbia’s institutional needs. As the 
data ultimately demonstrated, all of these issues conspired to compromise his ability to 
adjust to academic culture.
Frustration. Frustration was a theme that showed up repeatedly in Eisenhower’s 
writing, being expressed roughly 53 times in various letters and diary entries (Galambos, 
1984a; Galambos, 1984b; Galambos, 1989a; Galambos, 1989b). This frustration was 
expressed in two distinct forms. First, as a career soldier Eisenhower was clearly 
annoyed by the unique dynamics of academic culture, which he referred to as a 
“bewildering world” (Galambos, 1984a, p. 107). He mentioned it in no less than 10 
times in letters to friends and relatives, with an overall frequency of roughly one 
reference in every five letters. A particular area o f contention for Eisenhower was what 
he considered the glacial pace of academic decision-making (Ambrose, 1990; Galambos,
1984a). This perspective made sense considering that as a general he was used to having 
his orders quickly executed. Conversely, in the academic world he was appalled at the 
amount of time and deliberation it took to get anything done. In one April 5,1950 diary 
entry, he expressed these sentiments when reflecting on a search process for a new dean: 
There is probably no more complicated business in the world than that of 
picking a new dean within a university. Faculties, including the retiring 
dean, feel an almost religious fervor in insisting upon acceptance of their
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views. These are as varied as there are individuals involved, and every 
man’s opinion is voiced in terms of urgency. The result is complete 
confusion and I cannot see why universities have followed such a custom! 
But I’ll be d— glad when we have a new dean of engineering and the fuss, 
fury, and hysteria die down (Galambos, 1984b, p. 1067).
Academic governance holds faculty views as central and germane to operations. With a 
great deal of power vested in the professional roles of faculty, the decision-making 
process outlined by Eisenhower is typical.
Eisenhower expressed similar frustration over the amount of paperwork he 
noticed in the higher education environment. Following a long career in the U.S. Army, 
he thought that no other organization could produce so many documents (Ambrose,
1990). However, following a few months at Columbia, he wrote, “one of the major 
surprises... is the paperwork... I thought I was leaving those mountainous white piles 
forever” (Ambrose, 1990, p. 241). When Eisenhower tried to insist that every project 
should be presented on one typewritten page, the very idea “reduced the professors to 
helpless rage or laughter” (Ambrose, 1990, p. 241). The bureaucratic nature of 
academics is long documented and a common cultural artifact for those working in higher 
education (Mintzberg, 1980; Bimbaum, 1988).
Eisenhower’s frustration with the dynamics of academic culture has also been 
well documented by both historians and his former Columbia associates (Ambrose, 1990; 
Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). Smith (2012) 
argued that while universities are governed by consensus, Eisenhower was accustomed to 
a chain of command. Thus, Eisenhower viewed the various deans and department chairs
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as his corps and division commanders, faculty members as officers and students as 
enlisted personnel (Smith, 2012). Much of Eisenhower’s frustration therefore stemmed 
from the decentralized nature o f the academy (Mintzberg, 1980), and the reality that 
academic decision-making did not follow a strict hierarchy (Smith, 2012). Moreover, he 
came to find academic affairs increasingly trivial over the course of his presidential 
tenure, which further fueled his discomfort and frustration (Ambrose, 1990; Smith, 
2012). For Eisenhower, faculty meetings were his “special hell” (Ambrose, 1990, p. 
241). According to John Krout, dean of the graduate faculty in 1949, Eisenhower 
constantly complained that instead of actually accomplishing anything, all faculty 
members did was talk (Ambrose, 1990). Consequently, total boredom combined with 
discussion over what Eisenhower considered trivial topics soon drove him away 
(Ambrose, 1990).
On this issue of frustration, the data from Eisenhower’s correspondence were 
supported by other Columbia officials as well. According to several faculty sources, 
much of his frustration stemmed from regret over accepting the Columbia presidency in 
the first place (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; McCaughey, 2003; Parmet, 1972; Smith,
2012). According to McCaughey (2003), Eisenhower believed that he had been tricked 
into taking the job. In later years, Dean Harry Carman recounted a conversation with 
Eisenhower that touched on this difficult subject (Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). With a 
tinge of regret, Carman remembered Eisenhower reflecting, “in a moment of weakness I 
listened to the blandishments of a couple of your trustees and here I find myself with a 
gigantic organization on my hands, and I don’t know a goddamn thing about it” (as cited 
in Jacobs, 2001, p. 87). In a similar vein, a close Eisenhower associate once remarked, “I
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don’t think that he had any idea what a complicated thing Columbia University was or is. 
No idea of it whatever.” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 87). By both personal accounts and 
those with whom Eisenhower was in contact, academics represented a foreign territory 
for this non-traditional college president, and ultimately Eisenhower never embraced the 
academic culture.
Eisenhower’s deep frustration also stemmed from the mounting expectations for 
him to engage in national military and government service, even while serving as 
Columbia’s president. He discussed this aspect of his frustration in 43 different letters 
and diary entries (Galambos, 1984a, Galambos, 1984b, Galambos, 1989a, Galambos, 
1989b). Originally, Eisenhower envisioned his post-World War II life to be a semi- 
retirement of sorts, in which he could be the master of his own schedule (Ambrose,
1990). However, pressing national security issues prompted a military leader o f his 
stature to be utilized extensively as a trouble shooter and informal advisor at the Pentagon 
throughout the late 1940s (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Smith, 2012).
Eisenhower’s services were needed in particular to work out Department of 
Defense budget problems and to smooth over disputes between the armed services 
(Ambrose, 1990; Smith, 2012). He therefore spent at least a couple o f days a week in 
Washington D.C. during the early stages of his Columbia tenure (Jacobs, 2001). The 
problem grew only worse when President Harry S. Truman asked Eisenhower to head the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in October 1950 (Childs, 1958). To be sure, 
Truman was within his rights as commander and chief to make this and other requests, 
since a five-star general, under the law creating the rank, never fully retires from active 
service (Childs, 1958). However, Eisenhower was still indignant over this assignment,
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which required him to take an unpopular leave of absence from Columbia (Ambrose, 
1990; Jacobs, 2001). Throughout this period, he also had to fend off increasing calls to 
run for president of the United States, which further fueled his stress and annoyance 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Clearly, this did not put 
Eisenhower in the ideal frame of mind to learn the ways of academic life, as it was 
doubtful he would have a long tenure in a university setting.
Eisenhower’s frustration over these military, government, and political 
obligations was highly evident in his correspondence. In explaining his feelings to a 
close friend, Eisenhower wrote in a February 24, 1950 letter:
I have read some of the same comments that you have concerning my 
alleged dissatisfaction with my present position! They are merely 
examples o f distortion and inaccuracy. It is true that in attempting, 
at times, to explain to my friends the difficulties of my present life,
I have dwelt upon the conflicts that arise between the details of 
university administration, unusually persistent adhesions from a 
past life, and, finally, the demands that arise out of my earnest effort 
to be of some help to people who are struggling manfully to support the 
essentials of the American way of life (Galambos, 1984b, p. 989).
This letter was written relatively early in Eisenhower’s Columbia presidency when he 
was still trying to acclimate as Columbia’s president. Eisenhower’s arc of frustration 
peaked shortly thereafter, when he began to realize that he would not be an effective 
higher education leader. In other letters and diary entries, Eisenhower expressed similar 
sentiments about having too much to do, discussing at length about how “the pressures on
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me are o f several kinds” (Galambos, 1989a, p. 367). Along with his military duties, he 
was very frustrated with mounting political expectations, which continued to grow as his 
tenure at Columbia progressed. To Eisenhower’s chagrin, pressure for him to run for 
president of the United States mounted no matter how much he denied interest in the 
position (Galambos, 1984b; 1989a). He referred to the endless calls for him to enter the 
presidential ring as “burdensome” and “monotonous” (Galambos, 1989a, p. 667). 
Ultimately, no matter what he did or said, Eisenhower could not escape the consensus 
from leaders in both political parties that the United States “demanded” him in politics 
(Galambos, 1989a, p. 698).
The data from Eisenhower’s writings reflecting these frustrations are supported by 
multiple historians and contemporaries (Ambrose, 1990; Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013; Neal, 
1978; Parmet, 1972). According to Ambrose (1990), any hopes for Eisenhower of a 
future free from politics were shattered on election night in 1948, when Democrat Harry 
S. Truman was re-elected president unexpectedly. Following their bitter defeat, 
Republicans began lobbying Eisenhower for a 1952 presidential run relentlessly 
(Ambrose, 1990). Anti-Truman Democrats were also eager for Eisenhower to run as 
their nominee in the 1948 and 1952 elections (Childs, 1958; Parmet, 1972). According to 
Childs (1958) Eisenhower was not even fully settled in his Columbia office before a 
seemingly endless stream of governors and congressmen descended upon Momingside 
Heights to demand a presidential run. This pressure only increased during Eisenhower’s 
tenure as Columbia’s president (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith,
2012). A few years later, Eisenhower was furious when U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
entered his name on the Republican ballot for the New Hampshire primary in January
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1952 (Ambrose, 1990). However, Eisenhower later gave in to this pressure and entered 
the presidential campaign reluctantly a few weeks later (Ambrose, 1990; Smith, 2012). 
Overall, the frustration resulting from these constant demands, as well as possible regrets 
about coming to Columbia in the first place, did not put Eisenhower in the best mental 
frame to undertake the rigors of learning academic culture. Moreover, Eisenhower had 
experienced a culture-shock of sorts engaging with academic culture and was forced to 
try and do a job that was much different than the one he was promised. Consequently, 
these factors also contributed to his frustration and severely limited his ability to 
acclimate to academe.
Overextended. Along with the frustration resulting from these non-academic 
professional demands, a related theme in Eisenhower’s writing was how overextended he 
was trying to take on all of these tasks. In a June 26,1951 letter to a friend, he 
commented, “here I am working as hard as I ever have in my life” (Galambos, 1989a, p. 
387). Despite his interest in seeking semi-retirement, Eisenhower’s workload had 
increased. To complicate matters, beyond his academic, military, and political duties, 
Eisenhower was also in high demand as a keynote speaker or patron for various 
organizations (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b; 1989a; 1989b). He was forced to decline the 
vast majority o f these invitations and consequently worried whether this “problem of 
saying no and sticking to it” would cause resentment toward Columbia (Galambos,
1984a, p. 328). Eisenhower discussed this problem of overextension in 30 different 
letters and diary entries during his tenure as Columbia’s president (Galambos, 1984a; 
Galambos, 1984b; Galambos, 1989a; Galambos, 1989b). An underlying theme in these 
writings was Eisenhower’s regret that he could not devote enough time to his duties at
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Columbia, even though he had reservations about serving as its president. In a September 
23,1948 letter, he wrote:
I have never had more difficulty than I have now in attempting to fulfill 
even a tiny percentage of the requests that are made upon me for various 
kinds of activities ranging from participation in “peace societies” to 
taking part in conventions for conservation of natural resources. The 
work here at the University would in itself occupy a man if he could give 
to it his entire attention. I am so driven that I sometimes feel guilty in the 
lack of time that I can devote to the affairs o f this great institution 
(as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 221).
This problem only grew worse when Eisenhower took the extended leave of 
absence from Columbia to serve as head of NATO, lasting from January 1951 to May 
1952 (Ambrose, 1990). He offered to resign upon hearing of this important assignment, 
but the trustees insisted that he remain in office on indefinite leave, asserting that an 
acting president could run the university while Eisenhower was in Europe (Galambos, 
1989a; Jacobs, 2001). The enthusiasm of the board to retain Eisenhower as president 
likely stemmed from their fear of undergoing another grueling presidential search 
(Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, several of the trustees clearly relished having a close 
association with the World War II hero (Jacobs, 1985). However, despite the trustees’ 
best intentions, this arrangement was highly unpopular with the Columbia faculty, who 
already considered Eisenhower aloof and uncommitted as president (Galambos, 1984b, p. 
1097). Faculty members also began to think that Eisenhower was only using Columbia 
as a perch to advance his political career (Smith, 2012). Further, his prolonged absence
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due to this military commitment also meant that Columbia suffered from weak leadership 
and diminished fundraising during the absence (Jacobs, 1985).
No one was more aware of this problem than Eisenhower, himself. By his 27,h 
month as president, he realized that he had actually been on campus for less than 10 
months’ time (Smith, 2012). During this period, Eisenhower began to label himself an 
“absentee president,” indicating a deep sense of guilt that he was not fulfilling his 
presidential responsibilities (as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 496). In 10 letters throughout the 
summer and fall of 1951, he discussed how this arrangement was unsustainable and 
openly considered resignation (Galambos, 1989a). In a May 16,1951 letter, Eisenhower 
discussed how his “retention as the nominal president is working against Columbia” (as 
cited in Galambos, 1989a, p. 292). Further, in a September 15,1951 letter, he discussed 
his fear that “the trustees out o f their friendship for me would permit a situation to 
develop that would be inimical to the best interests of the university” (as cited in 
Galambos, 1989a, p. 543). Attempting to find a suitable solution, Eisenhower proposed 
his reassignment as Columbia’s honorary chancellor, arguing that there must be a real 
president based at Momingside Heights (Galambos, 1989a). However, the board was 
determined to retain Eisenhower as president, and did not end up accepting his 
resignation until shortly before the U.S. presidential inauguration in January 1953 
(Jacobs, 2001). In the months prior to that event, Eisenhower was even more distracted 
from his Columbia duties by the rigors of his presidential campaign (Jacobs, 2001). 
Ultimately, he was spread too thin professionally to provide solid and consistent 
leadership at Columbia, despite his best intentions. Further, since Columbia was not
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Eisenhower’s top professional priority during this period, this eliminated any meaningful 
chance for him to adjust effectively to academic culture.
These data illustrating Eisenhower’s over extendedness are supported by several 
historians as well as by information from his Columbia colleagues. A central theme in 
many of Eisenhower’s biographical treatments is that he was spread in far too many 
professional directions during this period (Ambrose, 1990; Childs, 1958; Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978; Parmet, 1972; Smith, 2012). However, instead of Eisenhower 
creating this situation, historians maintain that many of these external pressures were 
thrust upon him against his will or better judgment (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 
1978; Smith, 2012). Consequently, Eisenhower pursued those military and political 
commitments out of a sense of duty, regretting the impact it had on Columbia (Ambrose, 
1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). To his credit, Eisenhower 
attempted to remedy the situation by resigning as Columbia’s president. However, he 
was thwarted repeatedly by Columbia’s board members, who were eager to keep him at 
the helm and avoid another long and costly presidential search (Jacobs, 2001).
Eisenhower’s Columbia colleagues expressed similar sentiments concerning this 
problem of overextension. Regarding Eisenhower’s NATO assignment, Economics Prof. 
Eli Ginzberg reflected that President Truman “was really putting a burden on him that he 
didn’t want” (as cited in Jacobs, 2001, p. 252). Further, Ginzberg asserted that President 
Truman leaned heavily on Eisenhower for support in national security matters, and that 
Eisenhower “was not happy about it... that is fact” (Jacobs, 2001, p. 252). Former 
Columbia president Grayson Kirk also reflected on the impact that these external 
pressures had on Eisenhower, explaining his prediction that following his departure for
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the NATO assignment, Eisenhower would not return to Columbia (Jacobs, 2001). Kirk 
explained that:
I had felt that he had not been particularly comfortable in his position, and 
also he had been under a great deal of pressure from outside interests to 
get into national politics. A combination of some discomfort at 
Momingside on his part and the various external pressures made it 
unlikely in my judgment that he would return and settle down (Jacobs, 
2001, pp. 252-253).
Kirk’s prediction eventually turned out to be an accurate one. While Eisenhower 
continued as Columbia’s nominal president following his retirement from the Army, he 
never really reconnected with the institution following his NATO service, even though he 
continued to profess a fondness for Columbia in several letters (Ambrose, 1990; 
Galambos, 1989a). Several historians assert that his interest in being an academic leader 
had subsided following his return from Europe (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 
1985; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Smith (2012) concluded that by this point, Columbia 
had become a “secondary interest” to Eisenhower (p. 488). He occupied himself 
primarily with his U.S. presidential campaign until his final departure from Columbia in 
January 1953, when he was designated as president emeritus (Ambrose, 1990; Galambos, 
1989b). According to Jacobs (1985) and Smith (2012), Eisenhower could have 
potentially been a great leader for Columbia had he possessed the time to do it. However, 
constant external pressures conspired to keep him away from Momingside Heights for 
much of his presidency, eliminating any meaningful chance of engaging with the 
academy and learning its culture.
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Lack of academic experience. Another central theme that appeared consistently 
in Eisenhower’s writings was his general lack of academic experience. Although he was 
a West Point graduate and military historian with an extensive organizational leadership 
background, Eisenhower had little to no connection with the scholarly world. In a letter 
to a friend, he once wrote, “I know nothing about the workings of a great university and 
am certainly far from being an ‘educator’...” (as cited in Neal, 1978, p. 240). This 
inexperience was highly apparent during his Columbia tenure, which limited his ability 
and willingness to learn the ways of academic culture. Eisenhower mentioned this lack 
o f knowledge in 14 different letters over the course of his Columbia presidency 
(Galambos, 1984a). In one such June 2,1949 letter, he wrote to another friend that he 
was “under no illusion as to any qualifications involving scholarship” (as cited in 
Galambos, 1984a, p. 601). Accustomed to abject followership in the military, 
Eisenhower often felt inferior to Columbia’s faculty members and worried that they 
questioned his authority as their president.
In other letters, Eisenhower sounded almost apologetic, referring at times to his 
“woeful ignorance” of certain academic fields (as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 688). 
Moreover, in his first appearance at Columbia’s Low Memorial Library, Eisenhower 
commented to a gathering of university deans and administrators that, “nobody is more 
keenly aware of my academic shortcomings than I am” (as cited in Neal, 1978, p. 239). 
Such sentiments did not instill much confidence in those campus academic leaders, who 
gave Eisenhower a chilly reception (Neal, 1978). Even after nearly two years in office, 
he commented to a friend in a February 10, 1950 letter that, “I have never yet understood 
some of the methods that we use for the performance of some of our most important
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work” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 963). Specifically, Eisenhower was at a loss to 
understand many organizational processes unique to academia, ranging from faculty 
hiring to the tenure review system.
In many cases, this lack of academic experience prompted Eisenhower to take a 
hands-off approach to many issues of university governance. This aloof behavior was 
reflected in 13 different letters during his Columbia tenure (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b; 
1989a). When Columbia constituents would ask him to help with certain administrative 
matters, ranging from admissions to athletics, Eisenhower would often respond that the 
request was not within his purview, or he did not know enough about the matter to offer 
constructive assistance (Galambos, 1984a; 1984b; 1989a). For instance, in a November 
4,1949 letter, Eisenhower wrote that he “should not be identified too closely with those 
individuals who interest themselves directly in the admission into the college of students 
with known football records” (Galambos, 1984a, p. 816). Despite Eisenhower’s fondness 
for football, he did not want to involve himself in recruiting. Further, in an October 9,
1950 letter to a prospective student, Eisenhower wrote that the “president of a great 
confederated university, such as Columbia, does not interfere in the slightest degree in 
the selection of students” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1363). In many cases, 
Eisenhower was certainly justified in not over-involving himself in such matters. 
However, the persistence of this sentiment in Eisenhower’s correspondence, coupled with 
his lack of knowledge about academic affairs, suggests the possibility that intimidation 
over getting involved in matters unfamiliar to him sometimes prompted Eisenhower to 
avoid such situations entirely.
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These data concerning Eisenhower’s challenges with academic culture are echoed 
in historical analysis as well as the reflection of contemporaries. Dean of Columbia 
College Harry J. Carman often told a story about his first encounter with a “solemn and 
uncomfortable” Eisenhower, who had just been installed as president (Neal, 1978, p. 
244). Summoning Carman to his office, Eisenhower exclaimed:
I need your help. I’m awfully green at this job. Damn it, I don’t even 
know what to call people around here. I find there are sixteen different 
schools here at the university and each one has a dean or director. What 
do I call these men? Dean? Director? Doctor (Neal, 1978, p. 244)?
Other faculty members and administrators had similar experiences that convinced them 
that Eisenhower was out of his depth in regards to dealing with the minutia of academics. 
In later years, Prof. Lionel Trilling reflected that although he had an “auspicious start... it 
gradually and quickly disintegrated” (as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 488). Thus, as 
Eisenhower’s tenure progressed, Trilling “began to sense that he was nowhere in relation 
to the university and this gradually began to affect people” (as cited in Smith, 2012, p. 
488). Douglas Black, a close Eisenhower friend and Columbia trustee concurred, 
reflecting that Eisenhower “never had the feeling or understanding of Columbia” (Jacobs, 
2001, p. 260). Prof. Eli Ginzberg concurred with this sentiment, concluding that 
Eisenhower “never found a way of responding to anything substantive on campus. 
Nothing gave him a real kick.... a central focus (as cited in Smith, 2012, pp. 488-489). 
Campus members attributed Eisenhower’s aloofness to a lack of understanding of all 
things academic -  university operations, curriculum management, and academic 
governance.
103
Multiple historians have concurred with this sentiment, arguing that there was 
considerable tension between Eisenhower and Columbia’s scholarly community 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 
1978; Smith, 2012). According to Clark (2013), Neal (1978), and Smith (2012), 
Eisenhower was intimidated by Columbia’s learned faculty, and never felt comfortable 
around them. Even though Eisenhower was a decorated veteran, he felt out o f place and 
inferior in the academic setting of Columbia, and made no effort to understand what 
made faculty members tick (McCaughey, 2003). Smith (2012) also argued that 
Eisenhower lacked an intuitive feel to tell him what was important to the faculty. 
According to Jacobs (2001), in one widely circulated story at Momingside Heights:
Eisenhower once stated at a faculty meeting, ‘the university is going to do 
so and so.’ A senior faculty member, supposedly, stood up and replied, 
‘you don’t understand, General Eisenhower, the faculty is the university’ 
(p. 317).
Further, this divide was not helped by Eisenhower’s military assistants, who were 
stationed at Momingside Heights to assist the general with his military correspondence. 
Completely unfamiliar with academic culture, these assistants treated administrators and 
faculty like junior army officers and restricted their access to Eisenhower (Jacobs, 2001; 
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). Thus, according to Jacobs (2001) and Neal (1978), such 
behavior completely alienated Columbia’s scholarly community from their president.
Overall, this lack of academic experience presented multiple problems for 
Eisenhower during his presidential tenure (Clark, 2013). While he did the best he could 
under the circumstances, Eisenhower was often at a loss when it came to addressing
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Columbia’s most pressing needs. According to Smith (2012), while some observers held 
great promise initially in Eisenhower’s leadership approach, the “complexity of 
Columbia confounded him” (p. 484). Consequently, his inability to govern the university 
fueled discontent and animosity among the institutional community. According to Smith 
(2012), there was intense hostility toward Eisenhower on the part of the faculty and 
student body by summer 1950. Ultimately, this tension created a rift that could not be 
healed between Eisenhower and Columbia’s scholarly community, precluding any chance 
for him to learn the ways of academic culture.
Lack of institutional vision. Another issue that hindered Eisenhower’s ability to 
adjust to academic culture was the complete disconnect between his personal plans for 
Columbia and its pressing institutional needs. As noted earlier, Eisenhower only 
accepted the presidency after he was assured by a couple of overeager Columbia trustees 
that he would not have to engage himself too deeply in university affairs and could 
instead focus on his platform of renewing American civic engagement (Ambrose, 1990; 
Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003). Unfortunately for 
Columbia, Eisenhower took this to heart and failed to develop a vision that advanced the 
institution (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Instead, he occupied himself with developing a 
national program for civic engagement that addressed the goals he desired, and while 
based at Columbia, this work did little to support the university itself (Clark, 2013;
Jacobs, 1985; 2001).
For Eisenhower, the crowning achievement of his Columbia presidency was the 
creation o f the American Assembly, an annual conference where the nation’s top leaders 
from government, business, labor, the military, and the professions could meet to deal
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with “basic political and social questions” affecting America (Jacobs, 1985, p. 557). In 
going to Columbia, Eisenhower believed that he could do more there “than anywhere else 
to further the cause to which I am devoted, the reawakening of intense interest in the 
basis of the American system” (as cited in Jacobs, 1985, p. 556). He therefore discussed 
the American Assembly in over 37 letters during his Columbia presidency. Eisenhower 
described it as able to “respond to the concern with which American citizens contemplate 
the possible future of our democracy and individual freedom based on a philosophy of 
competitive enterprise” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1379). Moreover, in an April 
16,1951 letter, he described the Assembly as his “primary Columbia concern” (as cited 
in Galambos, 1989a, p. 214). This focus was highly apparent during his 1951 leave of 
absence, when his interest in the Assembly was the main Columbia-related topic in his 
correspondence (Galambos, 1989a).
However, Eisenhower’s work with the Assembly illustrated the enormous gulf 
between his own personal interests and Columbia’s pressing institutional needs. While 
his intense interest in the Assembly prompted him to go to extensive lengths to facilitate 
its creation, Eisenhower was not nearly as interested in advancing Columbia itself (Clark, 
2013; Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Even before accepting the Columbia presidency, he 
made clear that he was no fundraiser, a fact that should have triggered alarm with the 
trustees (Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). Moreover, in four separate letters during his 
Columbia presidency, Eisenhower discussed at length his refusal to raise money for the 
institution (Galambos, 1984a; Galambos, 1984b). In a May 19,1949 letter to a close 
friend, Eisenhower asserted that:
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Much as I believe that an educational institution like Columbia is 
essential to the future o f the American system, I am never going to use my 
personal friendships as an avenue for approaching anyone for current or 
future support o f this university (Galambos, 1984a, p. 587).
Eisenhower reiterated this point in a September 22,1950 letter, when he declared that “I 
do not personally solicit funds from anyone” (as cited in Galambos, 1984b, p. 1333). He 
explained this mindset as the result o f “a lifetime spent in an atmosphere that promoted 
respect for ideas and quality of character and which refused to recognize accumulation of 
money as a true index for success” (as cited in Galambos, 1984a, p. 696). Ultimately, 
Eisenhower directed most of what fundraising prowess he could muster toward 
generating funds for the Assembly, and not Columbia itself (Jacobs, 2001; Neal, 1978). 
This fact was not lost on the Colombia community, which prompted Eisenhower 
speechwriter Kevin McCann to label his boss as “the poorest excuse for a fund-raising 
college president in the country” (Neal, 1978, p. 250).
These data from Eisenhower’s correspondence were also supported by writings of 
his Columbia associates as well as by leading historians. Many of Eisenhower’s 
contemporaries were distressed at his lack o f understanding for Columbia and its 
institutional needs (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Former Columbia president Grayson 
Kirk noted that Eisenhower “had alienated many on the faculty by making speeches 
about the purpose of education being to develop citizens rather than develop people 
intellectually” (Smith, 2012, p. 490). Another veteran professor recalled a heated 
exchange between Eisenhower and faculty leaders, where they debated the societal role 
that Columbia’s faculty should play (Neal, 1978). At the meeting, one professor noted
107
that Columbia had “some of America’s most exceptional physicists, mathematicians, 
chemists, and engineers” (Neal, 1978, p. 249). Eisenhower then asked if  these faculty 
members were also “exceptional Americans,” and was told in response that he did not 
understand (Neal, 1978, p. 249). Eisenhower then:
Burst into a rage, a large vein on his forehead throbbing as he said, 
‘dammit, what good are exceptional physicists... exceptional anything, 
unless they are exceptional Americans.’ He went on to say that every 
student who came to Columbia must leave it first a better citizen and 
secondarily a more learned scholar (Neal, 1978, pp. 249-250).
The preferencing of his own agenda to build a more democratic society was often at odds 
with faculty scholars who were focused specifically on advancing knowledge and 
understanding in their disciplinary areas.
Historians have also noted this considerable gulf between Eisenhower’s vision 
and Columbia’s institutional needs (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; 
McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978; Smith, 2012). According to Neal (1978), Eisenhower 
“saw the purpose of American education much as a high school civics teacher might, to 
teach the values for ‘effective citizenship’” (p. 249). However, according to Ambrose 
(1990) and Neal (1978), Columbia faculty found Eisenhower’s perspective embarrassing, 
considering it to be fatuous zeal. Further, they believed that Eisenhower’s diligent work 
on behalf o f the American Assembly did nothing to support Columbia or address its 
pressing problems (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978). 
Ultimately, as Smith (2012) argued, Columbia’s disappointment in Eisenhower stemmed 
not so much from administrative ineptitude, but from his inattentiveness to the problems
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of administration. Consequently, this immense divide between Eisenhower’s vision and 
Columbia’s needs precluded any meaningful chance for him to learn the ways of 
academic culture (Clark, 2013). His vision for American higher education was simply 
too different from that o f Columbia’s faculty for there to develop any kind of meaningful 
relationship or mutual understanding (Clark, 2013).
Summary
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded his World War II service as one of 
America’s greatest military heroes. During that conflict, he had led organizations the size 
and scope o f which few could only imagine. Eisenhower also interacted with many of 
modem history’s larger-than-life figures, including Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, 
Gen. George S. Patton, and Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, and found ways 
for them to all work together for a common purpose. For all practical purposes, his 
presidency of Columbia should have therefore been a success as well. However, despite 
his celebrated military leadership, he was unable to make the transition to civilian 
educator or learn the ways of academic culture. As the findings from this study 
concluded, this failure stemmed from four central issues: frustration over engaging with 
academic culture as well as the demands of mounting political and military obligations; 
being too overextended professionally; lacking academic experience; and possessing a 
presidential vision that did not align with Columbia’s institutional needs.
Thus, Eisenhower’s experience at Columbia demonstrates that despite the best 
intentions, even a non-traditional college president with a celebrated leadership record 
may fail to adjust effectively to the ways of academic culture. However, the next chapter 
will explore a non-traditional president with a professional background similar to
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Eisenhower’s who adjusted to academic culture seamlessly. Moreover, although he had 
to overcome some challenges, this college president achieved levels of organizational 
success and faculty admiration of which Eisenhower could have only imagined. Chapter 
5 will analyze Terry Sanford’s presidency of Duke University and explore why he was 
more successful in learning the ways of the academy.
110
Chapter 5 -  Terry Sanford and Duke University
Although Dwight D. Eisenhower had a challenging experience as Columbia 
University’s president, his difficult adjustment to academic culture was not representative 
of all non-traditional college presidents. Other such presidents have had highly 
successful tenures, making the transition to academic culture quite effectively. One such 
example was former North Carolina Gov. Terry Sanford, a high-profile attorney, 
businessman, and politician who served as Duke University’s president from 1969 to 
1985. According to Gordon (1998), his storied career read like the resume of a dozen 
men combined: four decorations as a paratrooper during World War II, two years as a 
state senator, four years as governor, 15 years as Duke’s president, two runs for the U.S. 
presidency, and six years as a U.S. senator. Moreover, while certainly confronting some 
challenges during his tenure, Sanford transformed Duke from a respected Southern liberal 
arts institution into one of the nation’s “preeminent academic powerhouses” (Gordon,
1998, p. 1). This success later led one biographer to refer to Sanford as Duke’s “patron 
saint” (Gordon, 1998, p. 1). Sanford’s noteworthy service to his native state as well as to 
Duke also prompted former North Carolina Gov. James Hunt to call him “one of the 
greatest leaders in North Carolina history” (Gordon, 1998, p. 1). Even today, Sanford is 
still considered a legend by many North Carolina residents.
During Sanford’s presidency, he also earned the lasting respect and admiration of 
the entire Duke community, including the institution’s faculty (Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Egerton, 1973). Former Duke University President Nan Keohane described Sanford as a 
“leader-hero,” and she argued that Sanford surpassed the usual expectations o f political 
leadership in pursuing his many projects and overcoming institutional challenges (Rubin
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& Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Many others admired his unique leadership style, which was once 
described as a “rare knack and ability to get ordinary people to do unordinary and 
extraordinary things” (Rubin & Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Ultimately, Sanford represents a 
non-traditional college president who effectively learned the ways of academic culture. 
Using data derived from his personal and official correspondence, along with selected 
secondary sources, this study found that his success stemmed from a combination of 
factors. These included Sanford’s ambitious vision for Duke that coincided well with its 
institutional needs; his strong personal commitment to Duke; his prior exposure to higher 
education as an education-focused governor; and his highly relational approach as a 
leader. To put these factors into perspective, this study situated them within a broader 
framework that included Sanford’s personal history, a historical context of the 1960s-era 
higher education landscape, and Duke’s institutional context during that period. Those 
sections follow below.
Personal History
Terry Sanford was bom on August 20, 1917 in Laurinburg, North Carolina and 
came of age during the Great Depression (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Gordon, 1998). He 
paid his own way through the University o f North Carolina -  Chapel Hill by washing 
dishes, graduating with an A.B. in 1939 (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). After 
college, he served briefly as an FBI special agent before volunteering for the U.S. Army 
during World War II. As a paratrooper, Sanford saw combat during five separate 
campaigns and participated in the Allied invasion of southern France as well as in the 
Battle o f the Bulge. Following his discharge as a first lieutenant, he attended law school 
and became active in the North Carolina Democratic Party (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987;
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Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). During this period, he also married Margaret 
Rose Knight and would go on to have two children (Gordon, 1998).
Sanford served briefly in the North Carolina Senate before being elected governor 
in 1961. A firm believer in the value of education, he made that a hallmark of his 
administration, nearly doubling the state’s expenditures on public schools during his 
tenure (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon, 1998). Moreover, Sanford consolidated the 
University o f North Carolina school system to ensure its solvency and strength and 
developed the state’s Governor’s Schools as well as the North Carolina School o f the 
Arts (Gordon, 1998). Most notably, Sanford fought for racial desegregation during a 
time when that was highly unpopular politically (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Gordon,
1998). To demonstrate his commitment to that cause, Sanford even sent his son to a 
desegregated public school despite safety concerns (Gordon, 1998). In recognition for 
Sanford’s work, a 1981 Harvard University survey named him one of the best governors 
of the 20th century (Gordon, 1998). As recently as the 2012 Democratic National 
Convention, political leaders continued to heap praise on Sanford. Speaking of Sanford’s 
North Carolina legacy, former Gov. James Hunt said:
Fifty years ago, this was a poor state -  poor, rural, rigidly segregated. But 
we had a governor named Terry Sanford -  a hero of mine.... He broke 
with most southerners in 1960 and endorsed John F. Kennedy. When 
other southern governors stood in the schoolhouse door, Terry Sanford 
stood up for civil rights. He worked with business leaders, political and 
education leaders to build our great universities, our 58 community 
colleges and our public schools (Mercola, 2012, p. 1).
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Throughout Sanford’s administration, his work attracted the interest of national 
Democratic Party leaders. A close friend of President John F. Kennedy, Sanford was 
even rumored to have been Kennedy’s choice for vice president in the 1964 election 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Although that campaign never materialized because of 
Kennedy’s tragic assassination, Sanford was regarded as a respected and highly 
influential political leader throughout this period.
After Sanford’s gubernatorial term ended in 1965, his star continued to rise 
nationally as he reentered the fields o f law and Democratic Party politics (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999). He interacted extensively with President Lyndon Johnson and was even 
offered a position in Johnson’s cabinet as secretary of agriculture (Covington & Ellis, 
1999). Sanford also managed Hubert Humphrey’s 1968 presidential campaign with an 
eye toward his own run for president in the early 1970s. During this period, a growing 
number o f people began to see Sanford as a possible successor to President Richard 
Nixon (Egerton, 1973). However, despite all of this political promise, Sanford’s career 
took an unexpected turn when he received inquiries from Duke University’s board of 
trustees about serving as their next president.
Historical Context
In many respects, the 1960s was a difficult period for American higher education. 
The nation’s colleges and universities were nearing the end of their “Golden Age,” and 
new challenges were beginning to materialize, ranging from desegregation to student 
unrest (Thelin, 2011, p. 260). To be sure, certain institutions still benefitted immensely 
from the post-World War II funding boom as well as from record student enrollments 
(Thelin, 2011). However, considering the time and cost involved with building
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construction, the question was whether those colleges could respond quickly enough to 
accommodate the increases in funding as well as enrollment (Thelin, 2011). A common 
solution during this period was for public institutions to rely upon “formula funding,” 
which awarded institutions with increased subsidies as they enrolled more students 
(Thelin, 2011, p. 285). Thus, many public institutions continued to expand rapidly during 
this period.
However, the environment was more precarious for private institutions. Just as 
public institutions enjoyed rapid expansion in the 1960s, many private colleges and 
universities struggled to stay open (Thelin, 2011). One major problem was that private 
institutions could not keep up with the low tuition prices offered by state-supported 
public schools (Thelin, 2011). The shortage of funding that resulted from this disparity 
also made it more difficult for private institutions to hire new faculty members (Thelin, 
2011). However, as the 1960s progressed, private colleges and universities turned the 
tide by designing innovative fundraising programs and capitalizing on the increasing 
public desire for their children to attend “prestigious” institutions (Thelin, 2011, p. 294).
The more difficult problems for public as well as private institutions during this 
period stemmed from the challenges o f desegregation along with growing student unrest 
(Thelin, 2011). During the 1950s and 1960s, desegregation was a politically explosive 
issue for many educational institutions throughout the South (Cole, 2013). According to 
Thelin (2011), 17 Southern states had legally segregated public educational systems 
following World War II. While the 1954 Brown v. the Board o f  Education o f  Topeka, 
Kansas court case outlawed such practices, the subsequent desegregation efforts of many 
Southern states were slow and half-hearted (Thelin, 2011). At various Southern state
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universities, court-ordered desegregation often resulted in violent student protests as well 
as gubernatorial opposition (Thelin, 2011). Further, a number of black student sit-ins 
occurred across the region, with one o f the more notable incidents taking place at 
Greensboro, North Carolina in 1960 (Cole, 2013). Overall, desegregation was a difficult 
issue that tested the leadership prowess of many college presidents (Cole, 2013; 
Covington & Ellis, 1999).
Another challenging issue involved increased student unrest across many of 
America’s colleges and universities (Egerton, 1973; Thelin, 2011). Some of this protest 
was in reaction to the mass expansion of higher education institutions, which some critics 
referred to as the growing “impersonality o f the multiversity” (Thelin, 2011, p. 307). 
Consequently, there was growing sentiment among students that they were viewed only 
as numbers or statistics instead of individuals (Thelin, 2011). Thus, students across the 
nation protested large lecture classes, cramped housing, and the over-automation of 
campus services in response to this impersonal, mass expansion (Thelin, 2011). A result 
o f this movement was a trend toward establishing formal student assembly organizations 
in order to continue the fight for better student conditions (Thelin, 2011).
The national political upheaval o f the period, fueled by the tragic assassinations of 
John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, also shook college 
campuses across the country (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Thelin, 2011). 
Moreover, the unpopular war in Vietnam spurred further and widely publicized student 
protests (Thelin, 2011). Some of these demonstrations, such as the May 1970 protests at 
Kent State University and Jackson State University, resulted in violent confrontations 
between students and National Guard troops (Thelin, 2011). The resulting student deaths
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prompted intense national outcry and received widespread media coverage (Thelin,
2011). Thus, many higher education leaders were at a loss for how to respond, as 
“universities everywhere were caught between the desire to be above the battle and the 
demand that they be in the midst of it” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Overall, it was a very 
challenging time for college and university leaders across the nation.
Institutional Context
In many ways, the wide range o f 1960s-era challenges found at higher education 
institutions across the nation was also present at Duke University. Renamed Duke 
University after industrialist James B. Duke donated a fortune in 1924 to then-Trinity 
College, the institution was still struggling to find its identity, even though it aspired to 
become a preeminent national university (Egerton, 1973). As with many other private 
schools during the period, Duke’s finances were unsettled as it struggled to attract high 
quality students (Egerton, 1973). The institution even ran its first budget deficit in 1970, 
prompting many to worry about its future (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Duke also had poor 
relations with the surrounding City of Durham, which created further problems for its 
institutional image (Egerton, 1973). Moreover, a lack of strong presidential leadership, 
along with the absence of a compelling institutional vision, had resulted in “fading and 
discouraged” support from alumni (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 378). By all accounts, 
Duke was stagnating and in dire need of bold and decisive leadership (Covington & Ellis, 
1999).
Although the institution had remained relatively quiet in regards to student 
protests for much of the decade, Martin Luther King’s assassination triggered an intense 
student reaction, with over 1,500 staging a silent campus vigil in April 1968 (Covington
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& Ellis, 1999). Further protests followed when students began campaigning for minority 
student rights and higher wages for black employees (Covington & Ellis, 1999). This all 
culminated in a black student sit-in at the Allen Administration Building on February 12, 
1969 (Covington & Ellis, 1999). The students, who then declared the building to be the 
“Malcolm X School of Liberation,” then presented a list of demands, which included the 
establishment of a black studies curriculum, a black student union, and the elimination of 
the SAT as a requirement for black student admissions (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 368). 
With little patience for such activity, the board of trustees demanded quick and decisive 
action from Duke’s then-president, Douglas Knight. Fearing violence, Knight secured 
assistance from the governor, who sent in state police to dislodge the protesting students. 
Meanwhile, other police officers in full riot gear fired tear gas to break up the boisterous 
group of 2,500 students who had gathered to watch the events unfold (Covington & Ellis,
1999).
Although no one was hurt and the crowd was dispersed, the event inflicted 
“grievous wounds” on Duke’s reputation (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 368). Seeing his 
days numbered as Duke’s president, Knight resigned shortly thereafter (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999). To respond to this problem, coupled with minimal state support and 
decreasing alumni involvement, Duke desperately needed a compelling new leader.
What follows (See Table 2) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Sanford’s 
experience at Duke. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context, Duke’s 
institutional context, and by Sanford’s personal history. These three categories are placed 
side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual overview of the key 
events and issues that occurred during the Sanford era at Duke.
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Table 2 -  Sanford/Duke Timeline
Historical Context Institutional Context Personal History
1954: Brown vs. Board o f
1838: Duke founded (as 
Brown’s Schoolhouse).
1859: Renamed Trinity 
College.
1924: Renamed Duke 
University to honor 
benefactor James B. Duke.
1917: Sanford bom.
Education o f  Topeka, KS 1939: Graduated from UNC
decision. 1963: Undergraduate -  Chapel Hill.
1950s-1960s:
college desegregated.
1942-1945: Service in
Desegregation crisis in 1968: MLK and Bobby WWII.
South. Kennedy assassinated.
1,500 student campus vigil 1953-1955: NC State
1961: Greensboro, NC sit- held. Senator.
in.
1969: Allen Building sit-in. 1961-1965: NC Governor.
1963: Pres. John F. Resignation of Pres.
Kennedy assassinated. Douglas Knight. Fuqua 1969: Appointed president
School o f Business opens. of Duke.
1968: Martin Luther King 
and Robert Kennedy 1970: First institutional 1972: Candidate for U.S.
assassinated. budget deficit. president.
Late 1960s: Higher 1971: Institute of Public 1976: Candidate for U.S.
Education Golden Age Policy opens (later named president.
coming to an end. after Sanford).
Late 1960s/Early 1970s: Early 1970s: Student 1985: Retires from Duke
Student protests over protests o f Vietnam War. presidency.
Vietnam War.
Early 1980s: Controversy 1986-1993: U.S. Senator.
1970: Kent State shootings. over proposed placement of
Nixon Presidential Library 1998: Sanford dies.
at Duke.
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Selecting a New President
Following Knight’s resignation, the board named a three-person search 
committee, known internally as “the Troika,” to find his successor (Covington & Ellis, 
1999, p. 369). Initially, the committee looked at conventional candidates, ranging from 
Duke faculty members to up-and-coming academic leaders from other institutions 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). However, at one particular committee meeting, a board 
member named Mrs. Earl Brian suggested Terry Sanford. Brian had known Sanford for 
years and was impressed by his leadership style (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Combined 
with his extensive professional background, she believed that Sanford was just the type of 
level-headed problem solver that Duke needed (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Other board 
members immediately liked the idea and cleared an impediment to Sanford’s nomination 
by changing the requirement that the president hold an earned doctorate (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999).
However, Sanford appeared to be a risky selection to others in the Duke 
community. In the minds of many, he was a non-academic politician who had graduated 
from Duke’s bitter rival, the University o f North Carolina -  Chapel Hill (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999). These reservations were best summarized by one senior Duke faculty 
member, who said “putting a great university in the hands of a politician seemed to me a 
perilous course o f action” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). As an up-and-coming politician, others 
in the Duke community wondered how long Sanford would even remain at the university 
if  he was selected president (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Nevertheless, the board forged 
ahead and put out official inquiries to Sanford, who was interested but skeptical about his 
prospects (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Duke’s board members believed that the benefits
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Sanford would provide Duke would far outweigh any potential liabilities (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999).
However, since Sanford still harbored political ambitions, some of his advisors 
warned him against accepting the position, arguing that it would “embroil [him] in 
internal affairs at Duke and compromise any chance he had to build a national 
constituency” (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 372). Sanford was intrigued by the 
possibilities o f academic leadership, though, and felt that obtaining Duke’s presidency -  
for him a lifetime achievement in itself - was worth the risk (Covington & Ellis, 1999). 
Therefore, he accepted the position and reported for work on April 2,1970, putting his 
political ambitions aside temporarily to embark upon a new career in higher education. 
Summary of Emerging Themes
Over the next 15 years, Sanford would go on to have a highly successful tenure at 
Duke, which he often described as the best years of his life (Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Gordon, 1998). He was responsible for constructing 40 new campus buildings at a cost 
of more than $190 million (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Moreover, Sanford led two 
successful fundraising campaigns, accumulating more than $435 million total (Covington 
& Ellis, 1999). He also more than doubled the Duke endowment from $80 million to 
$200 million and helped to increase annual alumni giving from $750,000 in 1970 to more 
than $6 million in 1985 (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Further, he was responsible for the 
creation of several academic programs, including the Institute of Policy Sciences and 
Public Affairs and the Institute of the Arts (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford was also 
instrumental in the development o f Duke’s prestigious Fuqua School of Business 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). These achievements led some to label Sanford as an
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“academic miracle worker” (Egerton, 1973, p. 28). In 1985, then-U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation Elizabeth Dole, a Duke graduate, summarized Sanford’s tenure by 
writing:
The historians of higher education will doubtlessly credit you, as they 
should, with a strengthened program of arts and sciences, the new 
Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, [and] a school of 
business.... They will write that it was during Terry Sanford’s 
presidency that Duke became a truly national university (Covington 
& Ellis, 1999, p. 435).
Along with achieving success in the realms of fundraising and infrastructure 
development, Sanford earned the respect and admiration of Duke’s academic community. 
Although he certainly endured some major controversies, including troublesome early 
1970s student anti-war protests as well as a major clash with Duke’s faculty over the 
possible placement o f the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on the campus, Sanford 
concluded his tenure on good terms with Duke’s academic community (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999). In fact, many felt that Sanford’s presidency represented “a very special time 
in the university’s history” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Duke Endowment chair Mary D. B. T. 
Semans, a grandniece of the institution’s principal benefactor James B. Duke, once wrote, 
“Terry Sanford was our hero... he made us feel that we were on his magic carpet and that 
he expected us to do things we never dreamed we were capable o f ’ (as cited in Rubin & 
Stroup, 1998, p. 1). Echoing that sentiment, a later Duke president, Nan Keohane, wrote 
“we are all better, and stronger, and more optimistic about the future because of the 
lasting legacies of Terry Sanford’s life and leadership” (as cited in Rubin & Stroup, 1998,
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p. 1). Duke trustee Isobel Craven Lewis Drill, who has sometimes opposed Sanford on 
certain initiatives, once reflected he was “the leader Duke needed during perilous days of 
student unrest and academic uncertainty” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 435). 
Drill also wrote that her strongest recollection of Sanford was his “courageous action in 
restoring our university to its intended purposes” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 
435).
Unlike Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford represents a clear example o f a non- 
traditional college president who adjusted well to academic culture (Covington & Ellis, 
1999; Egerton, 1973; Gordon, 1998). The purpose o f this study was to determine the 
specific issues that explained his successful adjustment to academe. To investigate this 
question, over 300 documents from Sanford’s presidency were examined. Approximately 
225 of those documents were letters, interviews, and memoirs produced by Sanford, 
while the other roughly 75 documents were newspaper articles about Sanford and his 
Duke tenure. Located in the Terry Sanford Papers at Duke’s David M. Rubenstein Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library, these materials included personal and official letters, 
speeches, newspaper clippings, and other related documents. In consultation with 
dissertation committee member Dr. Eddie Cole, these specific papers were selected for 
analysis because they were most germane to this study. Following close examination, all 
o f the papers were coded. For the purposes of data triangulation, the coded data were 
then compared to analysis by historians as well as the relevant reflections of Sanford’s 
Duke colleagues to ensure that the findings were consistent.
The objective behind this research was to identify Sanford’s thoughts about 
academic culture as reflected in his personal and official correspondence with others.
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Another key objective was to identify why Sanford was able to adjust so well to 
academic life. Open coding identified nine applicable codes that appeared multiple times 
in his papers (See Appendix E). Axial coding later narrowed these codes down to four 
central issues that helped explain Sanford’s success in adapting to academic culture. 
These included Sanford’s ambitious vision for Duke that coincided well with the 
university’s institutional needs, his strong personal commitment to Duke, his prior 
experience with higher education as an education-focused governor, and his highly 
relational approach as a leader. As the data ultimately demonstrated, all of these 
dynamics enabled Sanford to overcome some significant challenges and adjust effectively 
to academic culture.
Vision. Sanford’s ambitious and compelling vision for Duke University was a 
central theme that appeared repeatedly in his papers. Possessing a lifelong interest in 
history, he was fascinated by Duke’s evolution as a higher education institution 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus, upon assuming the presidency, Sanford took time to 
study the university’s history as well as the successes and failures of presidents who had 
served before him (Covington & Ellis, 1999). He then used this information to help craft 
his own unique vision for Duke’s future based on its institutional needs and where it had 
been in the past. Further, as an education-focused former governor, Sanford had the 
ability to ponder this vision in the context of state and national educational needs. What 
resulted was a compelling vision for Duke’s future that generated excitement and 
enthusiasm among Duke’s academic community (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 
1973). Among the approximately 300 documents examined for this study, Sanford 
discussed aspects o f his Duke vision in over 16, primarily in his speeches.
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An analysis of Sanford’s speeches revealed that he had gone to great lengths to 
reflect on the purpose of higher education, particularly at liberal arts institutions, before 
assuming Duke’s presidency (Sanford, 1977a, 1979a). This approach was likely a result 
o f Sanford’s gubernatorial term, which was noted for its strong focus on developing 
North Carolina’s higher education system (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus, upon 
becoming president, Sanford had specific ideas about the role of America’s higher 
education system that he often articulated in his speeches. In one address, Sanford 
asserted, “the seeker of truth, the insister of truth, may be the ultimate mark of the person 
with a liberal education” (Sanford, 1979a, p. 5). He echoed that sentiment in another 
speech, when he argued, “to keep alive a vision of hope and confidence for humanity is 
probably the greatest responsibility o f liberal arts education and of graduates of liberal 
arts colleges” (Sanford, 1977a, p.l). Thus, this clear perspective on the uses of a liberal 
arts education likely assisted Sanford in formulating a clear and compelling vision for 
Duke itself.
This focused and thoughtful vision for Duke’s institutional future also appeared in 
several o f Sanford’s speeches. He envisioned Duke as a university focused primarily on 
undergraduate learning with a goal of producing well-rounded leaders with a passion for 
seeking knowledge and truth (Sanford, 1970a). In his inaugural address, he touched on 
these concepts by remarking:
Duke University can lead, therefore Duke University must lead. We 
must lead in the strengthening of the internal structure of universities, 
making them freer to fulfill the aspirations of students. We must lead 
in providing the dynamic dimension of higher education that will provide
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students with the developed capacity to add to civilization. We must lead 
in preserving the ancient truths of civilization and in solving the recent 
distresses of society. Duke University accepts leadership as its 
hallmark... Duke has led and is positioned for leadership today not by 
chance but by careful, deliberate design (Sanford, 1970a, p. 1).
Sanford’s inspiring language empowered a Duke community that had been in a malaise 
o f sorts based on recent institutional challenges (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford’s 
aspiration to transform Duke into a nationally prominent university resonated with its 
community and triggered a renewed enthusiasm and focus (Covington & Ellis, 1999). In 
many ways, Duke needed a meaningful institutional purpose and Sanford was able to 
provide it by developing a premier center for learning, leadership, and creativity that 
remained true to its North Carolina roots (Covington & Ellis, 1999). The heart of 
Sanford’s Duke vision was also evident in his inaugural address:
I want to see for Duke University a spirit that makes a Duke graduate a 
Renaissance Man with a purpose. I want to see Duke University applying 
its special resources in its special setting to seek out and develop as our 
primary interest men and women who will exhibit and apply both 
creativity and leadership, no matter what occupations they might pursue 
(Sanford, 1970a, p. 3).
The power and reach of Sanford’s vision, along with its noticeable impact on 
Duke’s development as a university, has also been commended by university officials as 
well as historians over the years. Duke’s first African-American faculty member, Samuel 
DuBois Cook, once wrote that Sanford represented “the ultimate in vision, decency, and
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integrity... I don’t know what I’d do without Terry. I just feel less secure in the world 
without Terry Sanford” (as cited in Rubin & Stroup, 1998, p. 2). According to Covington 
and Ellis (1999), even in Sanford’s earliest interviews with Duke’s presidential search 
committee, the members were impressed by his knowledge of the institution and his 
compelling ideas for its future. According to Duke Endowment Chair Mary D. B. T. 
Semans, she believed that “he would bring Duke back into focus as the kind of place Mr. 
Duke would have wanted” (as cited in Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 374). Indeed, Sanford 
and the committee were in full agreement about the need to keep building Duke as a 
national university while reconnecting with its local roots in North Carolina (Covington 
& Ellis, 1999). Consequently, early in Sanford’s tenure, a new professor remarked, 
“Duke is a smug, tweedy place being shaken up by Sanford... they’re trying to decide 
whether or not they like it - 1 think they’re about to decide they do” (as cited in Egerton, 
1973, p. 29).
According to Egerton (1973), the key objective behind Sanford’s Duke vision was 
to find a way to mitigate the contradiction between “academic eminence and social 
usefulness” (p. 29). Sanford believed firmly that Duke could be one of the nation’s great 
universities while being “actively engaged in seeking and applying solutions to the 
nation’s problems” (Egerton, 1973, p. 29). Thus, much of Sanford’s presidency was 
dedicated to this pursuit. According to Covington and Ellis (1999), this aspect of 
Sanford’s vision was highly effective as it culminated in a strong partnership between 
Duke and multiple local, state, and national constituency groups. Ultimately, as these 
data indicated, Sanford’s compelling vision for Duke was an integral factor in his 
adjustment to academic life. He formulated a powerful vision for the university’s future
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that generated excitement and enthusiasm among many members of the Duke 
community. This vision also allowed Sanford to endure some significant crises during 
his tenure and keep the university moving in one, unified direction.
Commitment to Duke. A second theme that appeared multiple times in 
Sanford’s papers was his strong, personal commitment to Duke University. Although 
Sanford engaged in many outside political activities over the course o f his presidential 
tenure, he consistently made it clear that Duke was his number one professional priority. 
Sanford discussed his commitment to Duke in approximately eight o f the letters and 
personal memoranda examined for this study. This dedication to Duke was significant, 
since many in the university community wondered initially how long he would remain as 
president (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). Some speculated that he would 
quickly succumb to the pressure he was under to run for offices ranging from U.S. 
senator to president of the United States (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
However, Sanford typically resisted such entreaties, arguing that he could not “be 
president of Duke and keep one eye cocked on a political future” (as cited in Nordheiber, 
1970, p. 1). Ultimately, while Sanford did run for political office twice during his Duke 
tenure, he pursued those campaigns in a manner that was mindful o f his university 
responsibilities (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Specifically, he built his political activities 
around his Duke schedule instead of neglecting his presidential responsibilities for the 
sake of his campaign schedule (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Consequently, while Sanford 
did not give those ultimately unsuccessful campaigns his full energy and attention, it did 
remind the Duke community that the institution itself was most important to him.
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According to Covington and Ellis (1999) and Egerton (1973), Sanford had major 
political ambitions during his tenure at Duke and dreamed of one day becoming president 
of the United States. However, he also truly enjoyed serving as Duke University’s 
president (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Sanford, 1974). This became a 
challenge as he tried to plan U.S. presidential campaigns in 1972 and 1976, and it often 
resulted in his campaign timetables being extended (Covington & Ellis, 1999). As 
Sanford recalled:
I was far fascinated with running Duke... I was in love with Duke. I 
thought it would be great to be the first [modem] Southern president 
but not all that damned great... I had accomplished more than I thought I 
was going to, but I saw how much more I could accomplish here. I could 
see how this would be a worthy ambition in anybody’s life if  they didn’t 
do anything else. I was really dedicated to Duke and that’s probably why 
I was reluctant to leave (Covington & Ellis, 1999, pp. 417-418).
Sanford retained this commitment to Duke even when offered significant political 
appointments. In summer 1977, he was offered two such opportunities (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1977b, 1977c). First, then-North Carolina Gov. James Hunt offered 
Sanford an appointment to the State Board of Education, which Sanford promptly 
declined (Sanford, 1977b). In a letter to Duke’s board of trustees’ chairman, Sanford 
wrote, “I simply felt that I could not devote enough time to it to do the job the way it 
should be done” (Sanford, 1977b, p. 1). Actions like this underscored Sanford’s 
commitment to Duke.
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Shortly thereafter, President Jimmy Carter asked Sanford to become U.S. 
ambassador to France (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1977b, 1977c). True to form, 
Sanford also declined this prestigious appointment, remarking, “I felt morally obligated 
to stay at Duke, having told everybody that I would not accept a federal job” (Sanford, 
1977b, p. 1). Echoing the same sentiment in a private memorandum, Sanford wrote “I 
simply felt that I could not leave Duke right now” (Sanford, 1977c, p. 2). He believed 
that there would be plenty of other opportunities in the future and that he wanted to stay 
at Duke in order to complete the work he had started there (Sanford, 1977c). Overall, 
these data demonstrated that Sanford considered his position at Duke to be his most 
important professional responsibility, even though he was offered many other high- 
profile opportunities during his tenure.
Sanford’s strong commitment to Duke has also been discussed over the years by 
university officials as well as historians, providing effective data triangulation for this 
study. Reflecting upon Sanford’s presidential tenure, one faculty member stated, “1 
thought he would try to make this a base for his political ambitions... but he hasn’t. The 
man really works at being president (as cited in Egerton, 1973, p. 32). McKnight (1969) 
seconded that point, arguing that Sanford was genuinely motivated to serve Duke 
University, along with its students and higher education in general. Covington and Ellis 
(1999) also echoed that sentiment, asserting that Sanford “approached his responsibilities 
at Duke with the same high ambition that he had carried into the governor’s office” (p. 
379). These data concluded that despite his non-traditional background, Sanford 
genuinely wanted to serve as an academic leader.
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Overall, while Sanford retained a strong interest in politics throughout his Duke 
tenure, he never felt it necessary to totally abandon his work at the university in order to 
pursue elected office (Covington & Ellis, 1999). While Sanford was viewed as a serious 
presidential or vice presidential contender in American politics for much of the 1970s, his 
work at Duke was ultimately more important to him (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 
1973). According to Gordon (1998), Sanford “never needed a [political] title to do the 
work of kings” (p. 1). As these data indicated, Sanford’s commitment to Duke earned 
him a lasting respect among the institution’s academic community. This respect was vital 
in facilitating his successful transition to academic culture. However, it also came at the 
expense o f Sanford’s failed political campaigns, as he had to choose Duke as his top 
professional priority.
Prior academic exposure. A third central theme in Sanford’s writings pertained 
to how his prior government service prepared him for his academic leadership role at 
Duke. Although Sanford appeared to assume Duke’s presidency with a non-academic 
background, he came into office with more higher education exposure than many realized 
(Carroll, 1969; Covington & Ellis, 1999; East, 1970; Jackson & John, 1969; McKnight,
1969). According to Jackson and John (1969), Sanford’s gubernatorial term had been 
known as “an administration whose reputation [was] founded on its concern for 
education” (p. 5). Specifically, higher education was an area o f great focus during 
Sanford’s tenure, and the budgets for state colleges and universities increased by 70 
percent during that time (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Jackson & John, 1969). Moreover, 
Sanford spearheaded the effort to create three new liberal arts colleges and a system of 
community colleges while in office (Jackson & John, 1969). This commitment to higher
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education likely generated a spirit of goodwill for Sanford within North Carolina’s 
college and university campuses.
Along with pursuing educational goals as governor, Sanford had extensive 
personal ties to higher education prior to assuming Duke’s presidency (Jackson & John,
1969). He had served for several years as chairman of the board of trustees for both the 
University o f North Carolina and Methodist College (Jackson & John, 1969). Further, 
Sanford had served on the governing boards for Shaw University, Berea College,
Chowan College, Davidson College, Appalachian State University, Guilford College, and 
Wake Forest University (Jackson & John, 1969). Such extensive board affiliations likely 
gave Sanford at least a basic understanding of academic culture before even assuming 
Duke’s presidency. Further, upon accepting the appointment as Duke’s president, 
Sanford immersed himself in preparing for the job (Covington & Ellis, 1999; East, 1970). 
For several months, he attended dozens o f meetings with Duke officials and pored over 
briefing books to prepare for his presidential duties (Covington & Ellis, 1999; East,
1970). Thus, between his successful, pro-education track record as governor and his 
prior higher education exposure, Sanford was well prepared to engage with academic 
culture, even as a non-traditional president.
In the primary source materials examined for this study, references to this 
academic exposure were discovered in nearly 10 documents. Appearing primarily in 
interviews as well as in personal and official correspondence, these references were 
present in roughly one out of every eight documents examined. As these data indicated, 
Sanford’s prior experience with North Carolina’s higher education system provided a 
degree o f confidence that he brought into office (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973;
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Sanford, 1974a). Because of Sanford’s unique educational background, academic culture 
was not entirely new to him, and he felt comfortable engaging with it (Sanford, 1974a). 
For instance, in response to critics who predicted that as a non-academic, Sanford would 
have a hands-off approach as an academic leader, Sanford reflected:
Several people said, ‘well, he’ll come in here as a great fund-raiser.’ I 
said, ‘I’m not coming as a fund-raiser. I’m coming as president of the 
university and as the president of the faculty. That’s my position.’ So 
occasionally when somebody wanted to categorize me and say, ‘well, 
he’s not really a PhD, he’s here for this,’ I slapped that down right then 
and there. I said, ‘I’m president of the university from start to finish’” 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 380).
Further, Sanford believed that his work as Duke’s president was not much different than 
his previous work as governor (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight,
1969; Sanford, 1974a). In one interview, Sanford drew parallels between the two roles 
by asserting, “essentially, both jobs require you to deal with people... I think both of 
these jobs have a number of similarities and one would probably prepare you for the 
other” (Sanford, 1974a, p. 1). He also believed that universities and government 
bureaucracy were fundamentally similar, arguing “both are fairly good at resisting change 
as institutions. On the other hand, individuals within both are ready for change if  the 
climate is right...” (Sanford, 1974a, p. 2). Thus, Sanford believed that his work as a state 
government executive ultimately provided him the skills he needed to be an effective 
university president (Sanford, 1974a).
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Sanford’s conclusions about how his previous experiences prepared him for 
Duke’s presidency have been supported over the years by his Duke colleagues, media 
observers, and historians (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969; 
Nordheiber, 1970). As one faculty member noted, “when Sanford arrived, he made it 
clear he was going to run the university, it wasn’t going to run him” (Nordheiber, 1970). 
Echoing that point, McKnight (1969) wrote that in appointing Sanford as president, “the 
trustees undoubtedly were motivated in part by the knowledge that Sanford is a strong 
man who lets everybody know who is in charge” (p. 1). Nordheiber (1970) noted that 
even among Sanford’s critics, they recognized “Mr. Sanford’s adeptness as an 
administrator and as a man who is not easily intimidated” (p. 1). Further, Covington and 
Ellis (1999) and Nordheiber (1970) both noted that radical students intent on testing 
Sanford’s leadership discovered quickly that they were up against a true professional. 
According to one Duke graduate, such students came to believe that “it’s impossible to 
outfox him... he’s just plain smarter than the radicals are” (as cited in Nordheiber, 1970, 
p. 1). In certain cases, this contrasted with other North Carolina college presidents during 
this period, who sometimes struggled to find ways to respond to the era’s tumultuous 
challenges (Cole, 2013). Ultimately, while Sanford was not a professional academic, his 
commitment to education and significant involvement with North Carolina’s colleges and 
universities helped provide him the necessary skills to engage with academic culture 
effectively.
Relational approach. The final and most apparent theme derived from an 
examination of Sanford’s papers pertained to his leadership style at Duke. The data 
revealed a highly relational approach that appeared to endear him to Duke’s academic
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community. Specifically, Sanford utilized a leadership style that encouraged 
transparency, welcomed outside input, and interjected humor to ease stressful situations 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Sanford, 1970b, 1971, 1974b, 1975a, 1975b). 
He was also highly approachable and made it a point to interact extensively with his 
followers, particularly students (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). Sanford’s 
policy was to be highly visible to Duke students, faculty, and staff when he was on 
campus (Egerton, 1973).
Moreover, Sanford was a humble leader who never took personal credit for the 
considerable achievements o f his tenure (Egerton, 1973). Often embarrassed by praise, 
Sanford would typically respond by saying, “changes were coming to Duke anyway... 
it’s not proper for me to take credit” (as cited in Egerton, 1973, p. 28). In other 
situations, Sanford would react with self-deprecating humor, remarking:
I told the chairman of the board of trustees when he offered me this job 
that I didn’t have sense enough to be president o f Duke, and his reply was, 
‘I know that, but I’ve always admired your luck’” (as cited in Egerton, 
1973, p. 29).
Sanford’s unique leadership style was consistently evident in the materials examined for 
this study. Examples of his relational approach were found in over 30 primary source 
documents, including letters, interviews, and personal reflections. These data indicated 
that Sanford’s leadership style played an important role in facilitating his adjustment to 
academic culture.
Sanford’s relational approach manifested itself in many ways through his writing. 
He believed strongly in transparency and open communication, and regularly sent
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personal letters to the Duke community to keep them updated on university affairs 
(Sanford, 1970b, 1971,1974b, 1975a, 1975b). Throughout Sanford’s tenure, he also 
solicited and welcomed input from all members o f the Duke community (Sanford, 1974b, 
1978). For instance, in letters to alumni, he used phrases such as “you are an integral part 
of Duke University,” and “your participation is essential to the future o f Duke” (Sanford,
1974b, paragraphs 2, 6). This pattern was the same with Duke’s faculty, and Sanford 
requested a special mass meeting with them at least once a year where he would address 
their ideas and concerns (Sanford, 1978). Sanford also kept up to date with faculty 
research and praised professors for their professional accomplishments (Sanford, 1977d). 
In one such letter, he wrote, “I want you to know how much 1 appreciate the work you are 
doing and the great credit your work reflects on Duke University” (Sanford, 1977d, p. 1). 
This approach helped Sanford to develop a strong, working relationship with much of 
Duke’s faculty.
Sanford also forged a strong connection with Duke’s students, who referred to 
him as “Uncle Terry” for much of his tenure (Sanford, 1984, p. 1). Sanford preferred 
open communication and direct dialogue with students, encouraging them to take an 
active role in building Duke’s future and inspiring them to pursue excellence (Sanford, 
1979b, 1981,1984). It was also Sanford’s habit to write personal letters welcoming 
incoming freshmen to the university (Sanford, 1981). In one such letter, he wrote:
Duke is what it is, and what it is to become, because of many people 
who believed in it, who gave part o f their lives to it, and who knew it 
was worth the love and effort they shared... it cannot flourish without 
the intellectual excitement you will add to it for the next several years.
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It cannot continue to flourish without your love, attention, and support, 
including financial support, after you have left (Sanford, 1981, p. 1). 
Along with inspiring students to be active Duke citizens, Sanford challenged them to do 
better when their behavior did not meet the university’s expectations (Sanford, 1979b;
1984). For instance, responding to rowdy student behavior at Duke home basketball 
games, Sanford sent letters directly to students to express his concerns (Sanford, 1979b; 
1984). In his now legendary “An Avuncular Letter,” addressed “To My Duke Students,” 
Sanford wrote:
Resorting to the use of obscenities in cheers and chants at ball games 
indicates a lack of vocabulary, a lack of cleverness, a lack of ideas, and 
a lack of respect for other people... I suggest that we change... This 
request is in keeping with my commitment to self-government for 
students. It should not be up to me to enforce proper behavior that 
signifies the intelligence of Duke students. You should do it. Reprove 
those who make us all look bad. Shape up your own language. I hate for 
us to have the reputation of being stupid. With best wishes, Uncle Terry 
(Sanford, 1984, p. 1).
In a sign of respect for their president, Duke students chanted, “we beg to differ” at the 
following game when they disagreed with a referee’s call (Covington & Ellis, 1999, p. 
433). This was indicative of the deep bond that Sanford shared with Duke’s students 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
Over the years, members of the Duke community, historians, and media observers 
have also written extensively about Sanford’s relational leadership style. These
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reflections provided effective data triangulation for this study. Regarding Sanford’s 
accessibility to students, one Duke undergraduate claimed that he could see Sanford more 
easily than some of his professors (Egerton, 1973). Similarly, some historians claimed 
that no senior Duke administrator had ever provided a more receptive ear to students 
about either public issues or campus matters than Sanford (Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Egerton 1973). According to Covington and Ellis (1999) and Egerton (1973), Sanford 
was also known to directly intervene whenever members of the Duke community needed 
help, on matters ranging from admissions to job searching. This approach fostered a 
spirit o f goodwill and respect that endeared Sanford to many members of Duke’s 
academic community (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
This goodwill was in turn essential for Sanford when it came to enduring some of 
the major crises of his administration -  most notably the Vietnam War-era student 
protests and his clash with Duke faculty over the possible placement of the Nixon 
Presidential Library on the Duke campus (Covington & Ellis, 1999). In both instances, 
Sanford faced intense pressure and criticism from many faculty members, alumni, and 
students (Covington & Ellis, 1999). To counter these threats, Sanford maintained a high 
visibility level on campus and engaged in both formal and informal meetings with 
members of the Duke community (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Sanford was also highly 
transparent in his communications, explaining his actions in full detail through official 
letters as well as through personal appearances (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Thus, 
although members of Duke’s academic community may have disagreed with Sanford -  
sometimes intensely -  over various matters during his tenure, the goodwill cultivated by 
Sanford’s relational approach helped him to weather those storms (Covington & Ellis,
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1999). Thus, the data examined for this study indicated that Sanford’s leadership style 
was integral to his successful adjustment to academic culture.
Summary
Sanford represented a non-traditional college president who adjusted successfully 
to academic culture. Even today, Sanford is a beloved figure on the Duke University 
campus because of his achievements and the impact he had on so many people (Gordon, 
1998; Rubin & Stroup, 1998). As the findings from this study concluded, Sanford’s 
success stemmed from four central issues: he possessed a compelling presidential vision 
that aligned with Duke’s institutional needs; he made Duke his top professional priority 
throughout his tenure; he possessed prior experience with higher education and 
government bureaucracy that helped smooth his transition into academe; and he had a 
unique, relational leadership style that endeared him to many members of the Duke 
community. Thus, Sanford’s experience at Duke demonstrates that it is possible for non- 
traditional college presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture. The next chapter 
will explore a non-traditional president who had a more challenging but ultimately 
successful journey in adapting to academic culture. His leadership style was somewhat 
different than Sanford’s, but he also learned to operate within the cultural framework of 
academe and transform his university in the process. Chapter 6 will analyze Paul Trible’s 
presidency of Christopher Newport University and explore how he was also eventually 
successful in learning the ways of the academy.
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Chapter 6 -  Paul Trible and Christopher Newport University
In the preceding chapters, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Terry Sanford were 
presented as outlier cases in reference to the issues that non-traditional college presidents 
face in adjusting to academic culture. Eisenhower’s tenure at Columbia University 
represented a troubling scenario, highlighting a non-traditional president who failed to 
adjust to the ways of the academy. Conversely, Terry Sanford represented a more 
positive scenario, as he succeeded in earning the respect of Duke’s entire academic 
community and left a lasting positive impact on the institution. Eisenhower arguably 
failed on both of those fronts during his time at Columbia.
In a presidential tenure of nearly 20 years and counting, former U.S. Sen. Paul 
Trible’s time in office is the longest o f the three non-traditional presidents included in 
this study. He charted his own unique path at Christopher Newport University (CNU), 
located in Newport News, Virginia. Like Eisenhower and Sanford before him, Trible 
took the helm in 1996 of a deeply troubled institution, and was expected to be a “miracle 
worker” o f sorts to help redefine CNU for the 21st century (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208).
Over the course of his tenure, Trible took CNU to new heights, transforming a fledging, 
commuter school into a vital, up-and-coming liberal arts institution (Hamilton, 2011; 
Heuvel, 2009). For Trible, however, this success did not come easy. It was achieved 
only after a long and challenging adjustment process to academic culture, which included 
many clashes with faculty members (Hamilton, 2011).
Thus, for this study Trible represented somewhat of a middle ground between the 
two outlier cases of Eisenhower and Sanford. As data from this study indicated, he had a 
more difficult adjustment process to academic culture than Sanford, but was much more
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effective in the long run than Eisenhower. Using data derived from interviews along with 
selected secondary sources, this study found that Trible’s challenges and ultimate success 
stemmed from a combination of issues. These included his ambitious vision that 
coincided well with CNU’s institutional needs; his frustration with the ways of academe; 
his adaptability; and his ability for consensus building. To put these factors into 
perspective, this study situated them within a broader framework that included Trible’s 
personal history, a historical context o f the 1990s-era higher education landscape, and 
CNU’s institutional context during that period. Those sections follow below.
Personal History
Paul S. Trible, Jr. was bom on December 29,1946 in Baltimore, Maryland 
(Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011). The son of a salt company executive, Trible 
grew up in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, but possessed deep familial roots in Virginia’s 
Middle Peninsula region (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). With a desire to return to his 
family’s native state, Trible completed his bachelor’s degree at Hampden-Sydney 
College in 1968 and later graduated from Washington & Lee University’s Law School in 
1971 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Following service as a 
law clerk and assistant U.S. attorney, Trible heard of a vacancy in the commonwealth’s 
attorney office in his family’s native Essex County and was subsequently elected to that 
office in 1974 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). Intent on 
a political career, Trible sought federal office and was elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 1976 (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987; Hamilton, 2011). Representing 
Virginia’s 1st Congressional district, Trible served on the Armed Services and Budget 
Committees and was viewed as a rising star in the Republican Party (Di Vincenzo,
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1995a; Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Along the way, he married Rosemary Dunaway 
Trible and had two children (Hamilton, 2011).
In 1982, Trible was elected to the U.S. Senate, eking out a narrow victory against 
Virginia’s popular lieutenant governor (Barone & Ujifusa, 1987). A loyal Ronald 
Reagan supporter, Trible spent his years in the Senate serving most notably on the 
Foreign Relations Committee and was best known for his work during the Iran-Contra 
affair (Hamilton, 2011). However, in 1987 he made the surprising decision to not run for 
re-election, citing frustration with the legislative process as well as a desire to spend more 
time with his family as his reasons for departure (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). 
The following year, Trible ran for Virginia governor but lost in the Republican primary 
(Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). At this point, he decided to step back from electoral 
politics and pursue other professional opportunities. In the early 1990s, he served on the 
American delegation to the United Nations, taught briefly at Harvard, and also ran his 
own government consulting firm (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009).
However, a political appointment during this period unintentionally put Trible on 
track to pursue a second career in higher education. In 1994, Gov. George Allen 
appointed Trible to CNU’s board of visitors (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011; 
Heuvel, 2009). While Trible was certainly familiar with the institution because of his 
long Hampton Roads governmental service, this appointment allowed him to gain a 
deeper knowledge of CNU’s problems as well as its possibilities (Hamilton, 2011). As 
his board service progressed, Trible grew fascinated by CNU’s potential and began 
looking for ways to serve the institution in a more meaningful way (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; 
Hamilton, 2011).
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Historical Context
As Trible considered pursuing more focused CNU service, the nation’s colleges 
and universities were undergoing an important period of transition. By the early 1990s, 
higher education institutions were many years removed from their golden age (Thelin, 
2011). While American higher education endured a bleak economic outlook in the 
1970s, followed by a gradual recovery in the 1980s, many challenges still remained 
(Thelin, 2011). According to Thelin (2011), the sore spots in this era included increased 
competition from the for-profit educational sector, a move toward centralization among 
public institutions, uncertainty over how to better incorporate women and minorities into 
the field, and increasing public resentment over rising college costs. Despite intense 
debate over how to solve these pressing problems, they had to be addressed in order for 
the institutions to move successfully into the 21st century.
The rapid rise of for-profit educational institutions represented a most challenging 
predicament for established colleges and universities (Thelin, 2011). The generous 
provisions of the Pell Grant program and other student financial aid initiatives fueled the 
growth of many for-profit educational enterprises, which demanded the right to 
participate in federal financial aid programs (Thelin, 2011). Although the presidents of 
established institutions fought this vigorously, the government ultimately provided 
proprietary colleges a “seat at the table” for federal student aid (Thelin, 2011, p. 340). 
Most predominant among the for-profit institutions were distance-learning programs like 
the University of Phoenix, which quickly developed a multi-state network of sites 
(Thelin, 2011). The rise of such schools also compelled established colleges and
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universities to consider how to better incorporate new technology, such as online- 
leaming, into their traditional curriculums (Thelin, 2011).
For public colleges and universities, the move toward centralization also 
presented a unique challenge. This issue had its roots in a 1972 amendment to the 1964 
Higher Education Act, which sought to alter the governance of higher education (Thelin, 
2011). Its intention was to offer funding incentives to states that created higher 
education-coordinating agencies, aimed at reducing duplication and promoting long-term 
collective planning (Thelin, 2011). However, these “1202 commissions” had decidedly 
mixed results and were often viewed as a nuisance by university presidents (Thelin, 2011, 
p. 339). Many resented this extra layer of government bureaucracy that only had the 
power in most cases to offer recommendations on issues ranging from budget planning to 
academic programs (Thelin, 2011). Overall, these state higher education commissions 
added an extra layer of complexity to the work of university presidents, even if  they did 
promote some positive outcomes, such as statewide policy deliberations (Thelin, 2011).
Along with struggling to find ways to work with these new state higher education 
commissions, higher education leaders debated over how to incorporate larger numbers 
o f women and minorities into their profession (Thelin, 2011). As early as the 1970s, 
higher education observers noted a “chilly” climate for women and an acute lack of 
female graduate students as well as faculty members (Thelin, 2011, pp. 344-345).
Though the numbers in both areas had risen since the 1950s, there was still more work to 
be done (Thelin, 2011). The famous 1972 legislation, known as Title IX, also had 
significant ramifications for higher education leaders in the 1990s, as they urgently 
looked for ways to prohibit discrimination for females, especially in college athletics
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(Thelin, 2011). As for minorities, there was a highly publicized debate during the 1990s 
over affirmative action (Thelin, 2011). In an effort to boost minority numbers in the 
student, faculty, and administrative arenas, some higher education leaders advocated for 
affirmative action while other groups lobbied just as forcefully against it (Thelin, 2011). 
Overall, there was an urgent need among many within higher education to “promote 
access and acknowledge diversity” throughout the 1990s (Thelin, 2011, p. 349). 
However, the problem was in finding a clear, realistic path to reach those goals.
Along with increased public debate over Title IX and affirmative action, there 
was also widespread concern in the 1990s over rising college costs (Heller, 2001; Thelin, 
2011). Much of this concern was fueled by allegations o f abuses in the federal financial 
aid system (Thelin, 2011). Some government officials even insinuated that colleges and 
universities artificially inflated their tuition costs in order to demonstrate greater financial 
need among their student Pell Grant recipients (Thelin, 2011). As the 1990s progressed, 
public outcry continued as some in media and government circles accused higher 
education institutions o f increasing their tuition rates beyond the rate of inflation (Thelin, 
2011). In actuality, a root cause behind increased college costs was that the sluggish 
economic conditions o f earlier years resulted in deferred maintenance and a backlog of 
projects (Thelin, 2011). Thus, by the early 1990s those costs were beginning to catch up 
with many higher education institutions (Thelin, 2011). Nevertheless, the public outcry 
over college costs often cast private and public institutions against one another, resulting 
in a highly charged political atmosphere for much of the decade (Thelin, 2011). Overall, 
while America’s colleges and universities were poised to enter a new century full of 
opportunity and promise, they also faced a number o f pressing problems.
145
Institutional Context
While many established colleges and universities spent the early/mid-1990s 
confronting these challenging issues, CNU was struggling to even stay open. Opened in 
1961 as a two-year extension of The College of William and Mary, CNU (known 
originally as Christopher Newport College) spent the 1960s and 1970s providing a basic 
liberal arts education to primarily blue-collar Virginia Peninsula residents (Hamilton,
2011). Although the institution possessed minimal resources, it had a clear educational 
mission and stable student enrollments throughout this period (Hamilton, 2011). A 
milestone for CNU during this time was when it gained independence from William and 
Mary in 1977 and developed its own four-year curriculum (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 
2009). However, by the 1980s and early 1990s, growing competition from nearby four- 
year schools, community colleges, and for-profit institutions created pressing problems 
for CNU (Hamilton, 2011). Increasingly, it was left without a niche or purpose as 
prospective students began to drift away toward other educational opportunities 
(Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). Consequently, CNU experienced a steady decline in 
enrollment during this period, despite milestones such as its elevation to university status 
in 1992 and the construction of its first residence hall shortly thereafter (Hamilton, 2011).
To complicate matters further, CNU had been led since 1980 by well-meaning but 
ultimately ineffective presidents who did not have a clear vision for the institution’s 
future (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, CNU spent these years in a wilderness of sorts, trying to 
be all things to all people in order to attract any kind of student interest (Hamilton, 2011; 
Heuvel, 2009). Rather than attracting prospective students, however, this offering of a 
hodge-podge of disjointed curricular programs further fueled CNU’s downward spiral
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(Hamilton, 2011). Consequently, the institution developed the reputation as being 
inferior or second-rate, and remained entrenched at the bottom of Virginia’s public higher 
education system (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011).
Unfortunately, there seemed to be little hope on the horizon for CNU as the 1990s 
progressed. A major problem stemmed from its mediocre status in the Virginia General 
Assembly (Hamilton, 2011). Since CNU was not really known beyond the Virginia 
Peninsula, it remained a low priority when it came to state appropriations (Hamilton,
2011). Specifically, it was difficult to get a legislator from elsewhere in the state to really 
care about CNU if none of his or her constituents had ever heard of it or had their 
children enrolled there (Hamilton, 2011). This lack of state funding resulted in consistent 
budget problems for CNU throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Hamilton, 2011;
Heuvel, 2009). Moreover, faculty and staff morale was very poor as members of the 
CNU community worried about their institution’s future (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). 
Rumors about closure had circulated around campus in earlier years, but by the early 
1990s, there was a very real threat o f CNU shutting its doors permanently or being 
merged with another public university within the region (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, as the 
1990s progressed, there was an urgent need for a leader who could quickly take CNU out 
of this death spiral and provide a promising and compelling vision for its future. What 
follows (See Table 3) is a timeline that highlights key dates pertaining to Trible’s 
experience at CNU. The dates are sorted by historical higher education context, CNU’s 
institutional context, and by Trible’s personal history. These three categories are placed 
side-by-side to allow the reader to obtain a thorough contextual overview of the key 
events and issues that occurred during the Trible era at CNU.
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Table 3 -  Trible/CNU Timeline
Historical Context Institutional Context Personal History
1964: Higher Education Act 
passed.
1972: Title IX passed.
Early 1990s-present:
Budget challenges for 
public and private higher 
education institutions. 
Heightened public concern 
over rising college costs.
Mid-1990s-present: Rise of 
online higher education 
institutions. Rise o f neo­
liberalism movement in 
higher education. Debate 
over affirmative action.
1960: CNU founded (as 
Christopher Newport 
College).
Late 1960s: Development 
of four-year curriculum
1977: Gained independence 
from William & Mary.
Early/Mid 1980s: Budget 
problems.
1992: Renamed Christopher 
Newport University.
1995: First residence hall 
opens.
2000-present: Massive 
campus construction 
program.
2001: Football team 
established.
2003: Budget problems and 
decision to eliminate certain 
academic programs.
2011: The Princeton Review 
selected CNU for its annual 
“best colleges” guidebook.
1946: Trible bom.
1968: Graduated from 
Hampden-Sydney College.
1971: Graduated from 
Washington & Lee 
University School of Law.
1974-1976:
Commonwealth’s Attorney.
1977-1983: U.S. 
Representative.
1983-1989: U.S. Senator.
1989: Candidate for VA 
Governor.
Early 1990s: Member of 
U.S. United Nations 
Delegation.
1994: Appointed to CNU 
board of visitors.
1995: Appointed CNU 
President.
2003: Explored possible 
campaign for VA 
Lieutenant Governor.
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Selecting a New President
In June 1995, CNU’s incumbent president announced his resignation, prompting 
the need for a presidential search (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). A hiring 
committee quickly formed, comprised of Trible, other board members, faculty members, 
and administrators (Hamilton, 2011). As it began its search, the committee 
commissioned a consulting firm to draft a report that would assess CNU’s strengths and 
weaknesses and outline the key qualities that an ideal presidential candidate should 
possess (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). The resulting document stressed that the 
institution needed a president with proven leadership experience as well as enough 
political savvy to engage with state legislators in Richmond (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; 
Hamilton, 2011). The report also suggested that considering the institution’s need for a 
new vision, the committee should possibly look at candidates from outside the academic 
world, such as business executives or political figures (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 
2011).
After reading this report, Trible began to think that he was possibly qualified for 
the position (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). He quickly discussed the possibility 
with his wife, Rosemary, who was initially cool to the idea, considering that Trible did 
not hold a PhD and was not a career academician (Hamilton, 2011; Trible, 2009). 
However, after they thought it over she became more enthusiastic and encouraged him to 
apply (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, at a November 1995 search committee meeting, Trible 
announced to stunned colleagues that he was interested in applying for the position (Di 
Vincenzo, 1995a; Hamilton, 2011). After Trible recused himself from further 
deliberations, the shocked committee members discussed the matter over three additional
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meetings (Hamilton, 2011). By December 1995, they concluded that Trible would 
indeed be the best candidate for the job and stopped reviewing other applications 
(Hamilton, 2011). Shortly thereafter, the committee recommended his selection to the 
board of visitors (Hamilton, 2011). Trible was subsequently selected unanimously as 
CNU’s fifth president and took office on January 1,1996 (Di Vincenzo, 1995a; 
Hamilton, 2011).
While many faculty members expressed “disbelief’ over the appointment of a 
non-academic as president, they were willing to give Trible a chance considering CNU’s 
dire situation (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208). They realized that desperate times called for 
unusual measures, and Trible at least appeared to have a compelling vision for the 
institution’s future, based on content from media interviews and preliminary meetings 
with faculty members (Hamilton, 2011). In fact, some faculty argued that Trible’s 
selection made good sense, considering his years o f political, fundraising, and leadership 
experience (Hamilton, 2011). Nevertheless, some within the CNU community were 
surprised upon hearing about Trible’s lucrative compensation package, which exceeded 
the salaries former CNU presidents (Hamilton, 2011). However, CNU Rector David 
Peebles responded to such criticism by arguing “when you’re looking for a miracle 
worker, you’ve got to pay a miracle worker” (Hamilton, 2011, p. 208). On that note, 
Trible assumed the presidency of a deeply troubled institution, intent upon achieving 
transformational change.
Summary of Emerging Themes
Since assuming CNU’s presidency in 1996, Trible has achieved much of the 
change that he promised, namely the complete transformation of CNU from a little-
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known commuter college into a premier liberal arts institution. Over the course of his 
tenure, public interest in CNU has grown exponentially, resulting in a 700 percent 
application surge between 2003 and 2013, and a steady rise in student quality (Cooper, 
2013; Heuvel, 2009). Specifically, the average SAT score for incoming students has 
increased by approximately 200 points over the last decade, even though mean scores for 
both the SAT and ACT have remained relatively stable across the nation for 
approximately the same period (Cooper, 2013; State o f  College Admission, 2011). 
Moreover, using his fundraising skills honed by several years of political campaigning, 
Trible has transformed the CNU campus with an over $1 billion capital construction 
campaign (Barrett, 2001a; Cooper, 2013; Hamilton, 2011). Once a commuter school 
with aging facilities, CNU became a majority residential campus with state-of-the-art 
academic buildings by 2010 (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 2009). According to Hamilton
(2011), under Trible the school “took on the appearance of a well-endowed private liberal 
arts college rather than an underfunded and struggling state university” (p. 203). Trible 
also revitalized the institution’s finances by securing larger state appropriations as well as 
several multimillion-dollar donations from corporate and private donors (Cooper, 2013; 
Hamilton, 2011).
Despite all of these achievements, Trible did not have an entirely smooth 
transition into academic culture (Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011). Early in Trible’s 
tenure, some faculty members were either alarmed or skeptical about his transformational 
vision, concerned that it would either not work or drive CNU too far away from its 
institutional roots (Hamilton, 2011). Further, other faculty members were troubled by 
Trible’s lack of patience as well as his frustration with the ways of academic culture
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(Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011). This led to some clashes and a period of strained 
relations between Trible and some of his faculty colleagues (Barrett, 2000; 2001b; 
Hamilton, 2011). The most significant confrontations occurred early in Trible’s tenure. 
They centered primarily on his plans to eliminate several of CNU’s graduate programs 
and to completely reorganize the university’s administrative hierarchy (Barrett, 2000; 
2001b; Hamilton, 2011). Each initiative was strongly opposed by student and faculty 
coalitions that criticized Trible for not promoting enough open communication and for 
excluding them from the decision-making process (Barrett, 2001b; Hamilton, 2011).
However, as the data from this study indicated, Trible gradually came to learn the 
ways of academe, and was ultimately able to work effectively within that culture after 
several years of trial and error. The purpose of this study was to determine the specific 
issues that explained his successful adjustment to academic culture. To investigate this 
question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Trible along with five senior 
faculty and administrative leaders. Using an interview protocol that consisted of nine 
questions, each interview was typically an hour long and held on the CNU campus. For 
purposes of confidentiality, the names of the five faculty and administrative leaders were 
excluded. For purposes of identification in this study, they were instead labeled 
“Participant 1 ” through “Participant 5” (See Appendix A). Following transcription and 
analysis, all o f the interviews were coded (See Appendix E). For the purposes of data 
triangulation, the coded data from the Trible interview were then compared to those from 
the faculty and administrator interviews. Finally, those data were compared to analysis 
by historians and news media observers to ensure that the findings were consistent.
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The objective behind this research was to identify Trible’s thoughts about 
academic culture as reflected in his interview and in other publications, including 
newspaper articles and books. Another key objective was to identify how Trible was able 
to overcome some early challenges at CNU and eventually adjust to academic life. Open 
coding identified seven applicable codes that appeared multiple times in the interviews 
(See Appendix E). Axial coding later narrowed these codes down to four central themes 
that were primary factors behind Trible’s challenging yet successful adjustment to 
academic culture. These included Trible’s ambitious vision for CNU that coincided well 
with the university’s institutional needs, the impact of his frustration with academic 
culture, his willingness to adapt to a new environment, and his unique skill for consensus 
building. As these data ultimately demonstrated, these dynamics helped explain how 
Trible was able to overcome some significant challenges early in his tenure and 
ultimately adjust to academic culture.
Vision. A central theme that emerged from the data was the noticeable impact 
that Trible’s CNU vision had for not only the university, but for his acclimation to 
academic culture. While not all CNU students, faculty, and staff originally agreed with 
the vision, they were nevertheless comforted that Trible at least had a plan, considering 
the university’s precarious condition (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013; Participant 2, personal communication, June 2,2014; 
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014; Participant 5, personal 
communication, April 4,2012). As Participant 3 (2014) noted, “we needed a strong 
leader... we needed someone who could lay out the vision and take charge and make a 
decision to move forward quickly” (Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,
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2014). For this reason, faculty members were generally willing to “cut [Trible] some 
slack,” since CNU was in such dire straits (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 
2013). They were also interested to see if  his ideas for revitalizing the institution could 
work (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Over time, 
this vision had a unifying effect among CNU’s academic community and helped to 
solidify Trible’s position as president (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013).
During interviews with senior faculty and administrators, those participants also 
noted consistently the importance of Trible’s vision in forging a bond with the 
university’s academic community (Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 
2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal 
communication, June 3, 2014; Participant 3, personal communication; May 21,2014; 
Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). Among the seven total interviews 
conducted for this study (one senior administrator was interviewed twice), there were 
approximately 38 references to Trible’s vision, its impact on CNU, and how it helped him 
to forge a sense of common purpose with the university’s academic community.
Trible’s vision centered on highlighting CNU’s traditional strengths of small 
classes and caring faculty and developing a university where students could get the 
benefits of a private school education for a public school price (Hamilton, 2011; Heuvel, 
2009). Specifically, he endeavored to establish CNU as “a university o f choice for every 
Virginian” (Di Vincenzo, 1995b, p. 1). Trible also sought to transform how CNU 
students, faculty, and staff perceived their institution and its place in Virginia’s higher 
education system, asserting:
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We will work together and we will succeed together. It is time to think 
and act like winners. It is time to step out of the boxes in which this 
university has operated... We will not tolerate those that say it can’t be 
done or that it can only be done this way. We will not allow others to 
limit our dreams or diminish our success (as cited in Di Vincenzo, 1995b, 
p . l) .
Such sentiments were empowering to a CNU community that had for many years lacked 
a compelling purpose as a little-known and cash-strapped commuter school (Hamilton, 
2011). Thus, it gave many at CNU a renewed spirit and optimism for the institution’s 
future (Hamilton, 2011).
For Trible, this visionary approach was also at the core o f his leadership 
philosophy (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). Leadership for him “is 
all about vision and values, and sharing vision and values powerfully and persuasively” 
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Moreover, in taking the helm of a 
troubled university, Trible believed that it was crucial to offer CNU’s academic 
community hope for the future. Thus, he focused on “eliminating the negatives” from the 
organization and used his ambitious vision to “align people’s hearts and minds” (P.
Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). As Trible further reflected, “you can’t 
dictate from above, but someone has got to put forward that vision” (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately, Trible believed that this vision for liberal 
arts excellence helped to define CNU for the modem era, giving the university a clear 
sense of purpose (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). He also noted
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that a key component to instilling his vision on CNU’s academic community was to 
communicate it consistently, noting:
It’s about wearing those visions and values like clothes on your back. And 
everything that you say, everything that you do, pointing people in that 
direction. It’s communicating that vision and values powerfully and 
persuasively and encouraging others to embrace that vision... and I think 
that’s the key to our success here (P. Trible, personal communication, 
March 15,2013).
Ultimately, the CNU faculty members who adamantly opposed Trible’s vision left the 
university while those who were more receptive became major proponents over time 
(Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Thus, his 
compelling vision for CNU’s future helped him to forge a strong bond with CNU’s 
academic community.
Trible’s thoughts on the significance of his CNU vision and how it helped 
facilitate his adjustment to academic culture were seconded by university officials as well 
as historians (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30,2012; 
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal 
communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012; 
Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012). According to Participant 1
(2012), “in the early days o f his administration, he made a real concerted effort to 
communicate very broadly within the university... to communicate strongly that vision, 
the values, and the strategic direction.” This effort gradually paid off, as reluctant faculty 
members in particular began to sense Trible’s optimism and commitment and come
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around to support his plans (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, June 3,2014, personal 
communication; Participant 5, April 4,2012, personal communication).
Reflecting on this period, Participant 5 (2012) noted that there was initially great 
resistance among the faculty to Trible’s plans and to his style of urgency and directness. 
However, “as time passed, he became more participative in some realms, and faculty 
recognized the unique value he was bringing to the entire institution and became a little 
more tolerant” (Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012). This sentiment 
was supported by Participant 2 (2014), who recalled:
I just remember that he was able to articulate a vision. And I think once 
he could do that -  once he knew enough about running a university to do 
that in a way that faculty - 1 mean, you might not have agreed with it, but 
it was a vision for the university... and so once he had a vision, there was 
still tension about how to get it done, but I think that was the key.
Some participants noted that another key to Trible’s success in this area was found in his 
faculty hiring strategy (Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 
3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). When Trible assumed office in 1996, CNU 
had only 164 faculty members (Hamilton, 2011). However, he made it an institutional 
priority to increase the faculty roster, and through aggressive hiring increased the number 
to 268 in 2013 (Pawlowski, 2013). By fall 2014, that number had reached 273 (P. Trible, 
personal communication, September 4, 2014). Moreover, plans were put into place to 
increase the number o f faculty to 300 by 2020 (Pawlowski, 2013).
Since Trible increased significantly the size of CNU’s faculty during his tenure, 
he was able to bring in professors who already subscribed to his vision instead of having
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to focus entirely on converting pre-existing faculty who were entrenched in the old 
institutional culture (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3, 
2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). Moreover, long-serving 
CNU faculty members who were in some cases resistant to Trible’s vision retired and 
were replaced by these new hires. As Participant 2 (2014) asserted, “if you had only 
hired a couple of people, it wouldn’t have worked. But to double the faculty -  you’re 
going to be able to get a good body of people who subscribe to your vision.”
This point was supported by Participant 3 (2014), who noted, “with new faculty 
coming in, you can imprint that mission and that vision upon them because you’re hiring 
for that.” Ultimately, Trible was able to use his compelling vision for CNU’s future to 
forge a bond with much of the university’s faculty, which in turn helped to ease his 
transition into academic culture (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 2, personal communication, 
June 2,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, June 3,2014). He accomplished 
this through a combination of cultivating allies within CNU’s pre-existing faculty and 
through hiring new personnel who already subscribed to his vision (Hamilton, 2011; 
Participant 2, personal communication, June 2,2014; Participant 3, personal 
communication, June 3,2014). Thus, these data indicated that Trible’s CNU vision 
played a vital role in facilitating his adjustment to academe. By coming into the 
presidency with a specific plan for CNU’s future, he was gradually able to win the 
confidence o f many faculty members and find a common purpose with them.
Frustration. While Trible eventually forged a strong bond with CNU’s faculty 
by advancing a compelling institutional vision, other aspects of his adjustment to 
academic culture were not as smooth. Another central theme that appeared in the data
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was the frustration Trible experienced in trying to operate within the unique cultural 
dynamics o f academe (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,
2013). This theme was mentioned approximately 18 times during the seven interviews 
conducted for this study (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013; Participant 
1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 
3,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 5, personal 
communication, April 4,2012). Possessing a personal preference for quick, decisive 
action, Trible was often frustrated by multiple aspects of academic culture, ranging from 
shared governance to the typical slow decision-making pace (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). This presented a key challenge for him, especially in 
the early days of his tenure, which made his adjustment process to academic culture more 
difficult.
For Trible, several aspects of academic culture troubled him (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). For one, he believed that the faculty tradition of 
shared governance could be “good and very bad... it’s an invitation to endless discussion 
and debate, and often postpones action... sometimes indefinitely” (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). Further, Trible had great difficulty with the “glacial 
pace” of academic culture, noting that it can be a real obstacle to achieving great results 
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). According to Trible (2013), 
virtually any other type o f organization can move far more quickly and decisively. 
Another aspect of academic culture that frustrated Trible was that “academic cultures are 
highly resistant to change... institutionally they are very conservative [and] they want to 
embrace the status quo” (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). However,
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Trible also noted that to his surprise the CNU community largely embraced change 
during his tenure, which in his opinion was a key to the university’s revitalization (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Trible was also often frustrated in trying to get faculty members to look beyond 
their disciplines and departments and understand broader institutional needs (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15,2013). As he noted:
I have underscored the challenge of leadership in higher education -  
getting faculty to appreciate the strategic [perspective], because they 
are so focused on their individual research or scholarship, or on a 
subset o f their academic discipline. Now, that’s not something I dislike -  
it’s just a reality that one has to deal with (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013).
Overall, it took Trible quite some time to overcome these frustrations and learn how to 
understand the unique qualities of academic culture (P. Trible, personal communication, 
March 15,2013). Later in his presidential tenure, he learned how to work more 
effectively within that cultural dynamic, even though he still did not like all aspects of 
that environment (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately, 
Trible learned how to “survive the landscape and see opportunities and also identify 
minefields and avoid those” (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Trible’s frustration with academic culture was also discussed extensively by 
historians as well as by several participants in this study, allowing for effective data 
triangulation (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; 
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal
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communication, May 21,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012). 
Several participants noted that this frustration was a significant challenge for Trible in his 
early years as president, often leading to clashes with faculty on a variety of matters 
(Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, 
personal communication, June 3,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,
2014). Participant 1 (2014) noted that many aspects of academic culture bothered Trible, 
including its slow decision-making pace, the cumbersome process of faculty hiring and 
tenure review, and the tendency of faculty members to focus solely on their departments 
and disciplines.
Participant 2 (2014) supported that point, stressing that academic culture was 
initially like a foreign environment to Trible, which further exacerbated his frustration.
As Participant 2 (2014) noted:
I think coming from the political world - 1 mean, this ‘get it done’ 
mentality -  you know, that was like the first main clash. [In academic 
culture] you can’t just walk in and say, ‘ok, this is what we’re going to 
do,’ and then everybody just says, ‘ok, yes sir.’ So I think that was 
probably the first problem -  that was his [mistaken] perception. Yeah, and 
so I think that was the misconception -  that you could come in and 
everything would be fine.
Along those lines, other participants believed that Trible’s impatience was what primarily 
fueled his frustration with academic culture (Participant 3, personal communication, May 
21,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012). He believed that rapid 
and decisive action was needed to stabilize the troubled university, and such action was
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not always possible in an academic environment (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 3, personal 
communication, May 21, 2014). According to Participant 3 (2014), since some faculty 
members were resisting change early on, Trible grew frustrated and asked himself, “Why 
can’t everybody see this the way I see it? Why do I have to explain it so many times? 
Why do I have to convince people that this is the best thing for CNU?” As Participant 3 
(2014) also explained, “[Trible] was very impatient starting out, very impatient. And that 
did not bring out the best in him, quite frankly.” In this case, Trible’s adjustment to 
academic culture took time, and trial and error.
However, many participants also noted that Trible learned patience over the years, 
allowing him to better engage with academic culture (Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014; 
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014). As Participant 3 noted, “he’s still 
impatient, I mean -  he’s not totally cured, but that’s the driving force to move things 
forward.” Thus, while Trible’s frustration level with academic culture eventually 
decreased with time and experience, it still represented a formidable obstacle in his 
adjusting to academe. Moreover, this frustration may have derailed Trible’s presidency 
had it not been for other skillsets that he possessed and the maturity o f the university at 
the time. As CNU was quite young as an institution, Trible had a degree of flexibility 
there that may not have existed at older, more established institutions.
Adaptability. One of Trible’s skills -  adaptability -  represented another central 
theme that emerged from the data for this study. Throughout Trible’s presidential tenure, 
he made a concerted effort to understand and adapt to academic culture (Hamilton, 2011; 
P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Therefore, this effort has resulted
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in a broader perspective and has also been instrumental in his relationship-building with 
faculty (Hamilton, 2011; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
According to Trible (2013), “Over the years I have developed a much greater 
appreciation for the academy and for the ways of the academy. I think that my years here 
have made me just a bit more patient.” However, he also retained his expectations for 
decisive action and found ways to incorporate that into his interactions with faculty (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). Overall, this notion of adaptability 
was mentioned approximately 22 times in the seven interviews conducted for this study, 
and represented an important element of Trible’s academic adjustment experience (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication, 
March 30, 2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, 
personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9, 
2012; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012).
After a few years of trial and error, Trible was able to figure out a system of 
interaction with faculty that respected the traditions of academic culture while being 
receptive to his preference for decisive action and decision making (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). For instance, Trible came to respect the academic 
tradition of shared governance, but also established expectations that university 
committees could not deliberate endlessly on important matters (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). As Trible (2013) noted, “I more consciously 
endeavored to reach out and consult. But I have imposed on that process the expectation 
that decisions would be made, and that we would move forward” (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). Ultimately, Trible believed that a good leader could
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adapt to any situation or environment and achieve success (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). Thus, he considered it his responsibility to learn about 
this culture that had been so foreign to him and figure out how to best work with it (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
Historians and CNU officials also seconded these points and discussed 
extensively Trible’s willingness for adaptation, pointing out that his approach involved 
listening, consulting, and learning not only patience but an appreciation for faculty 
members and the work that they do (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal 
communication, March 30,2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; 
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014; Participant 4, personal 
communication, April 9,2012; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4,2012).
For instance, early in Trible’s tenure, many CNU officials were impressed by his 
eagerness to both learn and ask questions (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014). Specifically, Trible did not pretend to know everything 
about higher education and solicited guidance from many individuals (Hamilton, 2011; 
Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014). Reflecting on that period, one 
participant noted that “one of [Trible’s] greatest strengths as a leader is the recognition 
that he knows what he does not know” (Participant 4, personal communication, April 9, 
2012). Thus, Trible’s humble and information-seeking approach allowed him to cultivate 
many allies among CNU’s faculty and staff (Participant 1, personal communication, June
26,2014).
Some participants also noted that a more difficult adjustment for Trible involved 
learning to respect faculty members and the work that they do (Participant 1, personal
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communication, June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). 
According to Participant 1 (2014):
Trible originally had an outsider’s view of academic culture -  that faculty 
had a pretty easy life, that they only work eight or nine months a year, and 
they have a lot of freedom. But I don’t think he’s there anymore. 1 think 
he has come to really recognize and value the contribution of faculty -  
the intensity of the work, the sacrifice of the work they do, the hours that 
they give to students and to research... I think those are things that over 
the years he’s really learned to appreciate o f faculty.
Participant 2 (2014) supported this point, noting that Trible “had to learn to like faculty, 
and that was hard for him ... I think the idea that he didn’t have control and couldn’t 
control faculty - 1 think that was a hard adjustment.” According to Hamilton (2011), it 
took Trible some time to adapt his perspective in this area. Nevertheless, other 
participants were impressed by Trible’s ability to make this adjustment in attitude at all 
(Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal 
communication, May 21, 2014). As Participant 1 (2014) noted, “I’ve been kind of 
surprised, frankly, by how adaptable he has been. I think he has probably been surprised 
by how adaptable he has been.” Participant 3 (2014) supported this point, asserting that 
“as the college was learning and growing, I think [Trible] as president learned and grew 
along with it.” As these data indicated, Trible’s willingness to adapt his perspective and 
leadership approach was instrumental in facilitating his adjustment to academic culture.
Consensus-building. Along with adaptability, consensus-building was a 
leadership skill that Trible utilized extensively in order to adjust to academic culture (P.
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Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). On multiple occasions throughout 
Trible’s tenure, he organized groups consisting of faculty members and administrators to 
advise him on making important institutional decisions (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). While Trible made it clear that the university would 
not be ruled by a committee, he did appreciate the advantage in soliciting outside input 
and support for his initiatives (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). This 
tendency toward consensus-building represented another central theme that emerged 
from the data, and was cited approximately eight times in the interviews conducted for 
this study (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 2012; 
Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal 
communication, May 21, 2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9, 2012). 
Along with his willingness to learn and adapt, Trible’s preference for consensus-building 
was vital in facilitating his adjustment to academe.
Early in Trible’s presidential tenure, he realized that governance by consensus 
was an important aspect o f academic culture (P. Trible, personal communication, March 
15,2013). However, he feared that committees composed entirely o f faculty members 
would not be nimble enough to make decisions quickly and decisively (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15,2013). Therefore, he sought to modify the pre­
existing norm by altering the composition of certain university committees (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15, 2013). According to Trible (2013):
In regard to consultation, debate, and discussion, another way that we 
have refined a practice o f academic culture is that faculty want to have 
committees to investigate virtually everything that goes on. What we’ve
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done at CNU is that we have created committees composed of 
administrators and faculty at the same table... and we’re able to 
develop consensus and a shared notion of how we should proceed.
We have therefore become much more nimble. We’ve been able to 
very quickly pursue opportunities, very quickly resolve problems, 
and we’ve done it in a way that encouraged broad support.
A prominent example o f this has been CNU’s budget advisory committee, which has 
been in operation since 2002 (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). 
Comprised of senior faculty and administrators, Trible established this committee in 
order to give CNU’s faculty more involvement in the university’s budgetary process 
(Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). In the years since, the 
committee has evolved into an integral advisory body that provides faculty members a 
platform in which to dialogue with Trible and other administrators on important financial 
matters.
While Trible eventually came to appreciate the value o f utilizing committees in 
building consensus, he always emphasized that they would not supersede his decision­
making authority as president (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). 
Specifically, he was adamant about his singular responsibility in being the keeper o f the 
university’s vision, which he felt could not be delegated to a committee (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15, 2013). Instead, his approach in this area was to 
“consult, listen, and learn -  but then based on one’s own vision and values and all that 
one’s learned, develop quickly a game plan... and then communicate that game plan” (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013).
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Overall, Trible’s consensus-building approach involved his developing a 
university vision based in part on input from faculty and administrative colleagues (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). However, for it to be successful, 
Trible noted that it needed to be done in “such a way that people would then join forces 
and support and encourage the success of that enterprise” (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013). Ultimately, Trible learned over time that arbitrary 
presidential decisions would not always be well received by CNU’s academic community 
(P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). An infamous example of this 
occurred in 2002, when Trible sought to eliminate the institution’s nursing and education 
programs due to budgetary concerns (Hamilton, 2011). His unilateral decision was met 
with a firestorm of criticism from CNU faculty as well as concerned area residents 
(Hamilton, 2011). Following this incident, Trible sought to achieve his goals by seeking 
out faculty and administrative supporters who could help advance their shared agenda (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). This emphasis on consensus-building 
therefore earned Trible many allies within CNU’s professoriate.
Trible’s consensus-building approach, as well as the benefits it generated, was 
also discussed by historians as well as the participants in this study (Hamilton, 2011; 
Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 2012; Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014; 
Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). According to Hamilton (2011), 
Trible initially had a heavy-handed decision-making style that alarmed many faculty 
members. However, as Participant 1 (2012) noted, Trible’s decision-making style 
evolved as his tenure progressed, and he began to seek more input from a variety of
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university sources. Yet, Trible always maintained his expectation of decisive action in 
order to avoid what could sometimes be endless and unproductive faculty debate 
(Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012).
Further, a key to Trible’s evolution in consensus-building was to rely more 
heavily on the provost for guidance, which helped him to “buffer and improve the 
relationships with the faculty” (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014). 
There have been a handful of provosts over the course o f Trible’s 18-year tenure. 
According to Participant 3 (2014), the relationship that Trible has forged with the faculty 
senate has also been beneficial, noting that “it was second to none. It’s a lot of 
transparency and a lot of open communication.” Ultimately, these data indicated that 
despite some early setbacks, Trible was able to forge a bond with most of CNU’s faculty 
through increased use o f collaboration and consensus-building (Participant 1, personal 
communication, March 30,2012; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; 
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21,2014). Along with Trible’s willingness 
to adapt, this focus on consensus-building allowed him to build the faculty relationships 
necessary to acclimate effectively to academic culture.
Summary
Despite some initial challenges, Trible represented a non-traditional college 
president who adjusted successfully to academic culture. As the findings from this study 
concluded, Trible’s challenges and ultimate success stemmed from four central issues: he 
possessed a compelling presidential vision that aligned with CNU’s institutional needs; 
he found ways to overcome his initial frustration with academic culture; he had a 
willingness to learn and adapt to academic culture; and he had a unique ability for
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consensus-building that allowed him to forge relationships with many members of 
CNU’s academic community. In many ways, Trible learned from mistakes as he went 
and modified his approach accordingly. This willingness to adapt helped to facilitate his 
transition into academic culture, as faculty appreciated his efforts to learn and evolve.
Thus, Trible’s experience at CNU demonstrated that it is possible for non- 
traditional college presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture, even if  they 
encounter initial obstacles. It also indicated that non-traditional presidents do not always 
fall completely into the outlier categories of either successful or unsuccessful when it 
comes to their adaptation to academic culture. Conversely, Trible demonstrated that non- 
traditional presidents can sometimes have a difficult time engaging with academic culture 
initially, but can then learn from their mistakes and facilitate a better outcome over time. 
The next chapter will take a wider perspective on this issue, comparing and contrasting 
the adjustment experiences o f Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible. 
Along with examining implications for future research, it will also seek to draw lessons 
from the experiences o f each non-traditional president that can then be put into practice 
by future non-traditional presidents as well as the hiring boards that appoint them.
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Chapter 7 -  Analysis, Conclusions, and Implications for Future Research
As examined in previous chapters, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and 
Paul Trible each had unique experiences as president of their respective universities. 
These experiences were shaped by different situational dynamics as well as different 
professional backgrounds. Moreover, as the data demonstrated, Eisenhower, Sanford, 
and Trible implemented distinct approaches and strategies in attempting to leam the ways 
of the academy. Consequently, they each achieved varying degrees of success in 
adapting to academic culture. On the one hand, Eisenhower’s experience was very 
difficult and ultimately unsuccessful, while Sanford’s experience was nearly the opposite. 
While Sanford had to overcome some challenges during his tenure, his adjustment 
process was highly successful and he left Duke as a beloved academic leader. Of the 
three non-traditional presidents, Sanford was most effective in adapting to academic 
culture and proved to be a good fit for Duke’s organizational purposes. Trible’s 
experience fell somewhere in between. While his adjustment process was more difficult 
than Sanford’s, Trible was ultimately much more successful than Eisenhower in adjusting 
to academic culture. Ultimately, each of these case studies yielded important lessons 
about how non-traditional college presidents engage with and acclimate to the academic 
world.
As noted in earlier chapters, the purpose of this study was to explore the issues 
that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive 
what lessons could be learned to inform future practice. Another purpose of this study 
was to examine the perceptions that non-traditional presidents have of academic culture, 
and how those perceptions help or hinder their adjustment to academe. Chapters 4, 5, and
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6 focused on summarizing the findings from the case studies on Eisenhower, Sanford, 
and Trible. This chapter analyzes the findings as a whole, pointing out key similarities 
and differences in how each non-traditional president perceived and engaged with 
academic culture. Literature from Chapter 2 on academic culture and leadership are 
incorporated to provide a more thorough understanding of how Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible adjusted to their academic roles. The chapter also examines lessons that were 
learned from this study that can be o f use to presidential hiring boards as well as future 
non-traditional college presidents. The chapter concludes by exploring implications for 
future research in this area.
Analysis of Findings
After examining Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible’s academic culture adjustment 
experiences individually, it was useful to study them collectively in order to identify key 
themes and to note similarities and differences in their circumstances and approaches.
For instance, by endeavoring to glean perception and intention from the historical data, 
this cross-case comparison was helpful in analyzing how Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible perceived academic culture. A central finding from this study was that their 
perceptions o f academic culture varied widely. Ultimately, these divergent views 
produced a range of outcomes that either helped or hindered Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible’s adjustment process to academe. Further, the application of relevant scholarly 
literature on academic culture and leadership yielded several important insights that were 
useful in understanding the dynamics behind their adjustment experiences (Baldridge, et 
al., 1999; Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Bensimon, 1989; Bimbaum, 1988; Bimbaum & 
Umbach, 2001; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Bourdieu, 1985; Fullan, 2001; Heifetz, 1994;
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Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg, 1980; Randall & Coakley, 2007; 
Rotemberg, 1993). Ultimately, this cross-case comparison provides a broader 
perspective about patterns o f academic culture adjustment that may apply to all non- 
traditional college presidents.
Perceptions of academic culture. Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible differed 
significantly in their perceptions of academic culture, based on inferring their perceptions 
from the data. Ultimately, these views either helped or hindered them in their adjustment 
process to academe. Of the three non-traditional presidents, Eisenhower was the most 
intimidated by academic culture (Clark, 2013; McCaughey, 2003; Neal, 1978; Smith,
2012). Lacking a broad scholarly background or advanced graduate degrees, Eisenhower 
constantly felt inferior among Columbia’s erudite faculty (McCaughey, 2003). Further, 
as noted in Chapter 4, Eisenhower lacked the time, interest, or patience to learn how to 
engage effectively with Columbia’s faculty, and made little to no effort on that front 
(Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Smith, 2012). Consequently, the gulf widened between 
Eisenhower and Columbia’s academic community, which resulted in considerable faculty 
resentment toward Eisenhower (Smith, 2012). Thus, Eisenhower’s feelings of inferiority 
and intimidation among Columbia’s faculty played a key role in compromising his ability 
to adjust to academe effectively.
Among the three non-traditional presidents, Sanford had the most positive 
perception of academic culture, which was driven primarily by his strong professional 
interest in secondary and higher education (Covington & Ellis, 1999). He genuinely 
valued faculty service and demonstrated this commitment through providing the 
maximum amount o f funding possible to support faculty hiring and research at Duke
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(Egerton, 1973). As noted in Chapter 5, Sanford also kept up to date with faculty 
research and praised professors for their professional accomplishments (Sanford, 1977d). 
This support had a noticeable impact on Duke’s faculty, leading one professor to 
conclude that “you couldn’t ask for better circumstances” (Egerton, 1973, p. 31). As 
opposed to Eisenhower, Sanford’s positive perception of academic culture allowed him to 
gradually forge a bond with most of Duke’s faculty (Egerton, 1973). Further, this bond 
helped Sanford to endure some of the more challenging periods o f his administration, 
including the Vietnam War-era student protests and the controversy regarding the 
possible placement of the Nixon Presidential Library at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999). 
Thus, Sanford’s positive perception of academic culture played an integral role in his 
successful adjustment to academe.
As opposed to Eisenhower and Sanford, Trible initially had a negative perception 
of academic culture that gradually grew into a positive one (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; 
Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). Upon arriving at CNU, Trible had 
a fairly low opinion of faculty, subscribing to common stereotypes that they do not work 
that hard and are overpaid for what they do (Participant 2, personal communication, June
3,2014). Further, as noted in Chapter 6, Trible was critical of many of the cornerstones 
o f academic culture, including the tradition of shared governance and what he perceived 
to be its stubborn resistance to change (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,
2013). However, by consciously endeavoring to leam the ways o f the academy, Trible 
gradually began to appreciate the nuances of academic culture and value faculty work (P. 
Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication,
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June 26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). He accomplished 
this by forging bonds with several faculty members and striving to learn more about the 
work that they do (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014). Over time, 
Trible began to develop “a much greater appreciation for the academy” (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15,2013). This positive perception, forged by years of 
learning and relationship-building with faculty, proved integral in Trible’s adjustment 
process to academic culture. Overall, Sanford and Trible demonstrated that positive 
perceptions o f academic culture can help facilitate the adjustment o f non-traditional 
presidents to academe. Conversely, Eisenhower demonstrated that a negative or 
apprehensive perception of academic culture can contribute to significant adjustment 
problems for non-traditional presidents.
Leading as non-traditional presidents. The literature on non-traditional 
presidents provides a useful template to analyze the leadership approaches of 
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible at their respective institutions. According to the 
presidential paths model created by Bimbaum and Umbach (2001), the three presidents 
all most closely resembled “strangers,” to the academy, meaning none of them had ever 
held a formal position within a college setting (p. 206). However, Sanford represented a 
possible exception, in that he could arguably be classified as a “spanner,” or someone 
who had rotated in and out of higher education over time (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 
206). While Sanford had not held a full-time academic position prior to assuming Duke’s 
presidency, he had served on the governing boards of at least nine colleges or universities 
before beginning his presidential tenure (Jackson & John, 1969). Moreover, he had 
served for several years as board chairman for two of those institutions (Jackson & John,
175
1969). Consequently, he had a level o f exposure to academic culture that most non- 
traditional presidents, including Eisenhower and Trible did not have. However, all three 
were similar in that they did not have nearly the same level of academic experience that a 
traditional college president possessed. Thus, as “strangers,” academic culture was much 
more foreign to them than it would have been for their traditional president peers.
Further, according to Bimbaum and Umbach (2001), the academy tends to prefer 
presidents who have pursued scholarly endeavors prior to joining the administrative 
ranks. This preference therefore created an obstacle that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible 
would have had to overcome in order to gain legitimacy among faculty members. As the 
data from this study indicated, they each had varying levels of success in achieving that 
goal.
Another similarity that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible shared stemmed from the 
types of capital they possessed as non-traditional college presidents (Bourdieu, 1985). 
Using Bourdieu’s (1985) model for capital, each came into office with three distinct 
forms of capital. First, they all had economic capital, which refers to command over and 
distribution of economic resources, because they were all hired in part for their possible 
fundraising potential (Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Hamilton, 2011). Also, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible each had social capital, which 
refers to resources based on group membership, relationships, and networks of influence, 
as they all knew influential people who could benefit their respective universities 
(Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). They were 
each hired in part because of the large networks of supporters they possessed as high- 
profile public figures (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011).
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Specifically, each of their respective hiring boards wanted to tap into those networks for 
fundraising as well as friend-raising purposes (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Hamilton, 2011). Finally, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible all possessed symbolic 
capital, because they came from professional backgrounds that had brought them honor, 
prestige, and recognition (Ambrose, 1990; Bourdieu, 1985; Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Hamilton, 2011). In turn, each of their hiring boards wanted to draw upon that prestige in 
order to advance their respective institutions (Ambrose, 1990; Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Hamilton, 2011). Thus, it is important to consider what types of capital that Eisenhower, 
Sanford, and Trible possessed, as it provides important insights as to what made them 
attractive presidential candidates for their respective hiring boards.
However, a challenge they all shared as non-traditional presidents according to 
Bourdieu’s (1985) model was that from the perspective of faculty members, each of the 
presidents lacked cultural capital. According to Bourdieu (1985), cultural capital refers 
to forms of knowledge, skills, education, and advantages a person has, which gives them 
a higher status in society. While as educated professionals, Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible possessed cultural capital in a broad societal sense, they did not have as much 
within the higher education realm. Specifically, each had trouble in varying degrees 
gaining the acceptance of faculty members, who did not think they had backgrounds 
suitable for service as a college president (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; Covington & 
Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). As higher education most closely resembles Mintzberg’s 
(1980) model for professional bureaucracy, this challenge was highly significant since 
faculty comprise the academic organization’s operating core. Thus, in order to have any
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chance for success, a non-traditional president must gain the support of these academic 
professionals (Mintzberg, 1980).
For Sanford and Trible, they were eventually able to prove themselves through 
outreach and relationship-building to reluctant faculty and gain their acceptance 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; Participant 1, personal communication, June 
26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). However, Eisenhower 
was never able to forge such a bond with Columbia’s faculty (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 
2001). Ultimately, this played an integral role in explaining why Sanford and Trible were 
more successful in adjusting to academic culture than Eisenhower. Using Mintzberg’s 
(1980) model for professional bureaucracy as a reference, Sanford and Trible were 
eventually able to gain the support of faculty -  the operating core o f their respective 
institutions -  while Eisenhower was not.
An application of Bolman and Deal’s (1984) Four Frames Model revealed another 
similarity between Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. They each modelled the results of 
Bensimon’s (1989) study, which concluded that college presidents view the institutions 
they lead through multiple frames of reference. For instance, through his efforts to 
restructure Columbia’s administrative hierarchy and his fondness for ceremonial events, 
Eisenhower viewed his institution through at least the structural and symbolic frames 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). For Eisenhower, his tendency toward at least the 
structural frame, with its focus on hierarchy and rules, would make sense considering his 
military background (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Similarly, Sanford viewed 
Duke through at least the political, structural, and human resource frames, considering his 
efforts in fundraising, implementation o f new academic programs, and relationship
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building with faculty (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973).
Finally, Trible viewed CNU through at least the political and structural frames, 
considering his work in fundraising as well as in academic program development and 
administrative reorganization (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Hamilton, 2011). Further, one can 
argue that Trible also viewed CNU through the symbolic frame, evidenced by his focus 
on transforming the physical appearance of the campus (Bolman & Deal, 2013;
Hamilton, 2011). Thus, this analysis revealed that non-traditional presidents such as 
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible may view the institutions they lead through multiple 
frames, much in the same way as the traditional presidents examined in Bensimon’s 
(1989) study. Further, the ability to view institutions through multiple frames would be 
highly useful for non-traditional presidents, as it would allow them to understand the 
complex dynamics present within academic organizations. However, in reference to 
Heifetz’s (1994) model for adaptive leadership, developing this ability to view 
organizations through multiple frames would require a process of learning to which non- 
traditional presidents would have to fully commit. The data from this study concluded 
that Sanford and Trible were more open to this process of learning than Eisenhower, who 
never attempted to adapt to the ways o f the academy (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Engagement with academic culture. While there were some similarities in the 
ways that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible engaged with academic culture, there were 
also key differences that helped explain why they each achieved varying degrees of 
success. These differences became even more pronounced when compared with pertinent 
scholarly literature on leadership and academic culture (Baldridge et al., 1992; Beckhard 
& Pritchard, 1992; Bimbaum, 1988; Fullan, 2001; Heifetz, 1994; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg,
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1980; Rotemberg, 1993). For instance, they each had a different reaction to 
decentralization and goal ambiguity, which are two primary characteristics of academic 
culture (Baldridge et al., 1992; Lane, 1985). Coming from a military leadership 
background, Eisenhower could not comprehend goal ambiguity or the decentralized 
environment he found at Columbia (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, he made 
little to no effort to try to understand those perspectives since they were so foreign to him 
and he had neither the time nor patience to learn (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 
2001). Ultimately, this helped explain why Eisenhower’s transition to academic culture 
was so difficult (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, Sanford was more accustomed to decentralization and goal ambiguity 
because of his prior higher education exposure and his long tenure working in state 
government (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969; Sanford, 1974a). 
Sanford even maintained that his experience as Duke’s president in this area was similar 
to when he worked with politicians and bureaucrats as North Carolina’s governor 
(Sanford, 1974a). In certain respects, Sanford believed that state government was similar 
to the professional bureaucracy found within academic culture, since in his view both 
cultures contained highly trained specialists who had a certain degree of autonomy in 
their work (Mintzberg, 1980; Sanford, 1974a). Thus, Sanford was better equipped than 
Eisenhower to operate in such a decentralized and ambiguous decision-making 
environment, because he had spent several years prior to his presidency operating within 
a similar organizational culture (Sanford, 1974a).
For Trible, he also had a difficult time understanding decentralization and goal 
ambiguity since he personally favored prompt decision-making (Hamilton, 2011; P.
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Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). In many ways, this challenge 
stemmed from Trible’s strictly political and business-focused background and the fact 
that he assumed the presidency during the height of the neo-liberalism movement in 
American higher education (Hamilton, 2011; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).
Consequently, this focus on applying business practices to the academy compelled him to 
express concern regarding decentralization and goal ambiguity (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). However, unlike Eisenhower, Trible made a concerted 
effort to adjust to these tenants of academic culture and worked with faculty to find 
common ground when it came to setting institutional objectives (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). As the data indicated, this outreach to faculty was an 
important reason why he eventually adjusted to academic culture (P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013). Ultimately, the reactions that Eisenhower, Sanford, 
and Trible had to goal ambiguity and decentralization helped explain why they had such 
different adjustment experiences to academic culture.
Differences between academic and non-academic organizational cultures help 
reveal why Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible had different adjustment experiences in the 
early stages of their presidencies (Bimbaum, 1988; Lane, 1985; Mintzberg, 1980; 
Rotemberg, 1993). With the previously-mentioned exception of Sanford, each non- 
traditional president was more accustomed to more centralized, hierarchical forms of 
organization (Hamilton, 2011; Jacobs, 2001; Mintzberg, 1980; Sanford, 1974a). Thus, a 
key challenge for each was to acclimate to the professional bureaucracy found in higher 
education (Mintzberg, 1980). As Mintzberg (1980) noted, managers in this culture must 
have the support o f professional operators and be professionals themselves in order to
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maintain credibility and power. To varying degrees, this was difficult for Eisenhower, 
Sanford, and Trible because they were not academicians (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001; 
Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). Thus, they were compelled to earn legitimacy 
with faculty members in order to get anything accomplished (Bomstein, 2003).
Sanford and Trible were able to achieve legitimacy over time through relationship 
building and vision setting, but Eisenhower was not (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 
2011; Jacobs, 2001). Conversely, many Columbia professors did not respect Eisenhower 
and believed he was not suited to be the institution’s president (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 
2001). This helped explain why his adjustment experience was so difficult while 
Sanford’s and Trible’s were somewhat smoother. Overall, Eisenhower fell victim to one 
of Bomstein’s (2003) key threats to legitimacy: the lack of cultural fit (Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2001). Columbia’s faculty never accepted Eisenhower as an academic leader, 
and this severely compromised any chance he had for adaptation success (Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2001). Further, Eisenhower was guilty of another key threat to legitimacy: 
inattentiveness (Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Specifically, Columbia’s 
faculty did not think Eisenhower was a committed academic leader because he was 
constantly preoccupied with outside military and political obligations (Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2011).
Another significant issue centered on the differences between administrative 
authority and professional authority, and how those differences impacted the three non- 
traditional presidents examined in this study (Bimbaum, 1988). According to Bimbaum 
(1988), leaders from non-academic organizational cultures are more familiar with 
administrative authority, which is “predicated on the control and coordination of
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activities by superiors” (p. 10). Conversely, academic leaders operate in a professional 
authority environment, which is “is predicated on autonomy and individual knowledge” 
(Bimbaum, 1988, p. 10). Coming from a military administrative authority background, 
Eisenhower could not understand why his directives were not immediately followed by 
faculty members (Bimbaum, 1988; Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, he did not know how to 
operate within a professional authority-based environment. Thus, Eisenhower was 
unable to move away from an autocratic leadership approach toward the more collegial 
style to which faculty members were accustomed (Bimbaum, 1988; Jacobs, 2001; 
Rotemberg, 1993). To a lesser extent, Sanford and Trible also had challenges adjusting 
to a professional authority environment (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). 
However, their political backgrounds spent working with legislators and bureaucrats 
likely helped them to acclimate in a manner that was not possible for Eisenhower.
Sanford and Trible also presided at institutions that were smaller and less 
organizationally complex compared to Eisenhower. Thus, these factors also helped to 
explain why Sanford and Trible were ultimately more successful in acclimating to 
academic culture.
Implementing adaptive and change leadership. An examination of the 
adaptive and change leadership styles that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible employed as 
non-traditional presidents also helped to explain why their adjustment experiences varied. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Heifetz and Linsky (2002) proposed that leaders are confronted by 
two types of problems -  technical and adaptive. Technical problems are well defined 
with known solutions, and anyone with the right expertise and resources can solve them 
(Heifetz, 1994; Randall & Coakley, 2007). Conversely, adaptive problems are not well
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defined and consequently present no known solutions in advance (Heifetz, 1994; Randall 
& Coakley, 2007). Instead, it requires learning to formulate workable solutions (Heifetz,
1994). As accomplished leaders in their given professions, Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible were all highly proficient with technical problems. However, given the goal 
ambiguity present within academic culture, adaptive problems were also regularly present 
within that environment (Baldridge et al., 1999). For Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible, 
these adaptive problems ranged from trying to tackle complex budget problems to finding 
ways during their early tenures to inspire demoralized campus communities in the midst 
of crisis at their respective institutions. Given these circumstances, adaptive problems 
were more challenging for them to solve within their respective academic settings.
A key difference between Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible in this regard was in 
their willingness to learn. According to Beckhard and Pritchard (1992), any successful 
change or adaptation requires a conscious decision for the leader to transition to a 
learning mode. In this respect, there was a key difference between the manner in which 
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible approached adaptation to academic culture. In 
Eisenhower’s case, he was too frustrated by academic culture and too overextended 
professionally to engage in the self-direction o f learning necessary in andragogy 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001; Knowles, 1980; Merriam, 2001). In 
addition, Eisenhower was not willing or able to alter his military-centered frame of 
reference, which is a necessary step in transformative learning (Mezirow, 1996; Taylor, 
2008). Thus, his adaptation capability was severely compromised.
In Sanford’s case, he was the most familiar between the three non-traditional 
presidents with academic culture, so there was not the same sense of urgency for
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adaptation. However, through his humble and relational leadership approach, Sanford 
demonstrated that he had the ability to adapt if  needed (Covington & Ellis, 1999;
Egerton, 1973). Renowned for his personal charm and administrative skill, Sanford was 
a great believer in compromise and adaptation, arguing that “people have to be able to 
cross lines” (Egerton, 1973, p. 35). Thus, as per Mezirow’s (1996) transformative 
learning model, Sanford demonstrated an ability to change his frame of reference in order 
to understand faculty needs.
Overall, Trible demonstrated the greatest adaptation capability, expressing a 
willingness to learn and ask questions in order to better understand academic culture 
(Participant 1, personal communication, June 26, 2014; Participant 4, personal 
communication, April 9, 2012). This process of learning allowed him to transition from a 
negative perception of academic culture to one that was much more positive (P. Trible, 
personal communication, March 15,2013; Participant 1, personal communication, June 
26,2014; Participant 2, personal communication, June 3,2014). Thus, despite some 
difficult adjustment challenges, Trible was ultimately successful in learning how to work 
within academe. He overcame some initial clashes with faculty and was able to forge an 
effective working partnership with them that has culminated in a significant and highly 
publicized university transformation (Hamilton, 2011; Participant 3, personal 
communication, May 21, 2014). Overall, this willingness to learn proved to be a crucial 
indicator o f success or failure in examining how non-traditional college presidents 
adapted to academic culture.
The leadership qualities that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible demonstrated as 
college presidents also presented another important clue in evaluating their efficacy
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adjusting to academic culture. According to Fullan (2001), the qualities needed for 
effective change leadership include energy, enthusiasm, and hopefulness. However, each 
non-traditional president examined for this study varied when it came to possessing these 
traits. Preoccupied with outside political and military commitments, the data indicated 
that Eisenhower did not have the energy or enthusiasm to pursue his work at Columbia 
effectively (Ambrose, 1990; Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Eisenhower 
did seem to be hopeful for Columbia’s future, but his lack of a clear vision and general 
inattentiveness toward the institution precluded that optimism from mattering much 
(Bomstein, 2003; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, by possessing strong commitments to their presidential duties, 
Sanford and Trible demonstrated all of those qualities effectively (Covington & Ellis, 
1999; Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal 
communication, April 9,2012). They each pursued their duties at Duke and CNU with 
vigor and brought an enthusiasm to their respective institutions that eventually spread to 
students, faculty, staff, and alumni (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). 
Further, Sanford and Trible each offered compelling visions that came to inspire many 
members o f their institutional communities (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). 
Therefore, Sanford and Trible were in stronger positions than Eisenhower to overcome 
their initial adjustment challenges and become legitimate academic leaders.
Consequently, this variance in leadership style proved to be critical when determining 
who succeeded in adjusting to academic culture and who did not. What follows (See 
Table 4) is a chart comparing and contrasting the adaptive leadership styles ultimately
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employed by Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible based on Heifetz’s (1994) model for 
adaptive leadership.
Table 4 -  Adaptive Leadership Comparative Chart
Adaptive Leadership 
Step
Eisenhower Sanford Trible
1. Identify the 
adaptive 
challenge.
No Yes Yes
2. Keep the 
level of 
distress 
within a 
tolerable 
range for 
doing 
adaptive 
work.
No Yes Yes
3. Focus 
attention 
on ripening 
issues and 
not on 
stress- 
reducing 
distraction.
No Yes Yes
4. Give the 
work back 
to the 
people, but 
at a rate 
they can 
stand.
No Yes Yes
5. Protect 
voices of 
leadership 
without 
authority.
No Yes Yes
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Conclusions
Along with examining how non-traditional presidents perceive academic culture, 
a primary objective for this study was to identify what lessons could be learned by 
studying the adjustment experiences o f three non-traditional college presidents to 
academic culture. An examination of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul 
Trible revealed that some non-traditional presidents have been more successful than 
others in learning the ways of the academy. However, for the benefit of hiring boards as 
well as future non-traditional presidents, it was imperative to draw lessons from those 
experiences that could help inform future practice. What follows are four conclusions 
that were formulated after evaluating the issues behind Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible’s 
adjustment experiences. On one level, these conclusions should be of great importance 
for institutional hiring boards who are considering the appointment of a non-traditional 
president. Further, they would also be of use in guiding a new non-traditional president 
through the academic culture adjustment process. As there has been little empirical 
research on non-traditional presidents to date, these conclusions help inform our 
understanding of how they can most effectively engage with academic culture.
Vision. A central lesson from this study was that non-traditional college 
presidents need to have a clear and compelling institutional vision to help facilitate their 
transition into academic culture. While developing an institutional vision would also be 
expected of traditional presidents, it is particularly critical for non-traditional presidents 
as it helps to demonstrate their commitment to becoming legitimate academic leaders. A 
fundamental problem that Eisenhower faced was that he had no vision for Columbia upon 
assuming the presidency (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). He had only accepted the
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appointment reluctantly and had not given much thought to the university’s future 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). While Eisenhower intended to use the 
institution as a platform for his proposed civic engagement initiatives, he had no vision 
for Columbia itself (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Consequently, Columbia’s faculty 
gradually lost faith in Eisenhower as an academic leader and he lost whatever chance he 
had to forge a bond with them (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001).
Conversely, Sanford and Trible both had distinct institutional visions that they 
had created for their respective universities upon assuming the presidency (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). While Sanford and Trible later encouraged the refinement 
of those visions with their respective campus communities, the precarious nature of Duke 
and CNU at the beginning of their presidencies compelled them to enter office with 
distinct visions of their own creation (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011; 
Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014). Sanford and Trible each used 
these visions to build alliances with faculty members and administrators and identify 
common areas of interest and concern (Egerton, 1973; P. Trible, personal 
communication, March 15, 2013; Participant 1, personal communication, March 30, 
2012; Participant 3, personal communication, May 21, 2014).
Even if  there was initial faculty resistance to the visions, there was at least a 
comprehensive plan in place for each university’s future (Covington & Ellis, 1999; 
Hamilton 2011). In both cases, it also impressed many faculty members that a non- 
academic would take so much time and effort to understand academic culture and to 
develop a plan for their institution’s future (Egerton, 1973; Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014). It demonstrated to them that Sanford and Trible were
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very serious about their academic leadership work. Thus, faculty support for each 
president gradually grew as support for each vision began to take shape (Covington & 
Ellis, 1999; P. Trible, personal communication, March 15,2013). For Sanford and 
Trible, this support was integral in smoothing their transitions into academic culture.
Adaptability. Another important conclusion from this study was that non- 
traditional college presidents must be willing to adapt to the academic environment in 
order to acclimate successfully. As this study demonstrated, Eisenhower was not willing 
to adapt to academic culture for a variety of reasons. First, academe was entirely foreign 
to him and he did not understand it (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). Second, 
Eisenhower was intensely frustrated by the intricacies of academic culture and that 
frustration prevented him from acclimating effectively (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; 
Jacobs, 2001). Most importantly, because Eisenhower had so many outside professional 
commitments during his Columbia tenure, he lacked the time, energy, or patience to 
focus on learning academic culture (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). 
Ultimately, all of this conspired to compromise his relationships with faculty as well as 
his reputation as Columbia’s president.
Compared to Eisenhower, Sanford and Trible proved to be much more adaptable 
in regards to their engagement with academic culture. Emulating Heifetz’s (1994) 
framework for adaptive leadership, they both engaged in a process of learning that 
culminated in the ability to work effectively within academic culture. As previously 
noted, Sanford was arguably the best prepared of the three to engage with academic 
culture, thanks to his prior higher education experience and his gubernatorial tenure 
(Covington & Ellis, 1999; Sanford, 1974a). Nevertheless, Sanford still demonstrated
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adaptability by consulting extensively with Duke’s students and faculty members to learn 
their priorities, views, and concerns (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973). This 
interaction with Duke’s academic community provided Sanford the opportunity to see 
beyond his own perspective and adjust his views and priorities when needed. The 
knowledge obtained from these interactions also equipped Sanford to engage in the 
activities most associated with non-traditional presidents -  fundraising and friend-raising 
-  more effectively.
Trible followed a similar path by demonstrating a strong willingness to learn 
despite his frustration with aspects o f academic culture (Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014; Participant 4, personal communication, April 9,2012). 
He asked many questions during his early tenure and made a concerted effort to learn 
about faculty views and concerns (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26,
2014). This approach impressed many faculty members and made them more willing to 
work with Trible in an effort to find common ground. While traditional presidents could 
certainly engage in this outreach as well, members of CNU’s community found it 
reassuring that Trible made such effort to leam about the institution as an outsider with 
limited prior academic experience (Participant 1, personal communication, June 26, 
2014). Ultimately, this willingness to leam proved to be a vital component of Trible’s 
success in adjusting to academic culture. Therefore, adaptability played an integral role 
in determining the success or lack thereof that Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible achieved 
in adjusting to academic culture.
Commitment to institution. The third conclusion from this study was that in 
order for non-traditional presidents to adjust successfully to academic culture, they must
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demonstrate complete commitment to the institutions that they lead. Specifically, they 
must make the institution their number one priority over all other professional obligations 
and opportunities. While institutional commitment would also be an important trait for 
traditional presidents, it takes on an added sense of urgency for non-traditional presidents, 
who are often exposed to a wider array of professional opportunities. For instance, as 
noted in Chapter 5, Sanford passed up several political opportunities, including an 
ambassadorship and a prestigious position on the North Carolina Board of Education, in 
order to stay at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999). Such commitment demonstrated to 
those within Duke’s academic community that Sanford was focused on the university and 
that he genuinely wanted to be an academic leader (Egerton, 1973).
However, as this study concluded, Eisenhower did not demonstrate much 
commitment to Columbia as president (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). 
Although Eisenhower had good intentions he was too preoccupied with other obligations, 
namely important military and political matters, to give Columbia his full attention 
(Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). As noted in Chapter 4, Eisenhower 
recognized this and sorrowfully labeled himself an “absentee president” (Smith, 2012, p. 
496). Further, Eisenhower offered to either resign or shift to a more ceremonial role, but 
was prevented from doing so by Columbia’s board of trustees (Galambos, 1989a; Jacobs, 
2001). Consequently, this lack of commitment to Columbia eroded any confidence that 
faculty members had in Eisenhower and prevented him from acclimating to their culture.
Compared to Eisenhower, Sanford and Trible displayed much greater levels of 
commitment to their respective universities (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Hamilton, 2011). 
Although they both engaged in other professional activities during their tenures, Sanford
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and Trible always regarded their institutions as their top priorities and consistently 
demonstrated that through their actions (Covington & Ellis, 1999; Participant 1, personal 
communication, June 26,2014). For instance, although business and political leaders 
encouraged Trible to run for lieutenant governor o f Virginia in the 2005 election, he 
ultimately declined, stressing that “my first commitment is to CNU” (Scanlon, 2003, p.
1). In addition, Sanford ran for President o f the United States twice during his tenure, but 
always built his campaign schedule around his duties at Duke (Covington & Ellis, 1999). 
While that limited Sanford’s efficacy as a political candidate, he made it clear that 
serving at Duke was ultimately more important to him (Covington & Ellis, 1999).
In each case, this commitment gave Sanford and Trible a level of legitimacy as 
academic leaders that Eisenhower was never able to obtain. Since neither Sanford nor 
Trible were initially expected to stay in office very long, they each earned critical faculty 
support by demonstrating their commitment to remaining at Duke and CNU for 
significant tenures (Egerton, 1973; Hamilton, 2011). Ultimately, it was crucial to their 
adjustment experiences into academic culture to have the support and goodwill that this 
commitment generated from their respective university communities. As the data from 
this study indicated, for a new non-traditional college president to have any legitimacy 
with faculty, he or she must demonstrate their commitment to serving as an academic 
leader and not get preoccupied with too many non-academic endeavors.
Prior academic exposure. The final conclusion from this study was that prior 
exposure to higher education could possibly help non-traditional college presidents adjust 
more quickly and effectively to academic culture. This type of non-traditional president 
would most closely resemble the “spanner” included in Bimbaum and Umbach’s (2001)
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presidential pathways model (p. 206). While none o f the non-traditional presidents 
examined in this study had worked in academe prior to assuming their presidencies, some 
were more familiar with it than others. Of the three, Sanford had the most familiarity 
with academic culture by virtue of his prior college board of trustees service and his work 
in higher education as governor (Covington & Ellis, 1999; McKnight, 1969).
Conversely, Eisenhower had no previous connection to higher education beyond his cadet 
tenure at West Point (Ambrose, 1990; Jacobs, 2001). Thus, according to Bimbaum and 
Umbach’s (2001) model, Sanford most closely resembled a “spanner,” while Eisenhower 
most closely resembled a “stranger” (p. 206). Ultimately, this could help explain why 
Sanford’s academic culture adjustment process was much smoother and more successful 
than Eisenhower’s.
As noted in Chapter 6, Trible was situated somewhere in between Sanford and 
Eisenhower when it came to previous academic exposure. Beyond Trible’s tenure as a 
student, he had served briefly as a teaching fellow at Harvard and had been on CNU’s 
board of visitors for only a year before becoming its president (Hamilton, 2011). Thus, 
he had less familiarity with academe than Sanford, but had more than Eisenhower 
possessed. Consequently, that could be a factor in explaining why he fell somewhere in 
between the two when it came to adjusting to academic culture. Overall, the data from 
this study indicated that prior professional exposure to higher education could play a 
useful role in helping facilitate the transition of a non-traditional president to academic 
culture. However, more research in this area is needed to explore this dynamic further.
Conclusions summary. By examining the academic culture adjustment 
experiences o f Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible, this study yielded
194
some significant conclusions that will be of use to presidential hiring boards as well as 
aspiring non-traditional presidents. First, it is imperative for a non-traditional president 
to have a clear and compelling vision for the institution that he or she has been selected to 
lead. Such a vision communicates to faculty members that the individual is serious about 
becoming an effective academic leader. Second, a non-traditional president must be 
willing to adapt to academic culture by demonstrating a willingness to listen and learn. 
Specifically, even in an age of neoliberalism, non-traditional presidents must be able to 
keep an open mind when engaging academic culture and make an effort to understand 
faculty traditions and needs. As this study indicated, non-traditional presidents who react 
to academic culture with frustration or stubbornness will have a difficult time acclimating 
effectively. Third, a non-traditional president must demonstrate a strong commitment to 
his or her institution and not be preoccupied with other professional obligations or 
opportunities. This commitment demonstrates that the individual is serious about serving 
as an academic leader and is not merely using the office as a temporary assignment until 
something better comes along. Finally, this study indicated that prior higher education 
exposure could be useful for non-traditional presidents in helping them acclimate to 
academic culture.
Overall, the fundamental lesson from this study was determined by combining 
these four conclusions together. Taken as a whole, they ultimately equated to legitimacy 
with faculty, which is a non-traditional president’s “currency” (Participant 5, personal 
communication, April 4, 2012). This perspective is rooted in the notion that legitimacy is 
earned from constituents who are being served and led (Bomstein, 2003). For non- 
traditional college presidents to adapt successfully to academic culture, they must gain
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legitimacy with faculty members in order to survive (Bomstein, 2003; Participant 2, 
personal communication, June 3, 2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 
2012). Without legitimacy, a non-traditional president would be severely limited in his 
or her ability to engage effectively with academic culture (Participant 2, personal 
communication, June 3,2014; Participant 5, personal communication, April 4, 2012). 
Thus, this represents a key lesson that should be heeded by hiring committees as well as 
by new and aspiring non-traditional presidents.
Implications for Future Research
The purpose of this study was to explore the issues that non-traditional college 
presidents face in adjusting to academic culture and derive what lessons could be learned 
to inform future practice. Following a statement of the problem, a literature review, and 
an explanation of methodology, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focused on summarizing the 
findings from case studies on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Terry Sanford, and Paul Trible. 
Further, as the data presented in this chapter indicated, Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible 
demonstrated key similarities as well as differences in formulating an institutional vision, 
expressing willingness for adaptation, displaying a personal commitment to their 
respective universities, and possessing some degree of prior academic experience.
This study concluded that their degree of efficacy in adapting to academic culture 
was influenced by each of those four factors. Moreover, it also concluded that these 
factors ultimately equated to credibility with faculty, which a non-traditional president 
needs to earn in order to adapt successfully to academic culture. Overall, several lessons 
were drawn from these conclusions that could be of use to presidential hiring committees 
as well as new and aspiring non-traditional college presidents. Specifically, a non-
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traditional president must have a thoughtful and compelling institutional vision in order 
to generate support within the university’s academic community. He or she must also be 
willing to adapt, displaying to scholars a strong desire to learn and acclimate to the 
environment around them. A non-traditional president must also display a strong 
commitment to the institution, and not be preoccupied with other professional 
commitments. Finally, prior exposure to academic culture can be useful for non- 
traditional presidents in facilitating their adjustment to academe. Collectively, these 
lessons provided a starting point to help guide future non-traditional presidents in their 
transition into academic culture. They also provided a framework for hiring boards that 
could be used to help identify prospective non-traditional presidents who are best 
prepared to adjust successfully to academe.
This framework could include multiple recommendations for practice among 
hiring boards. For one, as this study concluded, non-traditional presidents with some 
degree of prior exposure to academe (such as Sanford) appear to be better equipped to 
acclimate to academic culture than those with no prior academic exposure. Hiring boards 
should seek out such “spanners” when possible over non-traditional candidates with no 
academic experience (Bimbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206). Further, hiring boards should 
conduct extensive background research to determine the level of commitment a non- 
traditional candidate has in making a transition to academic leadership. Specifically, 
hiring boards need to determine whether the candidate really wants to become an 
academic leader, or if  he or she is merely looking for a temporary assignment until the 
next opportunity in their professional field comes along. This would be particularly 
important with politicians, where there is always a question of whether or not they plan to
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run for office at any given time. To gauge this commitment level, hiring boards should 
question non-traditional candidates extensively on their knowledge of the institution they 
intend to lead. Further, hiring boards should compel non-traditional candidates to 
articulate their vision for the institution’s future. If a non-traditional candidate knows 
little about the institution and cannot articulate a thoughtful and compelling vision, those 
are likely signs that their commitment level is not where it needs to be. Ultimately, such 
strategies could help hiring boards distinguish between non-traditional candidates who 
could become effective academic leaders and those who could not.
While some useful insights on non-traditional presidents were discovered by 
examining Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible, the conclusions from this study also 
generated many questions that should be addressed in future research. Exploring these 
questions would help researchers better understand the unique dynamics surrounding 
non-traditional presidents beyond the realm of Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible. For 
instance, how much does institutional context account for in assessing the acclimation of 
non-traditional presidents to academic culture? Specifically, is it possible for a non- 
traditional president to acclimate to any higher education environment, or does it depend 
upon institutional context? In addition, would differences in gender or ethnicity among 
non-traditional presidents influence how they perceive and engage with academic 
culture? Further, what role does historical context play in this process o f acclimation to 
academic culture?
Also, how would “spanner” presidents (sometimes referred to as hybrid 
presidents), meaning those who possess academic as well as non-academic backgrounds, 
differ in their adjustment to academe compared to non-traditional presidents (Bimbaum
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& Umbach, 2001, p. 206)? Another key question is whether certain professions prepare 
non-traditional presidents for academe better than others. Specifically, would someone 
from a governmental background be better equipped to engage with academic culture 
than someone from a military background? Also, is there a way that presidential hiring 
boards can gauge the academic culture adjustment potential of a prospective non- 
traditional president? Further, if non-traditional presidents become the norm in higher 
education, what are the implications for academic culture? This section will examine 
these questions in greater depth and explore the implications they have for future higher 
education research.
Individual vs. context. This study examined the adjustment process of three 
non-traditional presidents in distinct institutional environments. Moreover, Eisenhower, 
Sanford, and Trible operated in unique historical contexts during their tenures. For each 
non-traditional president, these contexts presented different challenges and opportunities 
when it came to a pursuing acclimation to academe. As this study concluded, they 
ultimately achieved varying levels of success in adjusting to academic culture. However, 
the connection between individual leadership style and institutional context needs to be 
examined further. Future research should explore the extent to which institutional and 
historical contexts influence the acclimation process to academic culture for other non- 
traditional presidents. Looking beyond the experiences of Eisenhower, Sanford, and 
Trible, can other non-traditional presidents adjust successfully to academe in any kind of 
environment, or does it depend upon the institutional and historical contexts? Further, to 
what extent does institutional type influence the adjustment process? With the possible 
exception of Columbia, the institutional type of the universities in this study changed
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over time during the tenure of each non-traditional president, presenting another 
important consideration.
Data from this study provided an inconclusive response to these questions. As 
examined in Chapter 4, multiple historians noted Eisenhower’s initial desire to serve as 
president at a small, Midwestern liberal arts college (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Neal,
1978). Eisenhower believed that he could operate effectively as a college president in 
such an academic environment (Clark, 2013). However, as the data from this study 
indicated, Columbia University was far removed from that type of institution and proved 
to be too complex for Eisenhower to understand or lead effectively (Ambrose, 1990; 
Clark, 2013; Neal, 1978). Conversely, Sanford and Trible presided over smaller 
institutions that were less organizationally complex, which may have helped to ease their 
transitions into academe. What remains unknown is whether Eisenhower could have 
adjusted more effectively to academic culture in a smaller and less complex institutional 
environment. Further, it is difficult to ascertain whether Sanford and Trible would have 
had different adjustment experiences at larger institutions. This would all suggest that for 
non-traditional presidents, efficacy in adjusting to academic culture may be influenced by 
institutional type, as well as where the institution is in its life cycle.
However, another viewpoint that was expressed in this study is that effective 
leadership is universal (P. Trible, personal communication, March 15, 2013). According 
to Trible (2013), “a good leader can adapt to any situation and achieve success” (p. 8). 
Such sentiment challenges the notion that a non-traditional president such as Eisenhower 
could have fared better at an institution other than Columbia, or that he could have even 
been an effective academic leader in the first place. This would also suggest that a non-
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traditional president with strong leadership skills could overcome any kind of 
institutional challenge and engage successfully with academic culture. This 
inconsistency in the data reinforces the need for further research in this area. To 
understand fully the challenges that non-traditional presidents face in adjusting to 
academic culture, it is imperative that researchers achieve a better understanding of the 
role that institutional and historical context plays in this area. Specifically, does 
institutional or historical context drive the acclimation process to academic culture for 
non-traditional presidents, or is the process directed by the individual regardless of 
context? More research is needed to answer these questions more thoroughly.
Hybrid presidents. Another question that merits further investigation pertains to 
the emergence of hybrid college presidents. According to Basinger (2003) and Redden 
(2008), hybrid presidents are leaders who have spent their careers alternating between 
academic and non-academic positions. As noted earlier, they are very similar to the 
“spanner” president included in the Bimbaum and Umbach (2001) presidential pathways 
model (p. 206). Within higher education, hybrids are desirable as presidents because they 
combine a familiarity with academe with the benefits of non-traditional presidents -  most 
notably strong professional networks as well as fundraising prowess (Redden, 2008). 
Thus, they are often better prepared to engage with academic culture than a non- 
traditional president with no prior academic experience (Redden, 2008).
As this study concluded, the non-traditional president who was closest to being a 
hybrid (Sanford) was also the most successful in adjusting to academic culture. Sanford 
had served on multiple college boards of trustees prior to assuming Duke’s presidency 
and therefore came into office with greater confidence and awareness (Covington & Ellis,
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1999). Conversely, the non-traditional president who had the most difficult adjustment 
experience (Eisenhower) had the least prior experience with higher education.
Possessing no academic experience, Eisenhower came into office with a sense of 
uncertainty and intimidation when it came to dealing with faculty (Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 
2001). This raises the question of whether hybrid presidents may present an ideal 
solution to the leadership challenges facing higher education. However, what remains 
unknown is whether there would be enough hybrid presidents available to become a 
viable type o f higher education leader. In the future, efforts such as academic stints for 
mid-level leaders in business, government, and other related professions may be 
necessary in order to groom future hybrid presidents. Ultimately, it is currently unclear 
whether hybrid presidents could be a wave of the future or simply an occasional anomaly 
at certain colleges and universities.
More research on hybrid presidents is urgently needed in order to gauge their 
potential efficacy as academic leaders. Little empirical research exists for them and there 
are still many unanswered questions about their viability as educational leaders. For 
instance, do all hybrid presidents generally adjust to academic culture successfully, or 
does their acclimation also depend upon individual or contextual factors? It would be 
useful to study hybrid presidents who had troubled presidencies to compare them to those 
who were more successful and derive lessons. Further, most existing literature on hybrid 
presidents has presented them in a favorable light (Basinger, 2003; Redden, 2008). 
Therefore, it would be advantageous to examine whether there are any potential 
disadvantages to utilizing hybrid presidents. A cross-case analysis case study examining 
multiple hybrid presidents would be useful in addressing such questions. In addition, it
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would be useful to study faculty perceptions of hybrid presidents to determine whether 
they are perceived differently than non-traditional presidents. For instance, would faculty 
view hybrids as being more legitimate as academic leaders than non-traditional presidents 
with no prior academic experience? Overall, there are currently more questions 
pertaining to hybrid presidents than there are answers. As the college presidency 
continues to evolve, they are a type of educational leader that needs more focused 
examination.
Differences in professions. Another question generated from this study 
concerns whether certain professions prepare future non-traditional presidents more 
effectively for academic culture than others. According to ACE’s The American College 
President (2012), non-traditional college presidents come from a variety o f professional 
backgrounds, including K-12 education, business, religion, government, law, the military, 
medicine, and the non-profit sector. However, what remains unknown is whether some 
of these professions prepare non-traditional presidents for academe better than others.
For instance, would a non-traditional president with a government background be better 
equipped to transition to academe than a non-traditional president with a business 
background? Little is known about this question and more research is needed to explore 
it further.
However, this study provided some insights that could be examined in greater 
depth by future researchers. For instance, it concluded that Eisenhower’s military 
background -  much of it accumulated during wartime - did not prepare him to adjust 
successfully to academic culture (Ambrose, 1990; Clark, 2013; Jacobs, 2001). 
Specifically, the autocratic approach to leadership that he learned in the military was not
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effective within an academic culture environment (Bimbaum, 1988). Moreover, 
Eisenhower did not know how to operate within an organizational culture that is 
characterized by goal ambiguity and decentralization (Baldridge et al., 1999; Lane,
1985). Consequently, this lack of organizational knowledge produced a significant 
disadvantage for Eisenhower and his efforts at Columbia.
Conversely, this study concluded that Sanford and Trible were better prepared to 
acclimate to academic culture because of their backgrounds in government. As a former 
governor, Sanford in particular was well equipped to engage with academe because he 
was accustomed to working with professional bureaucrats, who in his opinion were 
similar to tenured faculty members, in a complex governmental organization (Covington 
& Ellis, 1999; Egerton, 1973; McKnight, 1969; Sanford, 1974a). This sentiment was 
supported by another non-traditional president during an October 2013 William & Mary 
School of Education forum on higher education policy and leadership. At this event, 
former U.S. Secretary o f Defense Robert M. Gates, a former president of Texas A&M 
University as well as William & Mary’s current chancellor, noted that tenured officials 
can be found in other public sector venues beyond academe (R. Gates, personal 
communication, October 25,2013). Thus, this experience gave Sanford a significant 
advantage when it came to transitioning to academic culture.
While Trible did not have gubernatorial experience like Sanford, his legislative 
background was useful in preparing him to find common ground with multiple 
constituency groups. This proved to be useful when he had to cultivate relationships with 
faculty members to advance his vision for CNU. However, the experiences of 
Eisenhower, Sanford, and Trible in this area represent only a limited perspective onto
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what is a broad and complex issue. More research is needed to determine whether these 
findings were anomalies or representative of most non-traditional college presidents 
across multiple professions.
Lessons for hiring boards. This study concluded that four factors that 
determined successful adjustment to academic culture for non-traditional presidents were 
the possession of an institutional vision, adaptability, the possession of institutional 
commitment, and the possession of prior academic experience. Moreover, a central goal 
for this study was to provide guidance for hiring boards that were considering the 
appointment o f non-traditional presidents to lead their institutions. However, further 
research is needed to determine how hiring boards can develop practical methods to 
apply the conclusions from this study and future studies on this topic. Specifically, is it 
possible to develop ways to identify potential non-traditional presidents who can adjust 
successfully to academe versus those who cannot? This would assume that it is possible 
to identify in advance whether or not a potential non-traditional president possesses such 
things as institutional vision and commitment. Moreover, would it be possible to 
implement such methods, which could include interviews or surveys, during the hiring 
process to ensure that potentially troublesome non-traditional presidents would not be 
appointed? More research in these areas is urgently needed as non-traditional presidents 
are becoming a more common sight across the higher education landscape.
As indicated in this study, a non-traditional president who is ill equipped to 
acclimate to academic culture can cause significant problems for his or her institution. 
This was evident with Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had such a difficult presidency at 
Columbia that it left a legacy of bitterness within that institutional community that lasted
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for many years after his departure (Jacobs, 2001). Therefore, it is in the best interest of 
the higher education community to find ways to help non-traditional presidents succeed 
instead of allowing them to fail. One way may be to develop resources for hiring boards 
to use in identifying non-traditional presidents who hold potential for transitioning to 
academe versus those who do not. While this study provided some general lessons for 
further reflection, more research is needed in this area to develop tangible strategies for 
hiring boards to implement.
In a similar vein, more research is needed regarding the influence o f boards of 
trustees on the hiring o f non-traditional presidents. As previously noted, modem colleges 
and universities are increasingly limited by insufficient resources, greater calls for 
scrutiny and accountability, and a highly competitive marketplace (Statement on Board 
Responsibility for Institutional Governance, 2010). In the cases of Eisenhower, Sanford, 
and Trible, these challenges compelled their hiring boards to select them against the 
preferences of each institution’s academic community, who would have preferred more 
traditional, academic candidates. More recently, the aforementioned hiring of veteran 
Florida state legislator John E. Thrasher as president of Florida State University caused 
considerable tension between the FSU board and FSU’s academic community, which 
wanted an academic at the helm (Schmidt, 2014). It is likely that this tension between 
boards of trustees and academics will become only more acute in the future. Thus, the 
role of boards of trustees in the hiring of non-traditional presidents presents a 
confounding factor that merits further research.
Non-traditional presidents as the norm. A final set of questions arises when 
considering the future prospects for non-traditional college presidents and their
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relationship with academic culture. For several generations at America’s colleges and 
universities, non-traditional presidents were an exception rather than the rule. 
Consequently, many academics viewed them as an occasional curiosity and nothing 
more. However, non-traditional presidents have become more common in the modem 
era, constituting over 20% of presidents serving across all institutional types in 2011 (The 
American College President, 2012). As the numbers of non-traditional presidents 
continue to grow, it raises the question of what impact they will have on academic culture 
in the years ahead. For instance, if non-traditional presidents someday become a majority 
among all serving presidents, will that force academic culture to further evolve?
Some scholars have already begun to consider that question. While academic 
culture has a long and distinguished tradition in Western civilization, many scholars have 
argued that its long-term survival is under threat (Beck & Young, 2005; Dill, 1982; Rice, 
1999; Rowland, 2002; Williams, 2008). As noted in Chapter 2, Beck and Young (2005) 
identified the modem primary threats as the increased calls for greater professionalism, 
productivity, and managerial oversight coming from non-academic authorities. Further, 
Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) noted the rise of academic capitalism, where academic 
culture is being compelled to take on an increasing number o f market-like behaviors. 
Conversely, Bastedo (2012) concluded that non-academic organizations are actually 
taking on characteristics found traditionally within academe. Ultimately, more research 
is needed to examine how and if  academic culture is evolving in the modem era. 
Moreover, research is also needed to examine whether the gradual increase of non- 
traditional presidents is having a noticeable impact on the evolution of academic culture. 
What remains unknown is whether in the future non-traditional presidents will have a
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greater influence on academic culture, or whether academic culture will have a greater 
influence on non-traditional presidents. As non-traditional presidents are becoming more 
common, it is imperative that more research be conducted on that topic.
Summary
This study analyzed the experiences o f three non-traditional presidents and 
concluded that successful adjustment to academic culture involved possessing an 
institutional vision, adaptability, possessing institutional commitment, and possessing 
some degree of prior academic exposure. Further, this study concluded that a non- 
traditional president must gain legitimacy with faculty in order to have a successful 
adjustment experience to academe. Ultimately, these findings will help hiring boards as 
well as new and aspiring non-traditional presidents better understand the unique 
dynamics of acclimating to academic culture from a non-academic background.
However, as the ranks o f non-traditional presidents are growing steadily in 
American higher education, it is imperative that greater scholarly attention is placed upon 
them. Building upon this study, more focused research is needed to determine what 
issues they face in adjusting to academic culture. As the rising number of non-traditional 
presidents is beginning to generate significant potential for a culture clash between the 
worlds of academic and non-academic culture, this issue needs to be studied further in 
order to provide current and future non-traditional presidents the information they need to 
succeed in adjusting to academe. Only then can this new breed of educational leader that 
is looked to increasingly for leadership be in a position to help guide America’s colleges 
and universities into the future.
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Appendices 
Appendix A -  Interviewee List
1) The Honorable Paul S. Trible, Jr. -  President, CNU (1996-present)
2) Participant 1 -  Senior Administrator, CNU (25+ years of service)
3) Participant 2 -  Senior Faculty Member, CNU (25+ years of service)
4) Participant 3 -  Senior Administrator, CNU (20+ years of service)
5) Participant 4 -  Senior Administrator, CNU (10+ years of service)
6) Participant 5 -  Senior Administrator, CNU (15+ years of service)
233
Appendix B -  Search Plan for Archival Research
Search Plan for Archival Research at Duke University:
Step 1 -  Obtain inventories o f records and papers of Terry Sanford at Duke University.
Step 2 -  Review these inventories and identify the specific materials that will most likely 
have information pertaining to Sanford’s experiences with academic culture (i.e. personal 
notes, letters, diary entries, newspaper articles)
Step 3 -  Share this information with the historical research expert on my dissertation 
committee (Dr. Eddie Cole) and obtain his feedback, guidance, and suggestions.
Step 4 -  Send emails to the head of special collections at Duke University’s library that 
explain my dissertation project and solicit their feedback, guidance, and suggestions.
Step 5 -  Schedule research trip and make appointments at the appropriate library 
departments at Duke University.
Step 6 -  Visit those departments and conduct archival research.
Step 7 -  Collect data and complete regular field journal entries.
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Appendix C -  Interview Protocols
1) Interview Protocol for Paul Trible
Project: Culture Clash: A Case Study of the Issues that Non-Traditional College 
Presidents Face in Adjusting to Academic Culture
Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer: Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate -  The College o f William and Mary) 
Interviewee:
Position of Interviewee:
[Describe here the project, telling the interviewee about (a) the purpose of the study, (b) 
the individuals and sources of data being collected, and (c) how long the interview will 
take].
[Have the interviewee read and sign the consent form].
[Turn on the tape/digital recorder and test it].
Questions
1) How would you define a non-traditional college president? Please add specific 
examples to illustrate this definition.
2) How would you define academic culture? Please add specific examples to 
illustrate this definition.
3) In what ways do you find academic culture unique compared to other 
organizational cultures? (Probes -  How does this differ from your experience in 
the private sector? How does this differ from government?)
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4) In what ways is academic culture similar to non-academic cultures, such as those 
found in the business, military, and government realms? Please give examples to 
illustrate how the culture is similar.
5) At the beginning of your presidency, what was your perception of academic 
culture? Has that perception changed over the years? Please offer examples to 
illustrate. (Probes -  What are some of your earliest memories when becoming 
president of CNU? Was there a specific critical incident?)
6) What (if any) issues have you faced in adjusting to academic culture? Can you, as 
the president of the university, actually adjust or impact the academic culture? If 
yes, can you offer examples to illustrate?
7) Are there aspects of academic culture that you have grown to like? If so, what are 
they?
8) Are there any particular aspects of academic culture that you dislike? If so, what 
are they?
9) What suggestions would you give to a new non-traditional college president about 
how to best adapt to academic culture?
[Thank the individual for his cooperation and participation in this interview. Assure him 
that he will see the final research product and of the potential for future interviews].
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2) Interview Protocol for Senior CNU Administrative/Faculty Leaders
Project: Culture Clash: A Case Study of the Issues that Non-Traditional College 
Presidents Face in Adjusting to Academic Culture
Time of Interview:
Date:
Place:
Interviewer: Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate -  The College of William and Mary) 
Interviewee:
Position of Interviewee:
[Describe here the project, telling the interviewee about (a) the purpose of the study, (b) 
the individuals and sources of data being collected, and (c) how long the interview will 
take].
[Have the interviewee read and sign the consent form].
[Turn on the tape/digital recorder and test it].
Questions
1) How would you define a non-traditional college president? Please add specific 
examples to illustrate this definition.
2) How would you define academic culture? Please add specific examples to 
illustrate this definition.
3) In what ways do you find academic culture unique compared to other 
organizational cultures?
4) In what ways is academic culture similar to non-academic cultures, such as those 
found in the business, military, and government realms? Please give examples to 
illustrate how the culture is similar.
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5) At the beginning of Paul Trible’s presidency, what was his perception of 
academic culture? Has that perception changed over the years? Please offer 
examples to illustrate. (Probes -  What were your first impressions of President 
Trible? Describe one of your first interactions with him. Was there a critical 
incident?
6) What (if any) issues have President Trible faced in adjusting to academic culture? 
Can he, as the president of the university, actually adjust or impact the academic 
culture? If yes, can you offer examples to illustrate?
7) Based on your observations, are there aspects of academic culture that President 
Trible has grown to like? If so, what are they?
8) Based on your observations, re there any particular aspects of academic culture 
that President Trible dislikes? If so, what are they?
9) What suggestions would you give to a new non-traditional college president about 
how to best adapt to academic culture?
[Thank the individual for his/her cooperation and participation in this interview. Assure 
him/her that he/she will see the final research product and of the potential for future 
interviews].
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Appendix D -  Consent Form
Title - Culture Clash: A Case Study of the Issues that Non-Traditional College Presidents Face in Adjusting to 
Academic Culture
Principal Investigator -  Sean M. Heuvel (PhD candidate, The College of William and Mary)
Co-Principal Investigators -  Dr. Pamela Eddv. Dr. Monica Griffin, and Dr. Eddie Cole (The College of William 
and Marv)
To:
The following information is provided to help you decide whether you wish to participate in the present 
study. You should be aware that you are tree to decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without facing any 
sort o f negative repercussion.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the issues that non-traditional college presidents face in adjusting to 
academic culture. A case study approach will be used to explore how they adapted to academic culture during their 
presidential tenures.
Data will be collected by conducting an interview with you and other participants. You will be asked nine 
questions, along with some follow-up questions in certain cases. The responses to these questions will comprise part of 
the data collected for this study. The rest o f the data will come from archival research and document analysis.
Do not hesitate to ask questions about the study before participating or during the study. The findings of this 
study will be shared with you upon the project’s completion. Your involvement in the study will be considered 
confidential and your name will not be included in the final document. Moreover, only the principal investigator will 
know the true identity of all participants. In the event that the researchers plan to publish the findings or present them 
in an academic or public setting, your permission will be obtained in advance.
There are no known risks and/or discomforts associated with this study. The expected benefit associated with 
your participation is the advancement o f scholarly knowledge concerning college presidents who come from 
professional backgrounds outside o f higher education and how they adapt to academic culture.
Please sign this consent form. You are signing it with full knowledge of the nature and purpose of the 
procedures. A copy of this form will be given to you to keep.
Signature Date
[ ] 1 agree to have this interview recorded.
NOTE. THIS PROJECT WAS FOUND TO COMPLY WITH APPROPRIATE ETHICAL STANDARDS 
AND WAS EXEMPTED FROM THE NEED FOR FORMAL REVIEW BY THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND 
MARY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE (Phone 757-221-39661 ON 2014-01-10 AND 
EXPIRES ON 2015-01-10.
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Appendix E -  List of Preliminary Codes
1) Dwight D. Eisenhower:
Frustration over political expectations/military service -  43 references
Vision non consistent with Columbia’s institutional needs -  37 references
Overextended -  30 references
Attachment to Columbia -  20 references
Focus on administrative reorganization -  18 references
Lack of knowledge about Columbia/academic culture -  14 references
Hands-off approach to governance -  13 references
Frustration with academic culture -  10 references
Consideration of resignation -  10 references
Utilizing military governance style -  3 references
Defending Columbia faculty during Red Scare -  2 references
Concern for private colleges and universities -  1
2) Terry Sanford:
Relational approach: 20 references 
Compelling vision for Duke: 16 references 
Firmness/very direct communication style: 11 references 
Strong commitment to Duke: 8 references 
Solicits outside input: 7 references 
Folksy/humorous approach: 4 references 
Prior academic exposure: 3 references 
Comfortable with change: 2 references 
Promotes diffusion of power: 1 reference
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3) Paul Trible: 
Compelling vision for CNU: 38 references 
Adaptability: 22 references 
Frustration with academic culture: 18 references 
Determination: 9 references 
Consensus-building: 8 references 
Strong commitment to CNU: 1 reference 
Prior academic exposure: 1 reference
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